Subject:  IRWIN v. VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, Syllabus



 
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as
is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is
issued.  The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but
has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
reader.  See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


Syllabus



IRWIN v. VETERANS ADMINISTRATION et al.


certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit

No. 89-5867.  Argued October 1, 1990 -- Decided December 3, 1990

Petitioner Irwin filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), claiming that he had been unlawfully fired by respondent
Veterans Administration on the basis of his race and disability.  The EEOC
dismissed the complaint on March 19, 1987, mailing copies of a right-to-sue
letter to both Irwin and his attorney.  Irwin received the letter on April
7.  His attorney received actual notice of the letter on April 10, having
been out of the country when it was delivered to his office on March 23.
Forty-four days after his attorney's office received the letter and
twenty-nine days after Irwin received his copy, he filed an action in the
District Court, alleging, inter alia, a violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.  The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
on the ground that the complaint was not filed within the time specified by
42 U. S. C. MDRV 2000e-16(c), which provides that a complaint against the
Federal Government must be filed within 30 days "of receipt of notice of
final action taken" by the EEOC.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that a notice of final action is "received" when the EEOC delivers its
notice to a claimant or his attorney's offices, whichever comes first, and
that the 30-day span operates as an absolute jurisdictional limit.

Held:

    1. Irwin's complaint was untimely.  Section 2000e-16(c) requires that
the EEOC's letter be "received" but does not specify that receipt must be
by the claimant rather than by his representative.  Congress may depart
from the common and established practice of providing notification through
counsel only if it does so expressly.  Irwin's argument that there is a
material difference between receipt by an attorney and receipt by his
office for purposes of MDRV 2000e-16(c) is rejected.  Lower courts have
consistently held that notice to an attorney's office which is acknowledged
by a representative of that office qualifies as notice to the client, and
the practical effect of a contrary rule would be to create uncertainty by
encouraging factual disputes about when actual notice was received.  Pp.
3-4.

    2. Statutes of limitations in actions against the Government are
subject to the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable
to suits against private defendants.  Applying the same rule amounts to
little, if any, broadening of a congressional waiver of sovereign immunity.
Pp. 4-6.

    3. Irwin's failure to file may not be excused under equitable tolling
principles.  Federal courts have typically extended equitable relief only
sparingly in suits against private litigants, allowing tolling where the
claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective
pleading or where he has been induced or tricked by his adversary's
misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.  Such equitable
tolling principles do not extend to Irwin's claim that his untimely filing
should be excused because his attorney was out of the office when the
notice was received and he filed within 30 days of the date he personally
received notice, which is at best a garden variety claim of excusable
neglect.  Pp. 6-7.

874 F. 2d 1092, affirmed.

Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Blackmun,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined.  White, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Marshall, J.,
joined.  Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part.  Souter, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
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Subject: 89-5867 -- OPINION, IRWIN v. VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

 


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-5867



SHIRLEY W. IRWIN, PETITIONER v. VETERANS ADMINISTRATION et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth
circuit

[December 3, 1990]



    Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
    In April 1986, petitioner, Shirley Irwin, was fired from his job by
respondent Veteran's Administration (VA).  Irwin contacted an Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) counselor and filed a complaint
with the EEOC, alleging that the VA had unlawfully discharged him on the
basis of his race and physical disability.  The EEOC dismissed Irwin's
complaint by a letter dated March 19, 1987.  The letter, which was sent to
both Irwin and his attorney, expressly informed them that Irwin had the
right to file a civil action under Title VII, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42
U. S. C. MDRV 2000e et seq., within 30 days of receipt of the EEOC notice.
According to Irwin, he did not receive the EEOC's letter until April 7,
1987, and the letter to his attorney arrived at the attorney's office on
March 23, 1987, while the attorney was out of the country.  The attorney
did not learn of the EEOC's action until his return on April 10, 1987.
    Irwin filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas on May 6, 1987, 44 days after the EEOC notice was
received at his attorney's office, but 29 days after the date on which he
claimed he received the letter.  The complaint alleged that the VA
discriminated against him because of his race, age, and handicap, in
violation of 42 U. S. C. MDRV 2000e et seq., 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29
U. S. C. MDRV 621 et seq., 87 Stat. 390, as amended, 29 U. S. C. MDRV 791
et seq., and the First and Fifth Amendments.  Respondent VA moved to
dismiss, asserting, inter alia, that the District Court lacked jurisdiction
because the complaint was not filed within 30 days of the EEOC's decision
as specified in 42 U. S. C. MDRV 2000e-16(c).  The District Court granted
the motion.
    The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.  874 F. 2d 1092
(1989).  The court held that the 30-day period begins to run on the date
that the EEOC right-to-sue letter is delivered to the offices of formally
designated counsel or to the claimant, even if counsel himself did not
actually receive notice until later.  Id., at 1094.  The Court of Appeals
further determined that the 30-day span allotted under MDRV 2000e16(c)
operates as an absolute jurisdictional limit.  Id., at 1095.  Accordingly,
it reasoned that the District Court could not excuse Irwin's late filing
because federal courts lacked jurisdiction over his untimely claim.  Ibid.
That holding is in direct conflict with the decisions of four other Courts
of Appeals. {1}
    We granted certiorari to determine when the 30-day period under MDRV
2000e-16(c) begins to run and to resolve the Circuit conflict over whether
late-filed claims are jurisdictionally barred.
    Section 2000e-16(c) provides that an employment discrimi nation
complaint against the Federal Government under Title VII must be filed
"[w]ithin thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken" by the
EEOC.  The Court of Appeals determined that a notice of final action is
"received" when the EEOC delivers its notice to a claimant or the
claimant's attorney, whichever comes first.  Id., at 1094.  Petitioner
argues that the clock does not begin until the claimant himself has notice
of his right to sue.
    We conclude that Irwin's complaint filed in the District Court was
untimely.  As the Court of Appeals observed, MDRV 2000e-16(c) requires only
that the EEOC notification letter be "received"; it does not specify
receipt by the claimant rather than by the claimant's designated
representative.  There is no question but that petitioner appeared by his
attorney in the EEOC proceeding.  Under our system of representative
litigation, "each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and
is considered to have `notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged
upon the attorney.' "  Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 634 (1962)
(quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U. S. 320, 326 (1880)).  Congress has endorsed
this sensible practice in the analogous provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provide that "[w]henever under these rules service
is required or per mitted to be made upon a party represented by an
attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon
the party is ordered by the court."  Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5(b).  To read
the term "receipt" to mean only "actual receipt by the claimant" would
render the practice of notifi cation through counsel a meaningless
exercise.  If Congress intends to depart from the common and established
practice of providing notification through counsel, it must do so
expressly.  See Decker v. Anheuser-Busch, 632 F. 2d 1221, 1224 (CA5 1980).
    We also reject Irwin's contention that there is a material difference
between receipt by an attorney and receipt by that attorney's office for
purposes of MDRV 2000e-16(c).  The lower federal courts have consistently
held that notice to an attorney's office which is acknowledged by a
representative of that office qualifies as notice to the client.  See
Ringgold v. National Maintenance Corp., 796 F. 2d 769 (CA5 1986);
Josiah-Faeduwor v. Communications Satellite Corp., 251 U. S. App. D. C.
346, 785 F. 2d 344 (1986).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b) also
permits notice to a litigant to be made by delivery of papers to the
litigant's attorney's office.  The practical effect of a contrary rule
would be to encourage factual disputes about when actual notice was
received, and thereby create uncertainty in an area of the law where
certainty is much to be desired.
    The fact that petitioner did not strictly comply with MDRV
2000e-16(c)'s filing deadline does not, however, end our inquiry.
Petitioner contends that even if he failed to timely file, his error may be
excused under equitable tolling principles.  The Court of Appeals rejected
this argument on the ground that the filing period contained in MDRV
2000e-16(c) is jurisdictional, and therefore the District Court lacked
authority to consider his equitable claims.  The court reasoned that MDRV
2000e-16(c) applies to suits against the Federal Government and thus is a
condition of Congress' waiver of sovereign immunity.  Since waivers of
sovereign immunity are traditionally construed narrowly, the court
determined that strict compliance with MDRV 2000e-16(c) is a necessary
predicate to a Title VII suit.
    Respondent correctly observes that MDRV 2000(e)-16(c) is a condition to
its waiver of sovereign immunity and thus must be strictly construed.  See
Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310 (1986).  But our previous cases
dealing with the effect of time limits in suits against the Government have
not been entirely consistent, even though the cases may be distinguished on
their facts.  In United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 94, n. 10 (1985), we
stated that we were leaving open the general question of whether principles
of equitable tolling, waiver, and estoppel apply against the Government
when it involves a statutory filing deadline.  But, as Justice White points
out in his concurring opinion, nearly thirty years earlier in Soriano v.
United States, 352 U. S. 270 (1957), we held the petitioner's claim to be
jurisdictionally barred, saying that "Congress was entitled to assume that
the limitation period it prescribed meant just that and no more."  352 U.
S., at 276.  More recently, in Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467,
479 (1986), we explained that "we must be careful not to `assume the
authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended,' or construe the
waiver `unduly restrictively' " (citation omitted).
    Title 42 U. S. C. MDRV 2000e-16(c) provides in relevant part:

"Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by . . . the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission . . . an employee or applicant for
employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, or by
the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action
as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title . . . ."


    The phraseology of this particular statutory time limit is probably
very similar to some other statutory limitations on suits against the
Government, but probably not to all of them.  In the present statute,
Congress said that "within thirty days . . . an employee . . . may file a
civil action . . . ."  In Soriano, supra, Congress provided that "every
claim . . . shall be barred unless the petition . . . is filed . . . within
six years . . . ."  An argument can undoubtedly be made that the latter
language is more stringent than the former, but we are not persuaded that
the difference between them is enough to manifest a different congressional
intent with respect to the availability of equitable tolling.  Thus a
continuing effort on our part to decide each case on an ad hoc basis, as we
appear to have done in the past, would have the disadvantage of continuing
unpredictability without the corresponding advantage of greater fidelity to
the intent of Congress.  We think that this case affords us an opportunity
to adopt a more general rule to govern the applicability of equitable
tolling in suits against the Government.
    Time requirements in law suits between private litigants are
customarily subject to "equitable tolling," Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,
493 U. S. ---, --- (slip op. 6) (1989).  Indeed, we have held that the
statutory time limits applicable to lawsuits against private employers
under Title VII are subject to equitable tolling. {2}
    A waiver of sovereign immunity " `cannot be implied but must be
unequivocally expressed.' "  United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535, 538
(1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 (1969)).  Once
Congress has made such a waiver, we think that making the rule of equitable
tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it
is applicable to private suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of
the congressional waiver.  Such a principle is likely to be a realistic
assessment of legislative intent as well as a practically useful principle
of interpretation.  We therefore hold that the same rebuttable presumption
of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should
also apply to suits against the United States.  Congress, of course, may
provide otherwise if it wishes to do so.
    But an examination of the cases in which we have applied the equitable
tolling doctrine as between private litigants affords petitioner little
help.  Federal courts have typically extended equitable relief only
sparingly.  We have allowed equitable tolling in situations where the
claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective
pleading during the statutory period, {3} or where the complainant has been
induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing
deadline to pass. {4}  We have generally been much less forgiving in
receiving late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence
in preserving his legal rights.  Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown,
466 U. S. 147, 151 (1984).  Because the time limits imposed by Congress in
a suit against the Government involve a waiver of sovereign immunity, it is
evident that no more favorable tolling doctrine may be employed against the
Government than is employed in suits between private litigants.
    Petitioner urges that his failure to file in a timely manner should be
excused because his lawyer was absent from his office at the time that the
EEOC notice was received, and that he thereafter filed within 30 days of
the day on which he personally received notice.  But the principles of
equitable tolling described above do not extend to what is at best a garden
variety claim of excusable neglect.
    The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.


    Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of this
case.
 
 
 
 
 
 

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1
    See Martinez v. Orr, 738 F. 2d 1107 (CA10 1984); Milam v. U. S. Postal
Service, 674 F. 2d 860 (CA11 1982); Saltz v. Lehman, 217 U. S. App. D. C.
354, 672 F. 2d 207 (1982); and Boddy v. Dean, 821 F. 2d 346-350 (CA6
1987).

2
    See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 394 (1982);
Crown, Cork & Seal, Co. v. Parker, 462 U. S. 345, 349 n. 3 (1983).

3
    See Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424 (1965) (plaintiff
timely filed complaint in wrong court); Herb v. Pitcairn, 325 U. S. 77
(1945) (same); American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538
(1974) (plaintiff's timely filing of an individual action tolled the
limitations period in a related class action claim).

4
    See Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 359 U. S. 231 (1959)
(adversary's misrepresentation caused plaintiff to let filing period
lapse); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392 (1946) (same).





Subject: 89-5867 -- CONCUR, IRWIN v. VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

 


    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-5867



SHIRLEY W. IRWIN, PETITIONER v. VETERANS ADMINISTRATION et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth
circuit

[December 3, 1990]



    Justice White, with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment.

    Although I agree with the Court that the 30-day period under 42 U. S.
C. MDRV 2000e-16(c) begins to run when the notice from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission is delivered either to the claimant or the
claimant's attorney, I do not join the portion of the opinion holding that
the 30-day time period is subject to equitable tolling, see ante, at 4-6.
    As the Court recognizes, see ante, at 4, statutory deadlines for suits
against the Government, such as the one in this case, are conditions on the
Government's waiver of sovereign immunity.  See, e. g., United States v.
Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834, 841 (1986); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111,
117-118 (1979).  As such, they must be " `strictly observed and exceptions
thereto are not to be implied.' "  Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 161
(1981) (quoting Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 276 (1957)); see
also Block v. North Dakota, 461 U. S. 273, 287 (1983).  In my view, the
Court has failed to "strictly observe" the terms of the statute at issue in
this case.
    Congress did not expressly provide for equitable tolling of the 30-day
filing deadline in MDRV 2000e-16(c).  The Court, however, holds that like
statutes of limitations for suits between private litigants, limitations
periods for suits against the Government will now presumptively be subject
to equitable tolling.  Ante, at 5-6.  That holding needlessly reverses at
least one of this Court's prior decisions, and is in tension with several
others.
    Because of the existence of sovereign immunity, we have traditionally
held that the Government's consent to be sued " `cannot be implied but must
be unequivocally expressed.' "  United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535,
538 (1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 (1969)).  That
rule applies even where there is a contrary presumption for suits against
private defendants.  Our decision in Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S.
310 (1986), is instructive on this point.  There, we held that the
Government was not liable under the federal provisions of Title VII for
interest.  In reaching that conclusion, we reaffirmed the longstanding rule
that despite consent to be sued, the Government will not be liable for
interest unless there is a separate explicit waiver to that effect.  Id.,
at 316-317.  Although the statute in that case provided that the Government
was to be liable "the same as a private person" for "costs," including a
"reasonable attorney's fee," we stated that "we must construe waivers
strictly in favor of the sovereign . . . and not enlarge the waiver `beyond
what the language requires.' "  Id., at 318 (citations omitted).  It seems
to me that the Court in this case, by holding that the time limit in MDRV
2000e-16(c) is subject to equitable tolling, has done exactly what Shaw
proscribes -- it has enlarged the waiver in MDRV 2000e-16(c) beyond what
the language of that section requires. {1}
    Not only is the Court's holding inconsistent with our tra ditional
approach to cases involving sovereign immunity, it directly overrules a
prior decision by this Court, Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270
(1957).  The question in Sor iano was whether war tolled the statute of
limitations for claims against the Government filed in the Court of Claims.
In arguing for equitable tolling, the plaintiff there relied on a case in
which this Court had held that war had tolled a limitations statute for
purposes of private causes of action.  Id., at 275.  The Court was not
persuaded, stating that "[t]hat case involved private citizens, not the
Government.  It has no applicability to claims against the sovereign."
Ibid.  The Court explained:

"To permit the application of the doctrine urged by petitioner would impose
the tolling of the statute in every time-limit-consent Act passed by the
Congress. . . .  Strangely enough, Congress would be required to provide
expressly in each statute that the period of limitation was not to be
extended by war.  But Congress was entitled to assume that the limitation
period it prescribed meant just that period and no more.  With this intent
in mind, Congress has passed specific legislation each time it has seen fit
to toll such statutes of limitations because of war.  And this Court has
long decided that limitations and conditions upon which the Government
consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are
not to be implied."  Id., at 275-276 (footnote omitted).


As in Soriano, here Congress "was entitled to assume that the limitation
period it prescribed [in MDRV 2000e-16(c)] meant just that period and no
more."
    The Court deviates from the above cases because it believes that our
decisions concerning time requirements "have not been entirely consistent."
Ante, at 4. {2}  Even if that belief is well-founded, the doctrine of stare
decisis demands that we attempt to reconcile our prior decisions rather
than hastily overrule some of them. {3}  Such an attempt would reveal that
Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467 (1986), cited by the Court for the
alleged inconsistency, see ante, at 4-5, is not irreconcilable with the
cases discussed above.  In Bowen, we allowed equitable tolling against the
Government because, among other things, the statutory time period there,
set forth in 42 U. S. C. MDRV 405(g), expressly allowed tolling.  Section
405(g) requires that a civil action be filed "within sixty days . . . or
within such further time as the Secretary may allow."  See 476 U. S., at
472, n. 3 (emphasis added).  We noted that the provision in that section
allowing the Secretary to extend the filing deadline expressed Congress'
"clear intention to allow tolling in some cases."  Id., at 480.  Moreover,
we observed that the regulations promulgated by the Secretary governing
extensions of time under that provision were based on equitable concerns of
fairness to claimants, further "support[ing] our application of equitable
tolling."  Id., at 480, n. 12.  The statute in this case, unlike the one in
Bowen, does not manifest any "clear intention" by Congress to allow tolling
and thus should be subject to the rule articulated in Soriano, supra.
    Accordingly, I concur in the judgment because I do not believe that
equitable tolling is available as a defense to the 30day filing
requirement, and I would not reach the factual issue of whether equitable
tolling is supported by the circumstances of this case.

 
 
 
 
 

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1
    The Court's failure to recognize the importance of sovereign immunity
in statutory construction also ignores Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820 (1976).
In that case, we held that Title VII provisions for federal employees
pre-empt other remedies for discrimination in federal employment.  We
reached that conclusion despite our earlier holding in Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454 (1975), that Title VII provisions for
private employees did not pre-empt other discrimination remedies.  We found
Johnson to be "inapposite" because, among other things, "there were no
problems of sovereign immunity in the context of the Johnson case."  425 U.
S., at 833.

2
    The Court also asserts that allowing equitable tolling against the
Government "is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative intent."
Ante, at 6.  It is unclear, however, why that likelihood, rather than the
opposite, is true.  The statute here, for example, was enacted in 1972 when
the presumption was, as set forth in Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S.
270 (1957), that statutes of limitations for suits against the Government
were not subject to equitable tolling.  It is unlikely that the 1972
Congress had in mind the Court's present departure from that longstanding
rule.

3
    Stare decisis is "of fundamental importance to the rule of law," Welch
v. Texas Highways and Public Transp. Dept., 483 U. S. 468, 494 (1987),
because, among other things, it promotes stability and protects
expectations.  Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265-266 (1986).  Although
always an important guiding principle, it has "special force" in cases such
as this one that involve statutory interpretation because Congress is in a
position to overrule our decision if it so chooses.  Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U. S. ---, --- (1989).





Subject: 89-5867 -- CONCUR/DISSENT, IRWIN v. VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

 


    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-5867



SHIRLEY W. IRWIN, PETITIONER v. VETERANS ADMINISTRATION et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth
circuit

[December 3, 1990]



    Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
    While I agree with the Court's conclusion that the filing deadline in
42 U. S. C. MDRV 2000e-16(c) is subject to equitable tolling and that the
petitioner has failed to establish a basis for tolling in this case, I do
not agree that the 30-day limitations period began to run when petitioner's
lawyer, rather than petitioner himself, received notice from the EEOC of
petitioner's right to file a civil action.
    The Court is entirely correct that notice to a litigant's attorney is
generally considered notice to the litigant after litigation has been
commenced.  See ante, at 3.  But the Court overlooks the fact that
litigation is usually commenced by service of process on the adverse party
himself.  Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly require
service on the opposing litigant.  See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(d).  This
case involves a notice that is a condition precedent to the commencement of
formal litigation.  I therefore believe that Congress intended that this
notice, like a summons and complaint, be served on the adverse party, not
his representative.
    The Court contends that reading "the term `receipt' [in MDRV
2000e-16(c)] to mean only `actual receipt by the claimant' would render the
practice of notification through counsel a meaningless exercise."  Ante, at
3.  By the same logic, however, reading "receipt," as the Court does, to
mean only "receipt by the claimant's representative" renders "a meaningless
exercise" the EEOC's practice of notifying the claimant personally, a
practice codified in EEOC regulations, see 29 CFR MDRV 1613.234(a) (1990).
Actually, notifying both the claimant and his representative makes sense
regardless of which notice begins the ticking of the limitations clock.
Dual notification ensures that all persons concerned with the progress of
the action are apprised of important developments.  Cf. ibid. (also
requiring notification of employing agency).  However, a claimant's
representative before the EEOC will not necessarily also represent the
claimant in the ensuing civil suit; indeed, the representative in the
administrative proceedings need not even be an attorney.  See 29 CFR MDRV
1613.214(b) (1990).  Notice to the claimant is therefore the more logical
trigger for the limitations countdown.  This construction is not only
sensible in light of the notice requirement's function in the statutory
scheme but is also consistent with our previous admonitions that Title VII,
a remedial statute, should be construed in favor of those whom the
legislation was designed to protect.  See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 397-398 (1982); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522,
527 (1972).
    Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court's judgment.  I would
instead reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case
for resolution of the disputed factual issue of when the petitioner himself
actually received notice from the EEOC of his right to file a civil
action.

 
 
 
 
 

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