Subject:  FLORIDA v. JIMENO, Syllabus



 
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as
is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is
issued.  The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but
has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
reader.  See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


Syllabus


FLORIDA v. JIMENO et al.


certiorari to the supreme court of florida

No. 90-622.  Argued March 25, 1991 -- Decided May 23, 1991

Having stopped respondent Jimeno's car for a traffic infraction, police
officer Trujillo, who had been following the car after overhearing Jimeno
arranging what appeared to be a drug transaction, declared that he had
reason to believe that Jimeno was carrying narcotics in the car, and asked
permission to search it.  Jimeno consented, and Trujillo found cocaine
inside a folded paper bag on the car's floorboard.  Jimeno was charged with
possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of Florida law,
but the state trial court granted his motion to suppress the cocaine on the
ground that his consent to search the car did not carry with it specific
consent to open the bag and examine its contents.  The Florida District
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court affirmed.

Held: A criminal suspect's Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches is not violated when, after he gives police per
mission to search his car, they open a closed container found within the
car that might reasonably hold the object of the search.  The Amendment is
satisfied when, under the circumstances, it is objectively rea sonable for
the police to believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted
them to open the particular container.  Here, the authorization to search
extended beyond the car's interior surfaces to the bag, since Jimeno did
not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the search and was aware
that Trujillo would be looking for narcotics in the car, and since a
reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally
carried in some form of container.  There is no basis for adding to the
Fourth Amendment's basic test of objective reasonableness a requirement
that, if police wish to search closed containers within a car, they must
separately request permission to search each container.  Pp. 2-4.

564 So. 2d 1083, reversed and remanded.

    Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined.  Marshall,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined.

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Subject: 90-622 -- OPINION, FLORIDA v. JIMENO

 


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 90-622



FLORIDA, PETITIONER v. LUZ PIEDAD JIMENO

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of florida

[May 23, 1991]



    Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
    In this case we decide whether a criminal suspect's Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches is violated when, after he
gives a police officer permission to search his automobile, the officer
opens a closed container found within the car that might reasonably hold
the object of the search.  We find that it is not.  The Fourth Amendment is
satisfied when, under the circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for
the officer to believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted
him to open a particular container within the automobile.
    This case began when a Dade County police officer, Frank Trujillo,
overheard respondent, Enio Jimeno, arranging what appeared to be a drug
transaction over a public telephone.  Believing that respondent might be
involved in illegal drug trafficking, Officer Trujillo followed his car.
The officer observed respondent make a right turn at a red light without
stopping.  He then pulled respondent over to the side of the road in order
to issue him a traffic citation.  Officer Trujillo told respondent that he
had been stopped for committing a traffic infraction.  The officer went on
to say that he had reason to believe that respondent was carrying narcotics
in his car, and asked permission to search the car.  He explained that
respondent did not have to consent to a search of the car.  Respondent
stated that he had nothing to hide, and gave Trujillo permission to search
the automobile.  After two passengers stepped out of respondent's car,
Officer Trujillo went to the passenger side, opened the door, and saw a
folded, brown paper bag on the floorboard.  The officer picked up the bag,
opened it, and found a kilogram of cocaine inside.
    Respondent was charged with possession with intent to distribute
cocaine in violation of Florida law.  Before trial, he moved to suppress
the cocaine found in the bag on the ground that his consent to search the
car did not extend to the closed paper bag inside of the car.  The trial
court granted the motion.  It found that although respondent "could have
assumed that the officer would have searched the bag" at the time he gave
his consent, his mere consent to search the car did not carry with it
specific consent to open the bag and examine its contents.  No. 88-23967
(Cir. Ct. Dade Cty., Fla., Mar. 21, 1989); App. to Pet. for Cert. A-6.
    The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's
decision to suppress the evidence of the cocaine.  550 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1989).  In doing so, the court established a per se rule that "consent
to a general search for narcotics does not extend to `sealed containers
within the general area agreed to by the defendant.' "  Ibid. (citation
omitted).  The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, relying upon its decision in
State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464 (1989) aff'd on other grounds, 495 U. S. ---
(1990).  564 So. 2d 1083 (1990).  We granted certiorari to determine
whether consent to search a vehicle may extend to closed containers found
inside the vehicle.  498 U. S. --- (1990), and we now reverse the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Florida.
    The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.  Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 (1967).  The Fourth Amendment does not
proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes
those which are unreasonable.  Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U. S. --- (1990).
Thus, we have long approved consensual searches because it is no doubt
reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted
to do so.  Schneckloth v. Busta monte, 412 U. S. 218, 219 (1973).  The
standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth
Amendment is that of "objective" reasonableness -- what would the typical
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and
the suspect?  Illinois v. Rodriguez, supra, at --- - --- (slip op., at
5-11); Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 501-502 (1983) (opinion of White,
J.); id., at 514 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  The question before us, then,
is whether it is reasonable for an officer to consider a suspect's general
consent to a search of his car to include consent to examine a paper bag
lying on the floor of the car.  We think that it is.
    The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object.
United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982).  In this case, the terms of
the search's authorization were simple.  Respondent granted Officer
Trujillo permission to search his car, and did not place any explicit
limitation on the scope of the search.  Trujillo had informed respondent
that he believed respondent was carrying narcotics, and that he would be
looking for narcotics in the car.  We think that it was objectively
reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search
respondent's car included consent to search containers within that car
which might bear drugs.  A reasonable person may be expected to know that
narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container.  "Contraband
goods rarely are strewn across the trunk or floor of a car."  Id., at 820.
The authorization to search in this case, therefore, extended beyond the
surfaces of the car's interior to the paper bag lying on the car's floor.
    The facts of this case are therefore different from those in State v.
Wells, supra, on which the Supreme Court of Florida relied in affirming the
supression order in this case.  There the Supreme Court of Florida held
that consent to search the trunk of a car did not include authorization to
pry open a locked briefcase found inside the trunk.  It is very likely
unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his
trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the
trunk, but it is otherwise with respect to a closed paper bag.
    Respondent argues, and the Florida trial court agreed with him, that if
the police wish to search closed containers within a car they must
separately request permission to search each container.  But we see no
basis for adding this sort of superstructure to the Fourth Amendment's
basic test of objective reasonableness.  Cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S.
213 (1983).  A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the
search to which he consents.  But if his consent would reasonably be
understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment
provides no grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization.  "[T]he
community has a real interest in encouraging consent, for the resulting
search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and prosecution of
crime, evidence that may ensure that a wholly innocent person is not
wrongly charged with a criminal offense."  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
supra, at 243.
    The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is accordingly reversed,
and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

It is so ordered.


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Subject: 90-622 -- DISSENT, FLORIDA v. JIMENO

 


    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 90-622



FLORIDA, PETITIONER v. LUZ PIEDAD JIMENO

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of florida

[May 23, 1991]



    Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting.

    The question in this case is whether an individual's general consent to
a search of the interior of his car for narcotics should reasonably be
understood as consent to a search of closed containers inside the car.
Nothing in today's opinion dispels my belief that the two are not one and
the same from the consenting individual's standpoint.  Consequently, an
individual's consent to a search of the interior of his car should not be
understood to authorize a search of closed containers inside the car.  I
dissent.
    In my view, analysis of this question must start by identifying the
differing expectations of privacy that attach to cars and closed
containers.  It is well established that an individual has but a limited
expectation of privacy in the interior of his car.  A car ordinarily is not
used as a residence or repository for one's personal effects, and its
passengers and contents are generally exposed to public view.  See Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion).  Moreover, cars
"are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and
controls," South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 368 (1976), and may be
seized by the police when necessary to protect public safety or to
facilitate the flow of traffic, see id., at 368-369.
    In contrast, it is equally well established that an individual has a
heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container.
See, e. g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 13 (1977).  Luggage,
handbags, paper bags, and other containers are common repositories for
one's papers and effects, and the protection of these items from state
intrusion lies at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.  U. S. Const., Amdt. 4
("The right of the people to be secure in their . . . papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated").  By
placing his possessions inside a container, an individual manifests an
intent that his possessions be "preserve[d] as private," United States v.
Katz, 389 U. S. 347, 351 (1967), and thus kept "free from public
examination," United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 11.
    The distinct privacy expectations that a person has in a car as opposed
to a closed container do not merge when the individual uses his car to
transport the container.  In this situation, the individual still retains a
heightened expectation of privacy in the container.  See Robbins v.
California, 453 U. S. 420, 425 (1981) (plurality opinion); Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 763-764 (1979).  Nor does an individual's
heightened expectation of privacy turn on the type of container in which he
stores his possessions.  Notwithstanding the majority's suggestion to the
contrary, see ante, at 3-4, this Court has soundly rejected any distinction
between "worthy" containers, like locked briefcases, and "unworthy"
containers, like paper bags.
"Even though such a distinction perhaps could evolve in a series of cases
in which paper bags, locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange crates were
placed on one side of the line or the other, the central purpose of the
Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction.  For just as the most frail
cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of
privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also may a traveler who carries a
toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf
claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as
the sophisticated executive with the locked attache case."  United States
v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 822 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
    Because an individual's expectation of privacy in a container is
distinct from, and far greater than, his expectation of privacy in the
interior of his car, it follows that an individual's consent to a search of
the interior of his car cannot necessarily be understood as extending to
containers in the car.  At the very least, general consent to search the
car is ambiguous with respect to containers found inside the car.  In my
view, the independent and divisible nature of the privacy interests in cars
and containers mandates that a police officer who wishes to search a
suspicious container found during a consensual automobile search obtain
additional consent to search the container.  If the driver intended to
authorize search of the container, he will say so; if not, then he will say
no. {1}  The only objection that the police could have to such a rule is
that it would prevent them from exploiting the ignorance of a citizen who
simply did not anticipate that his consent to search the car would be
understood to authorize the police to rummage through his packages.
    According to the majority, it nonetheless is reasonable for a police
officer to construe generalized consent to search an automobile for
narcotics as extending to closed containers, because "[a] reasonable person
may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form
of a container."  Ante, at 3.  This is an interesting contention.  By the
same logic a person who consents to a search of the car from the driver's
seat could also be deemed to consent to a search of his person or indeed of
his body cavities, since a reasonable person may be expected to know that
drug couriers frequently store their contraband on their persons or in
their body cavities.  I suppose (and hope) that even the majority would
reject this conclusion, for a person who consents to the search of his car
for drugs certainly does not consent to a search of things other than his
car for drugs.  But this example illustrates that if there is a reason for
not treating a closed container as something "other than" the car in which
it sits, the reason cannot be based on intuitions about where people carry
drugs.  The majority, however, never identifies a reason for conflating the
distinct privacy expectations that a person has in a car and in closed
containers.
    The majority also argues that the police should not be required to
secure specific consent to search a closed container, because " `[t]he
community has a real interest in encouraging consent.' "  Ante, at 4,
quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 243 (1973).  I find this
rationalization equally unsatisfactory.  If anything, a rule that permits
the police to construe a consent to search more broadly than it may have
been intended would discourage individuals from consenting to searches of
their cars.  Apparently, the majority's real concern is that if the police
were required to ask for additional consent to search a closed container
found during the consensual search of an automobile, an individual who did
not mean to authorize such additional searching would have an opportunity
to say no.  In essence, then, the majority is claiming that "the community
has a real interest" not in encouraging citizens to consent to
investigatory efforts of their law enforcement agents, but rather in
encouraging individuals to be duped by them.  This is not the community
that the Fourth Amendment contemplates.
    Almost 20 years ago, this Court held that an individual could validly
"consent" to a search -- or, in other words, waive his right to be free
from an otherwise unlawful search -- without being told that he had the
right to withhold his consent.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra.  In
Schneckloth, as in this case, the Court cited the practical interests in
efficacious law enforcement as the basis for not requiring the police to
take meaningful steps to establish the basis of an individual's consent.  I
dissented in Schneckloth, and what I wrote in that case applies with equal
force here.

    "I must conclude, with some reluctance, that when the Court speaks of
practicality, what it really is talking of is the continued ability of the
police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to accomplish by
subterfuge what they could not achieve by relying only on the knowing
relinquishment of constitutional rights.  Of course it would be "practical"
for the police to ignore the commands of the Fourth Amendment, if by
practicality we mean that more criminals will be apprehended, even though
the constitutional rights of innocent people go by the board.  But such a
practical advantage is achieved only at the cost of permitting the police
to disregard the limitations that the Constitution places on their
behavior, a cost that a constitutional democracy cannot long absorb."  412
U. S., at 288.


    I dissent.

 
 
 
 
 

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1
    Alternatively, the police could obtain such consent in advance by
asking the individual for permission to search both the car and any closed
containers found inside.
