Subject:  McCARTHY v. BRONSON, Syllabus



 
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as
is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is
issued.  The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but
has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
reader.  See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


Syllabus



McCARTHY v. BRONSON, WARDEN, et al.


certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit

No. 90-5635.  Argued March 25, 1991 -- Decided May 20, 1991

Petitioner brought a District Court suit against various state prison
officials alleging that, in violation of his constitutional rights, they
used excessive force when transferring him from one cell to another.
Although he waived a jury trial and initially consented to have a
magistrate try the entire case pursuant to 28 U. S. C. MDRV 636(c)(1),
petitioner was permitted at trial to withdraw his consent to the
Magistrate's jurisdiction.  However, the Magistrate ruled that he was
nonetheless authorized to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to submit
proposed findings of fact and a recommended disposition to the court under
MDRV 636(b)(1)(B), which authorizes the nonconsensual referral to
magistrates for such purposes "of applications for posttrial relief made by
individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions
challenging conditions of confinement."  (Emphasis added.)  The District
Court overruled petitioner's objection to the Magistrate's role and
accepted the Magistrate's recommended findings and judgment for defendants.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: Section 636(b)(1)(B) does not, as petitioner contends, permit
nonconsensual referrals to a magistrate only when a prisoner challenges
ongoing prison conditions, but encompasses cases alleging a specific
episode of unconstitutional conduct by prison administrators.  Pp. 2-8.

    (a) Although the most natural reading of the phrase "challenging
conditions of confinement," when viewed in isolation, would not include
suits seeking relief from isolated episodes of unconstitutional conduct,
MDRV 636(b) (1)(B)'s text, when read in its entirety, suggests that
Congress intended to include the two primary categories of prisoner suits
-- habeas corpus applications and actions for monetary or injunctive relief
-- and thus to authorize the nonconsensual reference of all prisoner
petitions to a magistrate.  This interpretation is bolstered by Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 498-499, which, just three years before MDRV
636(b)(1)(B) was drafted, described the same two broad categories of
prisoner petitions and unambiguously embraced challenges to specific
instances of unconstitutional conduct within "conditions of confinement."
The fact that Congress may have used the latter term to mean ongoing
situations in other legislation having a different purpose cannot alter the
interpretation of the MDRV 636(b)(1)(B) language that so clearly parallels
the Preiser opinion.  Moreover, adoption of the Preiser definition comports
with MDRV 636(b)(1)(B)'s central purpose of assisting federal judges in
handling an ever-increasing caseload.  Pp. 2-7.

    (b) Petitioner argues that because a prisoner is constitutionally
entitled to a jury trial in a damages action arising out of a specific
episode of misconduct, it is unlikely that Congress would authorize a
nonconsensual reference in such a case to a magistrate who may not conduct
a jury trial.  This argument is not persuasive.  Petitioner's statutory
reading concededly would not eliminate in all actions the potential
constitutional difficulty he identifies.  More important, the statute
properly interpreted is not constitutionally infirm in cases like this one,
in which the plaintiff waived the right to a jury trial, nor in cases in
which the jury right exists and is not waived, in which the lower courts,
guided by the principle of constitutional avoidance, have consistently held
that the statute does not authorize reference to a magistrate.  Pp. 7-8.

906 F. 2d 835, affirmed.

    Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

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Subject: 90-5635 -- OPINION, McCARTHY v. BRONSON

 


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 90-5635



JOHN J. McCARTHY, PETITIONER v. GEORGE
BRONSON, WARDEN, et al.


on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second
circuit

[May 20, 1991]



    Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
    In 1976, Congress authorized the nonconsensual referral to magistrates
for a hearing and recommended findings "of prisoner petitions challenging
conditions of confinement."  28 U. S. C. MDRV 636(b)(1)(B). {1}  We granted
certiorari to decide whether that authorization includes cases alleging a
specific episode of unconstitutional conduct by prison administrators or
encompasses only challenges to ongoing prison conditions.  498 U. S. ---
(1990).
    In this case, the petitioner brought suit against various prison
officials alleging that, in violation of his constitutional rights, they
used excessive force when they transferred him from one cell to another on
July 13, 1982.  App. 11-24.  Petitioner waived a jury trial and initially
consented to have a magistrate try the entire case pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
MDRV 636(c)(1). {2}  See App. 7-8, 28-29.  On the first day of trial,
however, petitioner sought to withdraw his consent.  Petitioner was
permitted to withdraw his consent, but the Magistrate ruled that he was
nonetheless authorized to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to submit
proposed findings of fact and a recommended disposition to the District
Court.  See id., at 30-31.
    After a hearing, the Magistrate recommended detailed findings and a
judgment for defendants.  Id., at 33-49.  The District Court accepted the
Magistrate's recommendation and overruled petitioner's objection to the
Magistrate's role.  Id., at 54-55.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court's determination that the Magistrate was authorized by MDRV
636(b)(1)(B) to hold the hearing and to recommend findings.  906 F. 2d 835
(CA2 1990).
    Petitioner contends that MDRV 636(b)(1)(B) permits nonconsen sual
referrals to a magistrate only when a prisoner challenges ongoing prison
conditions.  Suits alleging that administrators acted unconstitutionally in
an isolated incident, petitioner suggests, are not properly classified as
"petitions challenging conditions of confinement."  MDRV 636(b)(1)(B).
    Petitioner advances two reasonable arguments for his construction of
the statute.  First, he maintains that the ordinary meaning of the words
"conditions of confinement" includes continuous conditions and excludes
isolated incidents.  Second, he suggests that because a prisoner is
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial in a damages action arising out
of a specific episode of misconduct, it seems unlikely that Congress would
authorize a nonconsensual reference to a magistrate in such a case.  In our
judgment, however, these arguments, although not without force, are
overcome by other considerations.
    We do not quarrel with petitioner's claim that the most natural reading
of the phrase "challenging conditions of confinement," when viewed in
isolation, would not include suits seeking relief from isolated episodes of
unconstitutional conduct.  However, statutory language must always be read
in its proper context.  "In ascertaining the plain meaning of [a] statute,
the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well
as the language and design of the statute as a whole."  K mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281, 291 (1988).  See also Crandon v. United
States, 494 U. S. ---, --- (1990) (slip op., at 5) ("In determining the
meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory
language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and
policy").
    The text of the statute does not define the term "conditions of
confinement" or contain any language suggesting that prisoner petitions
should be divided into subcategories.  On the contrary, when the relevant
section is read in its entirety, it suggests that Congress intended to
authorize the nonconsen sual reference of all prisoner petitions to a
magistrate.  In pertinent part, the statute provides:

"(b)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary --
 
    . . . . .




    "(B) a judge may . . . designate a magistrate to conduct hearings,
including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court
proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a
judge of the court, . . . of applications for posttrial relief made by
individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions
challenging conditions of confinement."  MDRV 636(b)(1)(B) (emphasis
added).

This description suggests Congress intended to include in their entirety
the two primary categories of suits brought by prisoners -- applications
for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 15 2254 and 2255 and
actions for monetary or injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C. MDRV 1983.
    Petitioner attempts to bolster his plain meaning argument with the
suggestion that this Court has interpreted the words "conditions of
confinement" to include the limitation that he suggests.  We certainly
presume that in 1976 when Congress selected this language, our elected
representatives were familiar with our recently announced opinions
concerning prisoner petitions.  See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.
S. 677, 696-697 (1979).  However, the possibility that Congress was
influenced in its choice of language by our opinions cuts against rather
than in favor of the statutory reading advanced by petitioner.
    All but one of the cases that petitioner claims support his reading
were decided well after the enactment of MDRV 636(b) (1)(B).  The sole case
identified by petitioner that predates the statute's enactment did not even
use the phrase "conditions of confinement" much less expound a narrow
definition of it.  See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974).
    Just three years before the statute was drafted, however, our opinion
in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973), had described two broad
categories of prisoner petitions: (1) those challenging the fact or
duration of confinement itself; and (2) those challenging the conditions of
confinement.  The statutory language from MDRV 636(b)(1)(B) that we
emphasized above describes these same two categories.  Significantly, our
description in Preiser of the latter category unambiguously embraced the
kind of single episode cases that petitioner's construction would exclude.
We wrote:

    "The respondents place a great deal of reliance on our recent decisions
upholding the right of state prisoners to bring federal civil rights
actions to challenge the conditions of their confinement.  Cooper v. Pate,
378 U. S. 546 (1964); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639 (1968); Wilwording
v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249 (1971); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972).
But none of the state prisoners in those cases was challenging the fact or
duration of his physical confinement itself, and none was seeking immediate
release or a speedier release from that confinement -- the heart of habeas
corpus.  In Cooper, the prisoner alleged that, solely because of his
religious beliefs, he had been denied permission to purchase certain
religious publications and had been denied other privileges enjoyed by his
fellow prisoners.  In Houghton, the prisoner's contention was that prison
authorities had violated the Constitution by confiscating legal materials
which he had acquired for pursuing his appeal, but which, in violation of
prison rules, had been found in the possession of another prisoner.  In
Wilwording, the prisoners' complaints related solely to their living
conditions and disciplinary measures while confined in maximum security.
And in Haines, the prisoner claimed that prison officials had acted
unconstitutionally by placing him in solitary confinement as a disciplinary
measure, and he sought damages for claimed physical injuries sustained
while so segregated.  It is clear, then, that in all those cases, the
prisoners' claims related solely to the State's alleged unconstitutional
treatment of them while in confinement.  None sought, as did the
respondents here, to challenge the very fact or duration of the confinement
itself.  Those cases, therefore, merely establish that a MDRV 1983 action
is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional
challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or
length of his custody."  Id., at 498-499.

The denial of religious publications in Cooper, the confiscation of legal
materials in Houghton, and, most definitely, the placement of the prisoner
in solitary confinement in Haines were all challenges to specific instances
of unconstitutional conduct, and the Preiser court described them as
challenges to "conditions of confinement."
    Petitioner also claims that his narrow reading is supported by the fact
that, in other legislation, Congress used the term "conditions of
confinement" to mean ongoing situations. {3}  However, the fact that
Congress may have used the term "conditions of confinement" in a different
sense in legislation having a different purpose cannot control our
interpretation of the language in this Act that so clearly parallels our
Preiser opinion.
    The broader reading we adopt also comports with the policy behind the
Act.  The central purpose of the 1976 amendment to the Magistrate's Act was
to authorize greater use of magistrates to assist federal judges "in
handling an everincreasing caseload."  S. Rep. No. 94-625, p. 2 (1976).
The adoption of the definition of "conditions of confinement" that we had
used in Preiser is consistent with this purpose because it will allow
referral of a broader category of cases.  Our reading also furthers the
policy of the Act because its simplicity avoids the litigation that
otherwise would inevitably arise in trying to identify the precise contours
of petitioner's suggested exception for single episode cases.
    Petitioner's definition would generate additional work for the district
courts because the distinction between cases challenging ongoing conditions
and those challenging specific acts of alleged misconduct will often be
difficult to identify.  The complaint filed by petitioner in this case
illustrates the point.  On the one hand, he alleged that the defendants
injured him by making improper use of a chemical agent "commonly referred
to by correctional sadists as `Big Red,' " App. 14, but on the other hand,
he also complained of the absence of prison regulations governing the use
of tear gas, {4} and sought injunctive relief {5} as well as damages.
Thus, this complaint, like many other prisoner petitions, could fairly be
characterized as challenging both ongoing practices and a specific act of
alleged misconduct.
    We are not persuaded to alter our reading of the statute by
petitioner's argument based on the constitutional right to a jury trial.
First, petitioner's statutory reading would not eliminate the potential
constitutional difficulty that he identifies.  Petitioner concedes that, in
some actions that would be considered "petitions challenging conditions of
confinement" under his definition, the prisoner would nonetheless have a
constitutional right to a jury trial that would render noncon sensual
referral constitutionally suspect.  See Reply Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 3.
Second, and, more important, the statute properly interpreted is not
constitutionally infirm.  No constitutional question arises in cases like
this one, in which the plaintiff has waived the right to a jury trial.
And, in cases in which the jury right exists and is not waived, the lower
courts, guided by the principle of constitutional avoidance, have
consistently held that the statute does not authorize reference to a
magistrate.  See, e. g., Hall v. Sharpe, 812 F. 2d 644, 647-649 (CA11
1987); Archie v. Christian, 808 F. 2d 1132, 1135-1137 (CA5 1987) (en banc);
Wimmer v. Cook, 774 F. 2d 68, 73-74 (CA4 1985).
    The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
 
 
 
 
 
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1
    Title 28 U. S. C. MDRV 636(b)(1)(B) provides in relevant part:
    "(b)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary --
 
    . . . . .

    "(B) a judge may . . . designate a magistrate to conduct hearings,
including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court
proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a
judge of the court, . . . of applications for posttrial relief made by
individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions
challenging conditions of confinement."

2
    Title 28 U. S. C. MDRV 636(c)(1) provides in relevant part:
    "Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary --
    "(1) Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States
magistrate or a part-time United States magistrate who serves as a
full-time judicial officer may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or
nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when
specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or
courts he serves."

3
    See 18 U. S. C. MDRV 4013(a)(4) (authorizing Attorney General to enter
into contracts "to establish acceptable conditions of confinement" in state
facilities housing federal detainees); 42 U. S. C. 15 1997a(a), 1997c(a)(1)
(authorizing Attorney General to initiate or intervene in injunctive
actions challenging "egregious or flagrant conditions" in state prisons);
42 U. S. C. 15 3769a(b), 3769b(a)(1) (requiring state governments to
develop a "plan for . . . improving conditions of confinement" as a
precondition to receiving federal funds to "relieve overcrowding [and]
substandard conditions").

4
    "27. There is no standard reporting form for any chemical weapon other
than mace used at CCI-Somers." App. 15.
    "30. There were no written directives governing the use of chemical
weapons other than mace at the time this incident occurred."  Id., at 16.
    "32. Written policy and procedure of the Department of Corrections and
the Institution did not provide for the use of the tear gas duster."  Id.,
at 17.

    "42. At the time of the incident, neither the Administrative Directives
nor the CCI-Somers Operational Directives contained a use of force
doctrine.  Neither addressed the use of the tear gas duster or other
chemical weapons, except mace."  Id., at 18.

5
    The complaint included a prayer for an injunction asking that
defendants "immediately formulate and adopt rigid Directives restricting
the use of Tear Gas and the weapon known as the Tear Gas Duster to riot
situations involving multiple inmates or to situations where there exist
barriers obstructing the use of mace[;] immediately formulate and adopt
rigid Directives requiring the immediate post-incident treatment of inmates
sprayed with tear gas including adequate medical treatment and shower
facilities."  Id., at 23.
