Subject:  SULLIVAN v. STROOP, Syllabus



    (Slip Opinion)
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as
    is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is
    issued.  The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court
    but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience
    of the reader.  See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321,
    337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


Syllabus



SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. STROOP et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit

No. 89-535.  Argued March 26, 1990, Decided June 14, 1990

In determining whether a family's income disqualifies it from receiving
benefits under the Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program
of Part A of Title IV of the Social Security Act, the appropriate agency of
a participating State is required to "disregard the first $50 of any child
support payments" received by the family in any month for which benefits
are sought.  42 U. S. C. 602(a)(8)(A)(vi).  Under this provision,
petitioner Secretary of Health and Human Services has declined to
"disregard" the first $50 of "child's insurance benefits" received under
Title II of the Act, reasoning that such benefits are not "child support"
because that term, as used throughout Title IV, invariably refers to
payments from absent parents.  The District Court granted summary judgment
for respondents, custodial parents receiving AFDC benefits, in their suit
challenging the Secretary's interpretation of 602(a)(8) (A)(vi).  The Court
of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that, since AFDC applicants receiving Title
II benefits are burdened by the same eligibility constraints as those
receiving payments directly from absent parents, no rational basis exists
for according one class of families the mitigating benefit of the disregard
while depriving the other of that benefit.  The court added that to
construe 602(a)(8)(vi) to exclude the Title II benefits from the disregard
would raise constitutional equal protection concerns.

Held: Title II "child's insurance benefits" do not constitute "child
support" within the meaning of 602(a)(8)(A)(vi).  The clear and unambiguous
language of the statute demonstrates that Congress used "child support"
throughout Title IV as a term of art referring exclusively to payments from
absent parents.  See, e. g., 651, the first provision in Part D of Title
IV, which is devoted exclusively to "Child Support and Enforcement of
Paternity."  Since the statute also makes plain that Congress meant for the
Part D program to work in tandem with the Part A AFDC program to provide
uniform levels of support for children of equal need, see 602(a)(26),
602(a)(27), 654(5), the phrase "child support" as used in the two Parts
must be given the same meaning.  See, e. g., Sorenson v. Secretary of
Treasury, 475 U. S. 851, 860.  Thus, although governmentally funded Title
II child's insurance benefits might be characterized as "support" in the
generic sense, they are not the sort of child support payments from absent
parents envisioned by Title IV.  This is the sort of statutory distinction
that does not violate the Equal Protection Clause "if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it," Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U. S.
587, 601, and it is justified by Congress' intent to encourage the making
of child support payments by absent parents.  Pp. 3-7.

870 F. 2d 969, reversed.

Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined.  Blackmun, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined.  Stevens,
J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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Subject: 89-535--OPINION, SULLIVAN v. STROOP

 


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-535



LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, PETITIONER v.
ELIZABETH STROOP, et al.


on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth
circuit

[June 14, 1990]



    Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
    In this case we review a determination by petitioner, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, that "child's insurance benefits" paid pursuant
to Title II of the Social Security Act, see 49 Stat. 623, as amended, 42 U.
S. C 402(d) (1982 ed. and Supp. V), do not constitute "child support" as
that term is used in a provision in Title IV of the Act governing
eligibility for Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC). See 42 U.
S. C 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) (1982 ed., Supp. V).  We uphold the Secretary's
determination and reverse the contrary holding of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
    Title IV requires the applicable agencies of States par- ticipating in
the AFDC program to consider "other income and resources of any child or
relative claiming" AFDC benefits "in determining need" for benefits.  42 U.
S. C 602(a) (7)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. V).  The state agencies "shall
determine ineligible for aid any family the combined value of whose
resources . . . exceeds" the level specified in the Act.  602(a)(7)(B).
Central to this case is one of the amendments to Title IV in the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), Pub. L. 98-369, 2640, 98 Stat. 1145-1146,
affecting eligibility for AFDC benefits.  This amendment provides:

". . . with respect to any month, in making the determination under
[602(a)(7)], the State agency,

                . . . . .



    shall disregard the first $50 of any child support payments received in
such month with respect to the dependent child or children in any family
applying for or receiving aid to families with dependent children
(including support payments collected and paid to the family under section
657(b) of this title); . . ."  42 U. S. C. 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) (1982 ed.,
Supp. V) (emphasis added).


The Secretary has declined to "disregard" under this provision the first
$50 of Title II Social Security child's insurance benefits paid on behalf
of children who are members of families applying for AFDC benefits.  In the
Secretary's view, the Government funded child's insurance benefits are not
"child support" for purposes of 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) because that term, as used
throughout Title IV, "invariably refers to payments from absent parents."
Brief for Petitioner 13.
    Respondents are custodial parents receiving AFDC benefits who are
aggrieved by the implementation of the DEFRA amendments.  They sued in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
challenging petitioner's interpretation of the disregard on statutory and
constitutional grounds.  See Complaint, App. 31-33.  The District Court
granted summary judgment for respondents on the basis of their statutory
challenge and thereby avoided reaching the constitutional challenge.  App.
to Pet. for Cert. 22a.
    The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
District Court.  Stroop v. Bowen, 870 F. 2d 969, 975 (1989).  According to
the Court of Appeals, Congress nowhere explicated its use of the term
"child support" in 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) and the only known discussion of the
purpose of the disregard provision is in our decision in Bowen v. Gilliard,
483 U. S. 587 (1987).  As read by the Court of Appeals, Bowen noted that
"the disregard of the first $50 paid by a father serves to mitigate the
burden of the changes wrought by the DEFRA amendments."  870 F. 2d, at 974
(citing 483 U. S., at 594.)  The court reasoned that although we had not
considered the question of Title II child's insurance payments in Bowen,
the disregarding of the first $50 of such payments, "received in lieu of
payments made by a father," would serve the same purpose of mitigating the
harshness of the DEFRA amendments.  870 F. 2d, at 974.  Since AFDC
applicants receiving Title II child's insurance benefits are burdened by
the DEFRA amendments no less than applicants receiving payments directly
from noncustodial parents, no rational basis exists for according one class
of families the mitigating benefit of the disregard while depriving another
indistinguishable class of families of the same benefit.  The court thus
rejected the Secretary's interpretation of the disregard and added that to
construe 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) to exclude the Title II benefits from the
disregard would raise constitutional equal protection concerns.  870 F. 2d,
at 975.  We granted certiorari, 493 U. S.  (1990), to resolve the conflict
between the decision of the Fourth Circuit and the contrary holding of the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Todd v. Norman, 840 F. 2d 608
(1988).
    We think the Secretary's construction is amply supported by the text of
the statute which shows that Congress used "child support" throughout Title
IV of the Social Security Act and its amendments as a term of art referring
exclusively to payments from absent parents.  This being the case, we need
go no further:

"`If the statute is clear and unambiguous "that is the end of the matter,
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress." . . . In ascertaining the plain meaning of
the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at
issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole."  K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281, 291-292 (1988) (internal
citations omitted).


    As an initial matter, the common usage of "child support" refers to
legally compulsory payments made by parents.  Black's Law Dictionary
defines "child support" as

    "[t]he legal obligation of parents to contribute to the economic
maintenance, including education, of their children; enforceable in both
civil and criminal contexts.  In a dissolution or custody action, money
paid by one parent to another toward the expenses of children of the
marriage."  Black's Law Dictionary 217 (5th ed. 1979).


Attorneys who have practiced in the area of domestic relations law will
immediately recognize this definition.  Respondents insist, however, that
we have traditionally "turned to authorities of general reference, not to
legal dictionaries, to [give] `ordinary meaning to ordinary words."' Brief
for Respondents 20 (citing Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U. S. ,  (1990)).  But
the general reference work upon which respondents principally rely defines
"child support" as "money paid for the care of one's minor child,
esp[ecially] payments to a divorced spouse or a guardian under a decree of
divorce."  Random House Dictionary of English Usage 358 (2d ed. 1987)
(emphasis added) (cited at Brief for Respondents 20).  Respondents also
seek to bolster their view with definitions of the word "support" from
other dictionaries.  Ibid.  But where a phrase in a statute appears to have
become a term of art, as is the case with "child support" in Title IV, any
attempt to break down the term into its constituent words is not apt to
illuminate its meaning.
    Congress' use of "child support" throughout Title IV shows no intent to
depart from common usage.  As previously noted, the provisions governing
eligibility for AFDC benefits, including the "disregard" provision in issue
here, are contained in Title IV of the Social Security Act.  42 U. S. C.
601-679a (1982 ed., and Supp. V).  Title IV, as its heading discloses,
establishes a unified program of grants "For Aid And Services To Needy
Families With Children And For Child-Welfare Services" to be implemented
through cooperative efforts of the States and the Federal Government.  Part
D of Title IV is devoted exclusively to "Child Support and Establishment of
Paternity."  See 42  U. S. C. 651-667 (1982 ed., and Supp. V).  The first
provision in Part D authorizes appropriations

"[f]or the purpose of enforcing the support obligations owed by absent
parents to their children and the spouse (or former spouse) with whom such
children are living, [and] locating absent parents . . . ."  42 U. S.C. 651
(1982 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added).


The remainder of Part D, 652-667 (1982 ed., and Supp. V), abounds with
references to "child support" in the context of compulsory support funds
from absent parents.  See, e. g., 652(a)(1), 652(a)(7), 652(a)(10)(B),
652(a)(10)(C), 652(b), 653(c)(1), 654, 654(6), 654(19)(A), 654(19)(B),
656(b), 657(a), 659(a), 659(b), 659(d), 661(b)(3), 662(b).  Section 653,
indeed, creates an absent parent "Locator Service."
    The statute also makes plain that Congress meant for the Part D Child
Support program to work in tandem with the AFDC program which constitutes
Part A of Title IV, 42 U. S. C. 601-615 (1982 ed., and Supp. V).  Section
602(a)(27) requires State plans for AFDC participation to "provide that the
State has in effect a plan approved under part D . . . and operates a child
support program in substantial compliance with such plan."  Section
602(a)(26) requires State AFDC plans to

        "provide that, as a condition of eligibility for [AFDC benefits],
        each applicant or recipient will be required, "(A) to assign the
        State any rights to support from any other person such applicant
        may have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family
        member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, . .
        . [and] "(B) to cooperate with the State . . . (ii) in obtaining
        support payments for such applicant and for a child with respect to
        whom such aid is claimed . . . ."


Part D, in turn, requires state plans implementing Title IV Child Support
programs to

"provide that (A) in any case in which support payments are collected for
an individual with respect to whom an assignment under section 602(a)(26)
[in Part A] of this title is effective, such payments shall be made to the
State for distribution pursuant to section 657 [in Part D] of this title .
. . ."  Id., 654(5).


    These cross-references illustrate Congress' intent that the AFDC and
Child Support programs operate together closely to provide uniform levels
of support for children of equal need.  That intent leads to the further
conclusion that Congress used the term "child support" in 602(a)(8)(A)(vi),
and in Part A generally, in the limited sense given the term by its
repeated use in Part D.  The substantial relation between the two programs
presents a classic case for application of the "normal rule of statutory
construction that "`identical words used in different parts of the same act
are intended to have the same meaning.""'  Sorenson v. Secretary of the
Treasury, 475 U. S. 851, 860 (1986) (quoting Helvering v. Stockholms
Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 87 (1934) (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers,
Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932)).
    Since the Secretary's interpretation of the 602(a)(8)(A) (vi) disregard
incorporates the definition of "child support" that we find plain on the
face of the statute, our statutory inquiry is at an end.  The disregard,
accordingly, does not admit of the interpretation advanced by respondents
and accepted by both courts below.  Though Title II child's insurance
benefits might be characterized as "support" in the generic sense, they are
not the sort of child support payments from absent parents envisioned in
the Title IV scheme.  The Title II payments are explicitly characterized in
402(d) as "insurance" benefits and are paid out of the public treasury to
all applicants meeting the statutory criteria.  Thus no portion of any
402(d) payments may be disregarded under 602(a)(8)(A)(vi).
    The Court of Appeals construed the statute the way it did in part
because it felt the construction we adopt would raise a serious doubt as to
its constitutionality.  Pet. for Cert. 12a.  We do not share that doubt.
We agree with the Secretary that Congress' desire to encourage the making
of child support payments by absent parents, see, e. g., 42 U. S. C.
602(a)(26)(B)(ii) and 654(5) (1982 ed., Supp. V) (requiring AFDC recipients
to assist in the collection of child support payments for distribution by
the States under Part D)), affords a rational basis for applying the
disregard to payments from absent parents, but not to Title II insurance
payments which are funded by the Government.  This sort of statutory
distinction does not violate the Equal Protection Clause "if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.
S., at 601 (1987).
    The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.


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Subject: 89-535--DISSENT, SULLIVAN v. STROOP

 


        SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-535



LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, PETITIONER v.
ELIZABETH STROOP et al.


on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth
circuit

[June 14, 1990]



    Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join,
dissenting.
    Today the Court holds that the plain language of a statute applicable
by its terms to "any child support payments" compels the conclusion that
the statute does not apply to benefits paid to the dependent child of a
disabled, retired, or deceased parent for the express purpose of supporting
that child.  Because I am persuaded that this crabbed interpretation of the
statute is neither compelled by its language nor consistent with its
purpose, and arbitrarily deprives certain families of a modest but urgently
needed welfare benefit, I dissent.

I
    I begin, as does the majority, with the plain language of the disregard
provision.  It refers to "any child support payments received . . . with
respect to the dependent child or children in any family applying for or
receiving aid to families with dependent children (including support
payments collected and paid to the family under section 657(b) of this
title)." {1}  42 U. S. C. 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) (1982 ed. Supp. V) (emphasis
added).  This language does not support the majority's narrow
interpretation.  The word "any" generally means all forms or types of the
thing mentioned.  When coupled with the parenthetical phrase "including . .
. ," it in dicates that "support payments collected and paid" by the State
constitute one type within the larger universe of "child support payments."
As the majority recognizes, 602(a)(26)(A) requires all applicants for AFDC
to "assign the State any rights to support from any other person . . ."
Thus, support payments from absent parents will almost always fall within
the parenthetical clause referring to "support payments collected and paid"
by the State.  The plain words of the disregard provision indicate that
such pay- ments are only one of various types of child-support payments;
limiting the meaning of child support to an absent parent's payments
renders the statutory language "any child support payments . . . including
. . ." meaningless.
    The majority's insistence that the ordinary meaning of the term "child
support" excludes Title II payments makes little sense.  Title II is a
program of mandatory wage de ductions, designed to ensure that a worker's
dependents will have some income, should the worker retire, die, or become
disabled.  Califano v. Boles, 443 U. S. 282, 283 (1979) (Title II "attempts
to obviate, through a program of forced sav- ings, the economic
dislocations that may otherwise accompany old age, disability, or the death
of a breadwinner").  Thus, the worker is legally compelled to set aside a
portion of his wages in order to earn benefits used to support his
dependent children in the event he becomes unable to do so himself.  A
child is entitled to Title II payments only if he or she lived with, or
received financial support from, the insured worker, that is, only if the
relationship between the child and the insured worker would (or did) give
rise to a legally enforceable support obligation.  42 U. S. C. 402(d) (1982
ed. and Supp. V).  The sole and express purpose of Title II childrens'
benefits is to support dependent children.  Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.
S. 628, 634 (1974) ("the primary purpose of the . . . Social Security
scheme is to provide support for dependents of a disabled wage earner");
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 507 (1976) ("the Secretary explains the
design of the statutory scheme . . . as a program to provide for all
children of deceased [or disabled] insureds who can demonstrate their
`need' in terms of dependency"); see also Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S.
181, 185-186, and n. 6 (1976).  It is unlawful to use Title II payments for
any other purpose.  42 U. S. C. 408(e). {2}
    How are Title II payments different from court-ordered payments by an
absent parent?  Their source is the same: a parent's wages or assets. {3}
Their purpose is the same: to provide for the needs of a dependent child,
in lieu of the support of a working parent living in the home.  The
majority does not even attempt to explain why the common usage and
understanding of the term "child support" would include all the types of
payments the Secretary says the disregard provision covers, legally
compulsory payments from absent parents, voluntary payments, {4} and even
spousal support payments {5}, but would exclude Title II payments.
    Nonetheless, the majority insists that Title II payments do not
constitute "child support."  The majority points to the use of the term
"child support" in Part D of Title IV to refer to court-ordered support
payments by absent parents.  This begs the question.  Naturally, Congress
was referring to compulsory support payments in Part D, because that part
of the statute is concerned with "enforcing the support obligations owed by
absent parents to their children."  42 U. S. C. 651 (1982 ed. Supp. V).
Other types of child support, such as payments voluntarily made by absent
parents, or payments made by the Government on behalf of dead, disabled, or
retired parents, do not involve the same problems of enforcement. {6}
Nowhere in Part D did Congress actually define "child support," nor does
Part D or any other provision of Title IV indicate that Congress thought
the term "child support" referred only to compulsory payments, or only to
payments made directly by the absent parent.
    The majority relies on the maxim of statutory construction that
identical words in two related statutes, or in different parts of the same
statute, are intended to have the same meaning.  Ante, at 6.  Like all such
maxims, however, this is merely a general assumption, and is not always
valid or applicable.  In Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U. S. 239 (1972),
for example, the Court declined to follow this maxim, because it was
invoked not simply to resolve any ambiguities or doubts in the statutory
language, but, as in this case, "to introduce an exception to the coverage
of the [statute] where none is now apparent."  Id., at 245.  The Court
commented: "[T]his might be a sensible construction of the two statutes if
they were intended to serve the same function, but plainly they were not."
Ibid.  It went on to explain that the two statutes had different purposes
and the reason for the limited scope of one was absent in the context of
the other.  Id., at 245-247.  See also District of Columbia v. Carter, 409
U. S. 418, 421 (1973) ("At first glance, it might seem logical simply to
assume . . . that identical words used in two related statutes were
intended to have the same effect.  Nevertheless . . . the meaning well may
vary to meet the purposes of the law") (internal quotation marks omitted);
Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 87 (1934) ("since most
words admit of different shades of meaning, susceptible of being expanded
or abridged to conform to the sense in which they are used, the presumption
readily yields [when] the words, though in the same act, are found in . . .
dissimilar connections").  This Court's articulation of the limits of the
maxim in Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427
(1932), bears repeating, for it remains true today:

"But the presumption is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such
variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to
warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the
act with different intent . . . .  [T]he meaning well may vary to meet the
purposes of the law, to be arrived at by a consideration of the language in
which those purposes are expressed, and of the circumstances under which
the language was employed . . . .
    "It is not unusual for the same word to be used with different meanings
in the same act, and there is no rule of statutory construction which
precludes the courts from giving to the word the meaning which the legis
lature intended it should have in each instance."  Id., at 433.


    I conclude that the plain language of the statute does not
unequivocally support the Secretary's interpretation.  It is equally
consistent with the opposite conclusion, that Title II payments fall within
the broad, inclusive phrase "any child support payments."  It is therefore
proper to turn to the purpose and history of the disregard provision for
aid in construing that provision.

II
    The majority, in its conservatively restrictive approach, makes only
passing reference to the hardship brought about by the DEFRA amendments.  A
closer look at the effect of these amendments is necessary to understand
the func- tion of the disregard provision.  DEFRA changed the AFDC statutes
in two ways relevant here.  First, it established the "mandatory filing
unit" requirement, that a family's ap plication for AFDC benefits must take
into account any income received by any member of the family, including all
children living in the same household.  42 U. S. C. 602(a)(38) (1982 ed.
Supp. V).  See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U. S. 587, 589 (1987).
    Under prior law, parents could choose to exclude from their AFDC
applications children who received income from other sources.  This
exclusion, in some circumstances, was advantageous to the family; although
the family then would not receive AFDC funds for the excluded child, that
child's income would not be considered in determining its overall AFDC
eligibility.  Thus, in situations where a child's separate income was
greater than the incremental amount of AFDC benefits the family would
receive for that child, the family was better off not counting the child in
its AFDC application.
    Along with the new requirement, however, Congress enacted the provision
at issue here.  The Court in Gilliard explained:

    "Because the 1984 amendments forced families to include in the filing
unit children for whom support payments were being received, the practical
effect was that many families' total income was reduced.  The burden of the
change was mitigated somewhat by a separate amendment providing that the
first $50 of child support collected by the State must be remitted to the
family and not counted as income for the purpose of determining its benefit
level."  Id., at 594. {7}


    The legislative history of the DEFRA amendments supports the conclusion
that the disregard provision was intended to mitigate the harsh effects of
the amendments.  The mandatory filing-unit provision was first proposed by
the Secretary in 1982, but it was dropped in Conference because of
opposition in the House.  See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97- 760, p. 446 (1982).
In 1983, the Secretary again proposed this provision, and it was approved
by the Senate.  S. Rep. No. 98-300, p. 165 (1983).  Again, there was
opposition in the House, and consideration of the provision was carried
over to the next session.  House Committee on Ways and Means, Description
of the Administration's 1985 Budget, Comm. Print No. 98-24, pp. 25, 29-30
(1984).  In 1984, the provision was added by the Senate amendments to H. R.
4170, the bill that became DEFRA.  The report of the House-Senate
Conference Committee explains:

"The conference agreement follows the Senate amendment with the following
modification: a monthly disregard of $50 of child support received by a
family is established."  H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 98-861, p. 1407 (1984).


    Neither the House bill nor the Senate bill had contained a disregard
provision prior to the Conference, nor is there any discussion in the
legislative history of such a provision.  The only plausible explanation
for its sudden appearance is that it was meant to assuage the concerns of
some Members of Congress about the harsh impact of the DEFRA amendments,
and thus to facilitate the passage of the mandatory filing-unit
requirement.
    The burden of the DEFRA amendments falls equally on families with
children receiving Title II benefits and on those with children receiving
court-ordered support payments.  The mitigating purpose of the disregard
provision therefore applies equally to both categories of families.  The
purpose and history of the disregard provision support the Court of
Appeals' interpretation of that provision, and resolve any ambiguity as to
the meaning of the statutory words "any child support payments."
    Since the Secretary's interpretation of the disregard rule is not
compelled by the language of the statute, and is not supported by its
purpose and legislative history, it is not entitled to deference and should
be rejected by this Court.  See NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.
S. 112, 123 (1987) ("On a pure question of statutory construction, our
first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using `traditional
tools of statutory construction.'  If we can do so, then that
interpretation must be given effect, and the regulations at issue must be
fully consistent with it"); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843, n. 9 (1984) ("The judiciary is
the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional
intent . . . .  If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect").

IV
    Even if the meaning of "child support" in the disregard provision were
ambiguous, however, the Secretary's interpretation should still be rejected
because it is so arbitrary as not to reflect a "permissible construction of
the statute."  Id., at 843.  The Secretary's position is that the disregard
applies to legally compulsory child-support payments, voluntary
child-support payments, and spousal-support payments by absent parents, but
not to Title II payments.  See nn. 4 and 5, supra.
    Consider, for example, a family consisting of a mother and three
children.  One of the children is of a prior marriage, and receives support
from her absent father.  The father voluntarily sets aside a portion of his
wages every month and sends them to the mother for the child's support.
The disregard provision applies.  See n. 4, supra.  Then the father
retires, and stops his voluntary contributions, but the child now receives
Title II benefits each month.  The disregard provision, according to the
Secretary, does not apply.  But then the mother obtains a court order
obligating the father to make child-support payments each month, and he
does so.  The disregard provision applies.  Then the father asks the court
to amend the support order, so that the Title II benefits are used to
satisfy his support obligation.  See n. 2, supra.  The disregard provision,
according to the Secretary, does not apply.
    Throughout this example, the child's and her family's financial needs
remain the same.  The impact of the mandatory filing-unit requirement,
forcing the family to count the child's income in its AFDC application and
thus reducing the level of its benefits, remains the same.  The source of
the child's income, her father's earnings, and the purpose of that income,
to fulfill his duty to provide for the needs of his dependent child, remain
the same.  But the applicability of the disregard provision changes with
the vagaries of the Secretary's regulations.
    The Secretary argues that his interpretation of the dis regard
provision is rational because the disregard serves as an incentive for
absent parents to make support payments, and for custodial parents to
cooperate in enforcement efforts (since $50 of those payments directly
benefits the family, and does not merely reimburse the State for AFDC).
But there is simply no indication that Congress intended to limit the
applicability of the disregard provision to situations in which it would
serve as an incentive.  There is no mention of such a purpose in the
legislative history of the provision; moreover, the Secretary points to no
discussion of the need for such an incentive anywhere in the legislative
history of the DEFRA amendments. {8}
    Even if the disregard rule were intended to serve as an incentive, that
does not justify applying the disregard to all court-ordered support
payments, but not to Title II benefits.  Not all court-ordered support
payments depend on the vol untary compliance of the absent parent; some are
deducted directly from the absent parent's wages, just like Title II
deductions.  See n. 3, supra.  Also, insofar as the disregard serves as an
incentive for the custodial parent to help collect support payments, that
purpose applies to Title II benefits as well as to court-ordered support
payments.  To qualify for Title II benefits, the custodial parent, on
behalf of the child, must complete an application and, if necessary,
establish paternity.  If the disregard does not apply to Title II benefits,
so that they serve only to reduce a family's AFDC eligibility, the
custodial parent has no financial incentive to apply for them.
    Thus, I believe that the Secretary cannot provide any rational
explanation for his view that the disregard provision does not apply to
Title II payments.  Even assuming that the provision is ambiguous and that
Chevron deference is to be considered, I cannot in good conscience defer to
an administrative interpretation that results in an arbitrary and
irrational reduction of welfare benefits to certain needy families.  I view
with regret the Court's acquiescence in an administrative effort to cut the
costs of the AFDC program by any means that are available.
    I dissent.

 
 
 
 
 


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1
    42 U. S. C. 657(b) (1982 ed. Supp. V) provides that, when a state
agency collects child or spousal support payments on behalf of a family
receiving AFDC, it shall pay to the family the first $50 of each month's
payment, and retain the rest to reimburse the Government for AFDC
benefits.

2
    The overwhelming majority of state courts that have passed on the
question have concluded that a parent's court-ordered child support obli
gations may be fulfilled by Title II payments, recognizing the functional
equivalence of the two types of payments.  See, e. g., Stroop v. Bowen, 870
F. 2d 969, 974-975 (CA4 1989) (collecting cases); Todd v. Norman, 840 F. 2d
608, 614 and n. 4 (CA8 1988) (dissenting opinion).

3
    Although Title II payments are made by a Government agency, not
directly by the parent, their ultimate source is the parent's earnings.
See Califano v. Boles, 443 U. S. 282, 283 (1979).  Moreover, not all court-
ordered support payments are made by the parent; under a mandatory
wage-assignment order, child support is deducted automatically from the
absent parent's wages (just as Title II deductions are).  See 42 U. S. C.
666(b) (1982 ed. Supp. V).

4
    The Secretary considers voluntary payments by an absent parent to be
"child support" within the meaning of the disregard provision.  53 Fed.
Reg. 21644 (1988).

5
    See id., at 21642.

6
    The majority's reliance on the fact that Part D "abounds with
references to `child support' in the context of compulsory support funds
from absent parents," ante, at 5, to limit the meaning of "child support"
in 602(a)(8)(A)(vi), appears to be inconsistent with the Secretary's own
interpretation of the disregard provision as including voluntary as well as
court-ordered payments.  See n. 4, supra.

7
    The $50 disregard, though it may seem to be a small sum, may be a
substantial part of a family's monthly income.  In Virginia, respond- ent's
State of residence, the maximum monthly AFDC payment for a family of three
is currently $265.  Brief for Respondents 1-2.  See 45 CFR 233.20(a)(2)
(1989); Virginia Code 63.1-110 (Supp. 1989).  An additional $50 would be a
19% increase in AFDC benefits.

8
    The Secretary relies on the legislative history of a 1975 provision
which allowed 40% of the first $50 of child support collected by the state
agency to be disregarded in determining the family's income level.  42 U.
S. C. 657(a)(1).  This provision, by its express terms, however, is
applicable only "during the 15 months beginning July 1, 1975."  In 1975,
the statutory obligation of AFDC applicants to assign support rights and
cooperate with enforcement efforts had just been established, see 42 U. S.
C. 602(a)(26), and Congress apparently believed that a temporary incentive
provision would help to ensure compliance with these new requirements.
Such a rule, however, was never again proposed or enacted between 1975 and
1984.
    By 1984, the assignment and cooperation requirements were long-standing
conditions of AFDC eligibility.  Custodial parents who failed to assign
their support rights and cooperate in enforcement efforts would know that
they stood to lose their AFDC benefits.  The very different contexts in
which the 1974 and 1984 disregard statutes were enacted thus give an
additional reason for this Court's usual reluctance to infer the intent of
one Congress from the views expressed by another.  See Russello v. United
States, 464 U. S. 16, 26 (1983); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750,
758 (1979).





Subject: 89-535--DISSENT, SULLIVAN v. STROOP

 


        SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-535



LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, PETITIONER v.
ELIZABETH STROOP, et al.


on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth
circuit


[June 14, 1990]




    Justice Stevens, dissenting.

    Although the answer to the question presented by this case is not quite
as clear to me as it is to Justice Blackmun, I believe he has the better of
the argument.  If one puts aside legal terminology and considers ordinary
English usage, Social Security benefits paid to the surviving child of a
deceased wage earner are reasonably characterized as a form of "child
support payments", indeed, they are quite obviously payments made to
support children.  Moreover, respondents' interpretation of Title IV of the
Social Security Act effectuates congressional intent: if a $50 portion of
Social Security payments is disregarded when a family's eligibility for aid
is determined, children with equal need will be more likely to receive
equal aid.  Finally, the interpretation achieves this parity in a way that
serves the disregard provision's purpose, fairly inferred from legislative
history, of mitigating the hardships imposed by the 1984 amendment that
required families applying for aid to count child support payments as
available income.

    Thus, Title II children's benefit payments are fairly encompassed by
both the language and the purpose of the disregard provision.  It may be
that Congress did not sharply focus on the specific problem presented by
this case; the statutory terminology suggests as much.  Yet, this fact does
not seem to me sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to Congress'
more general intent, an intent that is expressed, albeit imperfectly, in
the language Congress chose.  For these reasons, and others stated by
Justice Blackmun in his thorough opinion, I would affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.

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