Subject:  MAISLIN INDUSTRIES, U. S. v. PRIMARY STEEL, Syllabus



 
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as
is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is
issued.  The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but
has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
reader.  See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


Syllabus



MAISLIN INDUSTRIES, U. S., INC., et al. v. PRIMARY STEEL, INC.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit

No. 89-624.  Argued April 16, 1990--Decided June 21, 1990

The Interstate Commerce Act (Act) requires motor common carriers to publish
their rates in tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),
49 U. S. C. MDRV 10762, and prohibits both carriers and shippers from
deviating from those rates, MDRV 10761.  The Act also specifies that a
carrier's rates must be nondiscriminatory, MDRV 10741, and that its rates
and practices must be reasonable, MDRV 10701, and charges the ICC, upon
determining that a rate or practice violates the statute, with prescribing
the rate or practice to be followed, MDRV 10704(b)(1).  Purportedly
pursuant to this authority, the ICC, in its recent Negotiated Rates
decisions, has adopted a policy that relieves a shipper of the obligation
to pay the filed rate when it has privately negotiated a lower rate with
the carrier.  From 1981 to 1983, Quinn Freight Lines, a motor common
carrier and a subsidiary of petitioner Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc.,
privately negotiated interstate shipment rates with respondent Primary
Steel, Inc., that were lower than Quinn's filed rates.  Quinn never filed
the negotiated rates with the ICC.  In 1983, Maislin filed for bankruptcy,
and the bankrupt estate issued balance due bills to Primary for the
difference between the filed rates and the negotiated rates.  When Primary
refused to pay the undercharges, the estate brought suit in the District
Court, which referred the matter to the ICC.  Rejecting the argument that
it lacked the statutory power to release a shipper from liability for such
undercharges, the ICC relied on its Negotiated Rates policy to hold that
MDRV 10701 authorized it to consider all the circumstances surrounding an
undercharge suit to determine whether collection of the filed rate would
constitute an unreasonable practice.  The ICC concluded that Maislin was
not entitled to recover, since Quinn and Primary had negotiated other
rates, and since Primary had relied on Quinn to file those rates, had
reasonably believed that the amounts quoted and billed were the correct
total charges, and had made full payment.  The case returned to the
District Court, which granted summary judgment for Primary on the basis of
the ICC's decision.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing with the
District Court that the approach taken by the ICC was consistent with the
Act.

Held: The ICC's Negotiated Rates policy is inconsistent with the Act and is
therefore invalid.  Pp. 8-18.

    (a) Since the duty to file rates under MDRV 10762 and the obligation to
charge only those rates under MDRV 10761 have always been considered
essential to preventing price discrimination violative of MDRV 10741,
Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370, 384,
this Court has long held that the filed rate alone governs the legal rights
of a shipper against a carrier, see, e. g., Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern
R. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 163, and that the statute forbids equitable defenses
to collection of the filed tariff, see, e. g., Texas & Pacific R. Co. v.
Mugg, 202 U. S. 242, 245, including the shipper's ignorance or the
carrier's misquotation of rates, see, e. g., Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 97.  Despite its sometimes harsh effects, this
rigid "filed rate doctrine" has been strictly applied and consistently
adhered to by the Court.  See, e. g., Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan
K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U. S. 533, 535.  Pp. 8-10.

    (b) Although, under the filed rate doctrine, the tariff rate is not
enforceable if the ICC finds it to be unreasonable, see, e. g., Maxwell,
supra, at 97, that exception is not applicable here.  The ICC's
determination that a carrier engages in an "unreasonable practice" when it
attempts to collect the filed rate after the parties have negotiated a
lower rate is not entitled to deference, since it conflicts with this
Court's interpretation, from which Congress has not diverged, that the
secret negotiation and collection of rates lower than the filed rate is
discriminatory under MDRV 10741.  See, e. g., Armour Packing Co. v. United
States, 209 U. S. 56, 81.  Stripped of its semantic cover, the Negotiated
Rates policy and, more specifically, the ICC's interpretation of
"unreasonable practices," thus stand revealed as flatly inconsistent with
the Act's scheme as a whole and 15 10761 and 10762 in particular.  Nor can
the ICC's policy be justified on the ground that it prevents the carrier
from receiving a windfall, i.e., the higher filed rate, from its failure to
comply with MDRV 10762's directive to file the negotiated rate, since such
"equities" are irrelevant to the application of MDRV 10761, which requires
the carrier to collect the filed rate.  Compliance with 15 10761 and 10762
is utterly central to the administration of the Act, and, by sanctioning
adherence to unfiled rates, the Negotiated Rates policy effectively renders
those sections nugatory and conflicts directly with the Act's core
purposes.  Pp. 10-15.

    (c) The passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA)--which
substantially deregulated the motor carrier industry for the avowed purpose
of promoting competitive and efficient transportation services--does not
justify the ICC's Negotiated Rates policy.  Although the ICC has both the
authority and the expertise generally to adopt new policies when faced with
new developments in the industry, its power does not extend to a policy
that directly conflicts with its governing statute.  Nothing in the MCA
repeals 15 10761 and 10762, and generalized congressional exhortations to
"increase competition" cannot provide the ICC authority to alter the
requirements of those sections as interpreted by this Court.  Cf. Square D
Co. v. Niagara Frontier Traffic Bureau, Inc., 476 U. S. 409, 420.  The fact
that, even before the MCA's passage, Congress had allowed the ICC to exempt
motor contract carriers from the requirement that they adhere to the
published tariff, see MDRV 10761(b), demonstrates that Congress is aware of
the requirement and has deliberately chosen not to disturb it with respect
to motor common carriers.  Pp. 15-18.

879 F. 2d 400, reversed and remanded.

    Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined.  Scalia,
J., filed a concurring opinion.  Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------




Subject: 89-624--OPINION, MAISLIN INDUSTRIES, U. S. v. PRIMARY STEEL

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-624



MAISLIN INDUSTRIES, U. S., INC., et al., PETITIONERS v. PRIMARY STEEL, INC.


on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth
circuit

[June 21, 1990]



    Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court.

    Under the Interstate Commerce Act (Act), 49 U. S. C. MDRV 10101 et seq.
(1982 ed.), motor common carriers must file their rates with the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission), and both carriers and shippers
must adhere to these rates.  This case requires us to determine the
validity of a policy recently adopted by the ICC that relieves a shipper of
the obligation of paying the filed rate when the shipper and carrier have
privately negotiated a lower rate.  We hold that this policy is
inconsistent with the Act.

I


A
    The ICC regulates interstate transportation by motor common carriers to
ensure that rates are both reasonable and nondiscriminatory.  See 49 U. S.
C. 15 10101(a), 10701(a) 10741(b) (1982 ed.).  The Act provides that a
"common carrier . . . may not subject a person, place, port, or type of
traffic to unreasonable discrimination."  MDRV 10741.  In addition, the Act
states that "[a] rate . . . , classification, rule, or practice related to
transportation or service . . . must be reasonable."  MDRV 10701(a). {1}
The ICC has primary responsibility for determining whether a rate or
practice is reasonable.  See Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil
Co., 204 U. S. 426, 440-442 (1907).  The Commission may investigate the
reasonableness of a rate "on its own initiative or on complaint."  MDRV
11701(a).  When the Commission determines that a rate or practice violates
the statute, it "shall prescribe the rate . . . or practice to be
followed."  MDRV 10704(b)(1).  Moreover, motor common carriers are liable
"for damages resulting from the imposition of rates for transportation or
service the Commission finds to be in violation" of the Act.  49 U. S. C.
MDRV 11705(b)(3) (1982 ed., Supp. V).
    The Act requires a motor common carrier to "publish and file with the
Commission tariffs containing the rates for transportation it may provide."
49 U. S. C. MDRV 10762(a)(1) (1982 ed.).  The Act also specifically
prohibits a carrier from providing services at any rate other than the
filed (also known as tariff) rate:

    "Except as provided in this subtitle, a carrier providing
transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission . . . shall provide that transportation or service only
if the rate for the transportation or service is contained in a tariff that
is in effect under this subchapter.  That carrier may not charge or receive
a different compensation for that transportation or service than the rate
specified in the tariff whether by returning a part of that rate to a
person, giving a person a privilege, allowing the use of a facility that
affects the value of that transportation or service, or another device."
MDRV 10761(a).


Deviation from the filed rate may result in the imposition of civil or
criminal sanctions on the carrier or shipper.  See 15 11902-11904. {2}
    As the Court has frequently stated, the statute does not permit either
a shipper's ignorance or the carrier's misquotation of the applicable rate
to serve as a defense to the collection of the filed rate.  See Southern
Pacific Transp. Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456 U. S. 336, 352 (1982);
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 97 (1915).  In
1986, however, the ICC concluded that changes in the motor carrier industry
"clearly warrant a tempering of the former harsh rule of adhering to the
tariff rate in virtually all cases."  NITL--Petition to Institute
Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates, 3 I. C. C. 2d 99, 106
(1986) (Negotiated Rates I).  Under the new policy, when cases are referred
to the Commission, it "decid[es] if the collection of undercharges would be
an unreasonable practice."  Id., at 100.
    In Negotiated Rates I, the Commission adverted to a growing trend in
the motor carrier industry whereby carriers and shippers negotiate rates
lower than those on file with the ICC and the shippers are billed for and
remit payment at the negotiated rate.  In many instances, however, the
negotiated rate is never filed with the ICC.  In some of those cases, the
carrier subsequently files for bankruptcy and the trustee bills the shipper
for the difference between the tariff rate and the negotiated rate, arguing
that MDRV 10761 compels the collection of the filed rather than negotiated
rate.  Id., at 99.  The Commission concluded that, under such
circumstances, "it could be fundamentally unfair not to consider a
shipper's equitable defenses to a claim for undercharges."  Id., at 103.
The Commission reasoned that the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980,
which significantly deregulated the motor carrier industry, justified the
change in policy, for the new competitive atmosphere made strict
application of MDRV 10761 unnecessary to deter discrimination.  3 I. C. C.
2d, at 106.  Moreover, the Commission asserted that it had authority under
MDRV 10701 to determine whether the collection of the undercharge in a
particular case would constitute an unreasonable practice.  Id., at 103.
{3}
    The ICC clarified its new policy in NITL--Petition to Institute
Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates, 5 I. C. C. 2d 623
(1989) (Negotiated Rates II).  The Commission explained that its policy did
not recognize "equitable defenses" but rather applied the "affirmative
statutory requiremen[t] and obligatio[n]" of MDRV 10701 that a carrier's
practices be reasonable.   Id., at 631, n. 18. {4}  "[T]he Commission is
finding to be an unreasonable practice . . . a course of conduct consisting
of: (1) negotiating a rate; (2) agreeing to a rate that the shipper
reasonably relies upon as being lawfully filed; (3) failing, either
willfully or otherwise, to publish the rate; (4) billing and accepting
payment at the negotiated rate for (sometimes) numerous shipments; and (5)
then demanding additional payment at higher rates."  Id., at 628, n. 11.

B
    This case involves the application of the Commission's new Negotiated
Rates policy.  It arises from an action by petitioner Maislin Industries,
U. S., Inc. (Maislin), to recover freight undercharges for 1,081 interstate
shipments performed for a shipper, respondent Primary Steel (Primary), by
petitioner's subsidiary, Quinn Freight Lines (Quinn).  From 1981 to 1983,
Quinn, a motor common carrier certifi cated by the ICC, privately
negotiated rates with Primary that were lower than Quinn's rates then on
file with the ICC.  Quinn never filed the negotiated rates with the ICC.
    In 1983, Maislin filed for bankruptcy, and a postpetition audit of its
accounts revealed undercharges of $187,923.36 resulting from billing
Primary at the negotiated rather than filed rates.  The agents of the
bankrupt estate, pursuant to the authorization of the bankruptcy court,
issued balance due bills to Primary for these undercharges.  When Primary
refused to pay the amounts demanded, the estate brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri under 49 U. S.
C. MDRV 11706(a) (1982 ed.)  {5} for the difference between the filed rates
and the negotiated rates.
    In its answer, Primary alleged that since the parties had negotiated
lower rates, rebilling at the tariff rates would constitute an unreasonable
practice in violation of MDRV 10701; that the tariff rates themselves were
not "reasonable" within the meaning of MDRV 10701; and that the asserted
tariff rates were otherwise inapplicable to the shipments at issue.  The
District Court, finding these matters to be within the primary jurisdiction
of the ICC, stayed the proceeding at Primary's request and referred the
case to the Commission.  App. 6-8.    The ICC ruled in Primary's favor,
rejecting Maislin's argument that the Commission lacked the statutory power
to release a shipper from liability for such undercharges.  Relying on
Negotiated Rates I, the ICC reiterated that MDRV 10701 authorized it to
"consider all the circumstances surrounding an undercharge suit" to
determine whether collection of the filed rate would constitute an
unreasonable practice.   App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a.  In the Commission's
view, its role was "to undertake an analysis of whether a negotiated but
unpublished rate existed, the circumstances surrounding assessment of the
tariff rate, and any other pertinent facts."  Id., at 36a.  With respect to
the instant controversy, the ICC concluded that Quinn and Primary had
negotiated rates other than the tariff rates  {6} and that Primary had
relied on Quinn to file the rates with the ICC. {7}  "Primary reasonably
believed that the amounts quoted and billed by Quinn were the correct total
charges for the transportation services it performed, that the amounts were
reached as the result of negotiations between Primary and Quinn, and that,
since full payment was made by [Primary]," Maislin was not entitled to
recover the filed rates.   Id., at 43a.
    The case returned to the District Court where both parties moved for
summary judgment.  The court granted summary judgment for Primary,
rejecting Maislin's argument that the ICC's new policy was, in effect, an
impermissible recognition of equitable defenses to the application of the
filed rate.  The District Court concluded that the ICC's policy of
determining case by case whether the collection of undercharges would be an
unreasonable practice under MDRV 10701 was based on a permissible
construction of the Act.  705 F. Supp. 1401, 1405-1406 (1988).  The court
also determined that the ICC's finding that Maislin had engaged in an
unreasonable practice was supported by substantial evidence.  Id., at
1406-1407.
    The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the
approach taken by the ICC was consistent with the Act.  The court reasoned
that "[s]ection 10761(a), which mandates the collection of tariff rates, is
only part of an overall regulatory scheme administered by the ICC, and
there is no provision in the [Act] elevating this section over section
10701, which requires that tariff rates be reasonable."  879 F. 2d 400, 405
(1989).  The court concluded: "[T]he proper authority to harmonize these
competing provisions is the ICC. . . . The approach taken by the ICC does
not abolish the filed rate doctrine, but merely allows the ICC to consider
all of the circumstances, including equitable defenses, to determine if
strict adherence to the filed rate doctrine would constitute an
unreasonable practice."  Ibid. (citation omitted).  Because the Courts of
Appeals have disagreed on the important issue of whether the ICC's
Negotiated Rates policy is consistent with the Act, {8} we granted
certiorari.  493 U. S. ---- (1990).

II
    The Interstate Commerce Act requires a motor common carrier to publish
its rates in a tariff filed with the Commission.  49 U. S. C. MDRV 10762
(1982 ed.).  This Court has long understood that the filed rate governs the
legal relation- ship between shipper and carrier.  In Keogh v. Chicago &
Northwestern R. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 163 (1922), the Court explained:

"The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to a rate are
measured by the published tariff.  Unless and until suspended or set aside,
this rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and
shipper.  The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or enlarged
by either contract or tort of the carrier. . . . This stringent rule
prevails, because otherwise the paramount purpose of Congress--prevention
of unjust discrimination--might be defeated."  (Citations omitted.)


See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U. S. 409,
415-417 (1986); Abilene Cotton Oil, 204 U. S., at 439; Texas & Pacific R.
Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242, 245 (1906); Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co v. Hefley,
158 U. S. 98, 101 (1895).  The duty to file rates with the Commission, see
MDRV 10762, and the obligation to charge only those rates, see MDRV 10761,
have always been considered essential to preventing price discrimination
and stabilizing rates.  "In order to render rates definite and certain, and
to prevent discrimination and other abuses, the statute require[s] the
filing and publishing of tariffs specifying the rates adopted by the
carrier, and ma[kes] these the legal rates, that is, those which must be
charged to all shippers alike."  Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.
F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370, 384 (1932).
    Given the close interplay between the duties imposed by 15 10761-10762
and the statutory prohibition on discrimination, see MDRV 10741, this Court
has read the statute to create strict filed rate requirements and to forbid
equitable defenses to collection of the filed tariff.  See Mugg, supra, at
245; Hefley, supra, at 101.  The classic statement of the "filed rate
doctrine," as it has come to be known, is explained in Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94 (1915).  In that case, the Court
held that a passenger who purchased a train ticket at a rate misquoted by
the ticket agent did not have a defense against the subsequent collection
of the higher tariff rate by the railroad.

"Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the rate of the carrier duly filed is
the only lawful charge.  Deviation from it is not permitted upon any
pretext.  Shippers and travelers are charged with notice of it, and they as
well as the carrier must abide by it, unless it is found by the Commission
to be unreasonable.  Ignorance or misquotation of rates is not an excuse
for paying or charging either less or more than the rate filed.  This rule
is undeniably strict and it obviously may work hardship in some cases, but
it embodies the policy which has been adopted by Congress in the regulation
of interstate commerce in order to prevent unjust discrimination."  Id., at
97. {9}


This rigid approach was deemed necessary to prevent carriers from
intentionally "misquoting" rates to shippers as a means of offering them
rebates or discounts.  See S. Rep. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., 181,
188-190, 198-200 (1886).  As the Commission itself found, "past experience
shows that billing clerks and other agents of carriers might easily become
experts in the making of errors and mistakes in the quotation of rates to
favored shippers, while other shippers, less fortunate in their relations
with carriers and whose traffic is less important, would be compelled to
pay the higher published rates."  Poor v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 12 I. C.
C. 418, 421 Grain Co. (1907); see also Western Transp. Co. v. Wilson & Co.,
682 F. 2d 1227, 1230-1231 (CA7 1982).  Despite the harsh effects of the
filed rate doctrine, we have consistently adhered to it.  See, e. g.,
Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U. S. 533, 535
(1983); Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 456 U. S., at 343-344; Baldwin v.
Scott County Milling Co., 307 U. S. 478, 484-485 (1939); Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265 U. S. 59, 65 (1924).
    The filed rate doctrine, however, contains an important caveat: the
filed rate is not enforceable if the ICC finds the rate to be unreasonable.
See Maxwell, supra, at 97 (filed rate applies "unless it is found by the
Commission to be unreasonable") (emphasis added); see also Keogh, 260 U.
S., at 163 ("The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to a
rate are measured by the published tariff.  Unless and until suspended or
set aside, this rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate") (emphasis
added).  The filed rate doctrine, therefore, follows from the requirement
that only filed rates be collected, as commanded by 15 10761 and 10762, the
requirement that rates not be discriminatory, see 49 U. S. C. MDRV 10741,
and the requirement of MDRV 10701 that carriers adopt reasonable rates and
practices.  As we explained in Arizona Grocery, supra, although the filed
rate is the legal rate, the Act

"did not abrogate, but [rather] expressly affirmed, the common-law duty to
charge no more than a reasonable rate . . . .  In other words, the legal
rate was not made by the statute a lawful rate--it was lawful only if it
was reasonable.  Under [the Act] the shipper was bound to pay the legal
rate; but if he could show that it was unreasonable he might recover
reparation.
    "The Act altered the common law by lodging in the Commission the power
theretofore exercised by courts, of determining the reasonableness of a
published rate.  If the finding on this question was against the carrier,
reparation was to be awarded the shipper, and only the enforcement of the
award was relegated to the courts."  284 U. S., at 384-385 (footnote
omitted).


    In the instant case, the Commission did not find that the rates were
unreasonable  {10} but rather concluded that the carrier had engaged in an
unreasonable practice in violation of MDRV 10701 that should preclude it
from collecting the filed rates.  The Commission argues that under the
filed rate doctrine, a finding that the carrier engaged in an unreasonable
practice should, like a finding that the filed rate is unreasonable,
disentitle the carrier to collection of the filed rate.  We have never held
that a carrier's unreasonable practice justifies departure from the filed
tariff schedule. {11}  But we need not resolve this issue today because we
conclude that the justification for departure from the filed tariff
schedule that the ICC set forth in its Negotiated Rates policy rests on an
interpretation of the Act that is contrary to the language and structure of
the statute as a whole and the requirements that make up the filed rate
doctrine in particular.
    Under the Negotiated Rates policy, the ICC has determined that a
carrier engages in an unreasonable practice when it attempts to collect the
filed rate after the parties have negotiated a lower rate.  The ICC argues
that its conclusion is entitled to deference because MDRV 10701 does not
specifically address the types of practices that are to be considered
unreasonable and because its construction is rational and consistent with
the statute.  See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984).
    We disagree.  For a century, this Court has held that the Act, as it
incorporates the filed rate doctrine, forbids as discriminatory the secret
negotiation and collection of rates lower than the filed rate.  See supra,
at ----.  By refusing to order collection of the filed rate solely because
the parties had agreed to a lower rate, the ICC has permitted the very
price discrimination the Act by its terms seeks to prevent.  See 49 U. S.
C. MDRV 10741.  As we stated in Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.
S. 56, 81 (1908):

"If the rates are subject to secret alteration by special agreement then
the statute will fail of its purpose to establish a rate duly published,
known to all, and from which neither shipper nor carrier may depart. . . .
[The Act] has provided for the establishing of one rate, to be filed as
provided, subject to change as provided, and that rate to be while in force
the only legal rate.  Any other construction of the statute opens the door
to the possibility of the very abuses of unequal rates which it was the
design of the statute to prohibit and punish."


Congress has not diverged from this interpretation and we decline to
revisit it ourselves.  See California v. FERC, 495 U. S. ----, ---- (1990),
slip op. at 6 (recognizing the respect "this Court must accord to
long-standing and well-entrenched decisions, especially those interpreting
stautes that underlie complex regulatory regimes").  Once we have
determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under
the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's later
interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the
statute's meaning.  Labelling the carrier's conduct an "unreasonable
practice" cannot disguise the fact that the ICC is justifying deviation
from the filed rate purely on the ground that the carrier and shipper have
privately negotiated a lower rate.  Stripped of its semantic cover, the
Negotiated Rates policy and, more specifically, the Commission's
interpretation of "unreasonable practices" thus stand revealed as flatly
inconsistent with the statutory scheme as a whole, cf. Fort Stewart Schools
v. FLRA, 495 U. S. ----, ---- (1990) slip op., at 3; Dole v. United
Steelworkers, 494 U. S. ----, ---- (1990) [slip op., at 8], and 15 10761
and 10762 in particular.
    Nor can the Negotiated Rates policy be justified as a remedy for the
carrier's failure to comply with MDRV 10762's directive to file the
negotiated rate with the ICC.  See Negotiated Rates I, 3 I. C. C. 2d, at
103.  The Commission argues that the carrier should not receive a windfall,
i. e., the higher filed rate, from its failure to comply with the statute.
See Brief for United States 25-27.  But MDRV 10761 requires the carrier to
collect the filed rate, and we have never accepted the argument that such
"equities" are relevant to the application of MDRV 10761. {12}  See, e. g.,
Maxwell, 237 U. S., at 97.  Indeed, strict adherence to the filed rate has
never been justified on the ground that the carrier is equitably entitled
to that rate, but rather that such adherence, despite its harsh
consequences in some cases, is necessary to enforcement of the Act.  See
supra, at ----.
    Compliance with 15 10761 and 10762 is "utterly central" to the
administration of the Act.  Regular Common Carrier Conference v. United
States, 253 U. S. App. D. D. 305, 308, 793 F. 2d 376, 379 (1986).  "Without
[these provisions] . . .  it would be monumentally difficult to enforce the
requirement that rates be reasonable and nondiscriminatory, . . . and
virtually impossible for the public to assert its right to challenge the
lawfulness of existing proposed rates."  Ibid. (citations omitted).
Although the ICC argues that the Negotiated Rates policy does not
"abolis[h] the requirement in section 10761 that carriers must continue to
charge the tariff rate,"  App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a, the policy, by
sanctioning adherence to unfiled rates, undermines the basic structure of
the Act.  The ICC cannot review in advance the reasonableness of unfiled
rates.  Likewise, other shippers cannot know if they should challenge a
carrier's rates as discriminatory when many of the carrier's rates are
privately negotiated and never disclosed to the ICC.  Thus, although we
agree that the Commission may have discretion to craft appropriate remedies
for violations of the statute, see ICC v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.
467 U. S. 354, 364-365 (1984), the "remedy" articulated in the Negotiated
Rates policy effectively renders nugatory the requirements of 15 10761 and
10762 and conflicts directly with the core purposes of the Act.    The ICC
maintains, however, that the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980
(MCA), Pub. L. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793, justifies its Negotiated Rates policy.
The MCA substantially deregulated the motor carrier industry in many ways
in an effort to "promote competitive and efficient transportation
services."  Pub. L. 96-296, MDRV 4, formerly codified at 49 U. S. C. MDRV
10101(a)(7) (1976 ed., Supp. V).  In addition to loosening entry controls,
see MDRV 5, codified at 49 U. S. C. MDRV 10922 (1982 ed.), the MCA also
created a zone of reasonableness within which carriers can raise rates
without interference from the ICC.  See MDRV 11, codified at 49 U. S. C.
MDRV 10708 (1982 ed.).  More importantly, the MCA also allows motor
carriers to operate as both common carriers and contract carriers.  See
Pub. L. 96-296, MDRV 10(b)(1), amending 49 U. S. C. MDRV 10930(a) (1982
ed.).  A contract carrier transports property under exclusive agreements
with a shipper, see 49 U. S. C. MDRV 10102(14) (1982 ed.), and the
Commission has exempted all motor contract carriers from the requirements
of 15 10761 and 10762.  See Exemption of Motor Contract Carriers from
Tariff Filing Requirements, 133 M. C. C. 150 (1983), aff'd sub nom. Central
& Southern Motor Freight Tariff Assn., Inc. v. United States, 244 U. S.
App. D. C. 226, 757 F. 2d 301, cert. denied, 474 U. S. 1019 (1985). {13}
The Commission has also relaxed the regulations relating to motor common
carriers, most significantly, by allowing decreased rates to go into effect
one day after the filing of a tariff.  See Short Notice Effectiveness for
Independently Filed Rates, 1 I. C. C. 2d 146 (1984), aff'd sub nom.
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 773 F. 2d 1561
(CA11 1985). {14}  In Negotiated Rates I and II, the Commission concluded
that in light of the more competitive environment, strict adherence to the
filed rate doctrine "is inappropriate and unnecessary to deter
discrimination today."  Negotiated Rates I, 3 I. C. C., at 106.  According
to the Commission, " `the inability of a shipper to rely on a carrier's
interpretation of a tariff is a greater evil than the remote possibility
that a carrier might intentionally misquote an applicable tariff rate to
discriminate illegally between shippers.' "  Ibid., quoting Seaboard System
R. Co. v. United States, 794 F. 2d 635, 638 (CA11 1986).
    We reject this argument.  Although the Commission has both the
authority and expertise generally to adopt new policies when faced with new
developments in the industry, see American Trucking Assns, Inc. v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 397, 416 (1967), it does not have
the power to adopt a policy that directly conflicts with its governing
statute.  Nothing in the MCA repeals 15 10761 and 10762 or casts doubt on
our prior interpretation of those sections.  Generalized congressional
exhortations to "increase competition" cannot provide the ICC authority to
alter the well- established statutory filed rate requirements.  As we said
in Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Traffic Bureau, Inc., with respect to a
similarly longstanding judicial interpretation of the Act:

"Congress must be presumed to have been fully cognizant of this
interpretation of the statutory scheme, which had been a significant part
of our settled law for over half a century, and . . . Congress did not see
fit to change it when Congress carefully reexamined this area of the law in
1980.  [Respondent has] pointed to no specific statutory provision or
legislative history indicating a specific congressional intention to
overturn the longstanding . . . construction; harmony with the general
legislative purpose is inadequate for that formidable task."  476 U. S., at
420 (footnotes omitted).


See also California v. FERC, 495 U. S., at ----, slip op., at 6-7.  Even
before the passage of the MCA, Congress had allowed the Commission to
exempt motor contract carriers from the requirement that they adhere to the
published tariff, see 49 U. S. C. MDRV 10761(b) (1982 ed.), demonstrating
that Congress is aware of the requirement and has deliberately chosen not
to disturb it with respect to motor common carriers. {15}  If strict
adherence to 15 10761 and 10762 as embodied in the filed rate doctrine has
become an anachronism in the wake of the MCA, it is the responsibility of
Congress to modify or eliminate these sections.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the
cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
 
 
 
 
 
 

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1
    The Act states that when reviewing the reasonableness of a carrier's
rates, the Commission "shall authorize revenue levels that are adequate
under honest, economical, and efficient management to cover total operating
expenses . . . plus a reasonable profit."  49 U. S. C. MDRV 10701(e) (1982
ed.) [footnote omitted].

2
    Section 11902 provides that a shipper who knowingly receives a rebate
or offset against the filed rate is liable to the government for a civil
penalty in an amount equal to three times the rebate.  See MDRV 11902.
Section 11903(a) states that any person who "knowingly offers, grants,
gives, solicits, accepts, or receives" service at less than the filed rate
"shall be fined at least $1,000 but not more than $20,000, imprisoned for
not more than 2 years, or both."  A carrier who willfully fails to file and
publish its tariffs is subject to the same penalty.  See MDRV 11903(b); see
also MDRV 11904 (corporate liability).

3
    The Commission stated that its new policy did not "abrogate Section
10761.  Rather we emphasize that carriers must continue to charge the
tariff rate as provided in the statute.  The issue here is simply whether
we have the authority to consider all the circumstances surrounding an
undercharge suit."  NITL--Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated
Motor Common Carrier Rates, 3 I. C. C. 2d 99, 103 (1986) (citations
omitted).  The Commission rejected a proposal by the National Industrial
Transportation League (NITL) that would have declared the negotiated rate
to be the maximum reasonable rate.  The Commission concluded that the
proposal conflicted with MDRV 10761 because it created a "per se
determination that, as a matter of law, the negotiated rate would apply."
Id., at 102.

4
    The Commission stated: "[O]ur Negotiated Rates policy does not
represent a relaxed interpretation of MDRV 10761, but rather a separate
determination under MDRV 10701.  But even if it were viewed as a
reinterpretation of a previously strict construction of MDRV 10761, it
would be . . . well within this agency's authority (and indeed duty) to
reinterpret the Interstate Commerce Act, based on upon experience gained
and changing circumstances." NITL--Petition to Institute Rulemaking on
Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates, 5 I. C. C. 2d 623, 631 (1989)
(citing American Trucking Assn., Inc. v. Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U.
S. 397, 416 (1967)).

5
    Section 11706(a) provides:
    "A common carrier providing transportation or service subject to the
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission . . . must begin a civil
action to recover charges for transportation or service provided by the
carrier within 3 years after the claim accrues."

6
    See App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a-38a.  The Commission relied primarily on
two "rate sheets" to find that negotiated rates existed.  According to the
Commission, a three-page rate sheet prepared by Primary in 1981
demonstrated that Quinn, through its agent James McGowan, had negotiated a
five percent across-the-board increase in rates above those in Quinn's
tariff on file with the ICC.  Sometime in 1982, when Primary notified Quinn
that it would need relief from the rates in order to continue using Quinn,
the parties orally negotiated a decrease in the rates.  Primary prepared a
new rate sheet which was sent to all the relevant individuals.
Subsequently, whenever rates were needed for destinations other than those
shown on the rate sheet, McGowan would set a new rate based on the mileage
involved.  The ICC concluded that "there is evidence of offers,
acceptances, and approvals by the involved parties" before each of the
shipments in question.  Id., at 36a; see also id. at 38a.

7
    See id., at 43a.  This finding was based on the fact that McGowan
represented that his superiors had approved the rates on the written rate
sheets.  See id., at 40a.  The Commission noted that Primary's
representative was never given an actual tariff documenting that the agreed
upon rates had been filed with ICC and that Primary's representative had no
training with respect to tariffs, but the Commission concluded that the
representative "understood that Quinn would do whatever was necessary to
implement the agreed upon rates."  Id., at 32a.  The Commission
specifically found that "[w]hile Quinn may not have taken appropriate steps
to legalize the quoted rates, it has not been demonstrated that this
occurred as a result of any intent to engage in unlawful conduct."  Id., at
42a.

8
    Compare In re Caravan Refrigerated Cargo, Inc. (Supreme Beef
Processors), 864 F. 2d 388 (CA5 1989), with Delta Traffic Service v.
Transtop, ---- F. 2d ---- (CA1 1990); Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Zenith Electronic Corp., 899 F. 2d 642 (CA7 1990); West Coast Truck Lines,
Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser, Co., 893 F. 2d 1016 (CA9 1990); Delta Traffic Service
& Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. Appco Paper & Plastics Corp., 893 F. 2d 472
(CA2 1990).

9
    See also Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265
U. S. 59, 65 (1924) ("No contract of the carrier could reduce the amount
legally payable; or release from liability a shipper who had assumed an
obligation to pay the charges.  Nor could any act or omission of the
carrier (except the running of the statute of limitations) estop or
preclude it from enforcing payment of the full amount by a person liable
therefor"); Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 653 (1913)
("Neither the intentional nor accidental misstatement of the applicable
published rate will bind the carrier or shipper.  The lawful rate is that
which the carrier must exact and that which the shipper must pay.  The
shipper's knowledge of the lawful rate is conclusively presumed").

10
    The ICC did not determine whether the tariff rates were unreasonable
even though respondent requested such a determination.  We therefore must
assume, for purposes of our decision today, that the rates were reasonable.
The issue of the reasonableness of the tariff rates is open for exploration
on remand.

11
    None of our cases involving a determination by the ICC that the carrier
engaged in an unreasonable practices has required departure from the filed
tariff schedule altogether; instead, they have required merely the
application of a different filed tariff.  For example, in Hewitt-Robins
Inc. v. Eastern Freight-ways, Inc., 371 U. S. 84, 86 (1962), the
Commission's finding that a carrier had engaged in an unreasonable practice
by routing intrastate shipments over interstate routes required only the
application of a different filed rate, i. e., the intrastate rates, rather
than departure from the tariff schedule entirely.  See also Adams v. Mills,
286 U. S. 397, 412 (1932) (reparations ordered constituted difference
between one filed rate and another).  Likewise, the cases in which the ICC
has determined that a carrier engaged in an unreasonable practice by
requiring a certain notation attached to the bill of lading to qualify the
shipper for a reduced tariff also did not require deviation from the filed
tariff.  See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 350 I.
C. C. 555 (1974); Carriers Traffic Service, Inc. v. Anderson, Clayton &
Co., 881 F. 2d 475, 481-482 (CA7 1989) (collecting cases).

12
    Even if the equities of the situation were relevant, it is difficult to
see how the equities favor the shipper.  One would think that a shipper who
has the market power to require a carrier to reduce his tariffs could also
require proof from a carrier that the negotiated rates had been filed
before tendering the shipment, especially since there are commercial
services providing up-to-the-minute details of the carrier's rate schedule.
But see Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc., No. MC-C-
10983, slip op., at 5 (Aug. 4, 1987) (unreasonable practice found even when
the shipper had a copy of the tariff).  Nevertheless, the Commission argues
that if MDRV 10761 "prevailed over the requirement of reasonable practices,
a carrier could intentionally engage in `bait and switch' tactics by
negotiating one rate, fraudulently representing that it was properly filed,
and then insisting upon collection of a higher tariff rate."  Brief for
United States 30.  We note first that the Commission determined that there
was no intentional or fraudulent conduct in this case.  Moreover, any
carrier who engaged in such conduct could be punished under 49 U. S. C.
MDRV 11903(b) (1982 ed.).  Finally, this risk of intentional misconduct on
the part of a carrier has always existed and has never been considered
sufficient to justify a less stringent interpretation of MDRV 10761.

13
    The Act specifically provides that the Commission may "grant re- lief"
from the filing requirements to motor contract carriers "when relief is
consistent with the public interest and the transportation policy."  15
10761(b), 10762(f); see also MDRV 10702(b).  The Commission concluded that
granting a class-wide exemption rather than individual exemptions was both
in the public interest and consistent with the purpose behind the Act.  See
Exemption of Motor Contract Carriers from Tariff Filing Requirements 133 M.
C. C., 150, 156-158 (1983).  The Commission has also allowed contract
carriers to obtain permits to serve entire classes of unnamed shippers.
See Issuance of Permits Authorizing Industrywide Service, 133 M. C. C. 298
(1983).

14
    The Act provides that rates will not go into effect until 30 days after
the filing of a tariff, see MDRV 10762(c)(3), but specifically allows the
Commission to reduce the period if "cause exists."  MDRV 10762(d).  The
Commission determined that cause existed to reduce the waiting period to
one day after the filing of a tariff reducing rates and seven days after
the filing of a tariff increasing rates.  See Short Notice Effectiveness
for Independently Filed Rates, 1 I. C. C. 2d, 146, 150-160 (1982).  In
addition, the Commission has determined that neither tariffs applicable to
a single shipper nor rates providing volume discounts are per se
discriminatory.  See Rates for a Named Shipper or Receiver, 367 I. C. C. 2d
959 (1984); Petition for Declaratory Order--Lawfulness of Volume Discount
Rates by Motor Common Carriers of Property, 365 I. C. C. 711 (1982).  We
express no view today on the validity of such policies.

15
    Moreover, in the Household Goods Transportation Act of 1980, Pub. L.
96-454, 94 Stat. 2011, Congress provided that "motor common carrier[s]
providing transportation of household goods . . . may, subject to the
provisions of this chapter (including the general tariff requirements of
section 10762 of this title), establish a rate for the transportation of
household goods which is based on the carrier's written, binding estimate
of charges for providing such transportation."  49 U. S. C. MDRV
10735(a)(1) ((1982 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added).  This exception for
household goods carriers also demonstrates that Congress is aware of, but
has elected not to eliminate as applied to other motor common carriers, the
general requirements of 15 10761 and 10762.





Subject: 89-624--CONCUR, MAISLIN INDUSTRIES, U. S. v. PRIMARY STEEL

 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-624



MAISLIN INDUSTRIES, U. S., INC., et al., PETITIONERS v. PRIMARY STEEL, INC.


on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth
circuit


[June 21, 1990]



    Justice Scalia, concurring.
    I join the Court's opinion but add a few words in response to Justice
Stevens' assertion that the Court has "fail[ed] to adhere today to the
teaching of Chevron [U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984)]."  Post, at 14.
    In my view, the Court correctly relies upon our prior "filed-rate"
decisions, which were based not on the "regulatory scheme as a whole,"
post, at 6--by which Justice Stevens appears to mean the regulatory climate
within which the statute then operated, post, at 7-9--but rather on the
text of the statute.  Justice Stevens argues that there is no textual
limitation on the scope of the term "reasonable," as that term is used in
49 U. S. C. MDRV 10701(a) (1982 ed.) ("A . . . practice related to
transportation or service by a carrier . . . must be reasonable"), and that
we must therefore accord deference to the Commission's interpretation of
that term.  Post, at 4, 13-14.  I do not agree.  Whatever else may qualify
as an unreasonable practice, under no sensible construction of that term
could it consist of failing to do what the statute explicitly prohibits
doing--viz., charging or receiving a rate different from the rate specified
in a tariff.  49 U. S. C. MDRV 10761(a) (1982 ed.).
    Nor can the phrase "[e]xcept as provided in this subtitle," MDRV
10761(a) carry the enormous weight that Justice Stevens places upon it.
Post, at 5, and n. 6.  That clause is affixed to only the first sentence of
MDRV 10761(a), which states that before providing transportation and
services, certain carriers must place their rates on file.  (What is
referred to by the exception is obvious--such provisions as 49 U. S. C.
MDRV 10762 (a)(1) (1982 ed.), which states that certain motor contract
carriers that serve only one shipper need file only minimum rates.)  But it
is the second sentence of MDRV 10761(a) that contains the requirement that
only filed rates can be charged.  Of course the subject of the second
sentence, "[t]hat carrier" (emphasis added), must reasonably be deemed to
refer to a carrier covered by the first sentence--so that the obligation to
charge the filed rate applies only to those carriers required to file "the
rate for the transportation or service."  (Thus, a motor contract carrier
required to file only minimum rates under MDRV 10762(a)(1) can charge rates
higher than those minimums.)  But there is no way in which the "[e]xcept as
provided" clause can be imported directly into the second sentence, causing
it to recite an exception to the obligation to charge the
required-to-be-filed rate, which Justice Stevens asserts can refer to the
"reasonable practices" requirement of MDRV 10701(a) as readily as it can to
the "reasonable rate" requirement.  Post, at 4.  The basis for the
"unreasonable rate" exception to the "filed rate" rule is not the "[e]xcept
as provided" language at all; rather it is the need to reconcile two
textual provisions that would otherwise be categorically inconsistent (do
not charge unreasonable rates, but charge whatever rates you have filed).
While an "unreasonable rate" unavoidably means a rate that is economically
unreasonable--so that where economic unreasonableness exists 15 10701(a)
and 10761(a) need to be reconciled by assuming an implicit but unexpressed
exception to the filed-rate requirement--an "unreasonable practice" does
not unavoidably mean charging the filed rate when a different rate has been
promised, so with respect to that term normal construction of MDRV 10701(a)
(as in the previous paragraph) avoids any difficulty.
    Finally, Justice Stevens points to changes in the motor carrier
industry occasioned in part by 1980 amendments to the statute, which
amendments he says "represented a fundamental policy choice in favor of
deregulation."  Post, at 9.  See also post, at 9-13.  But the only
amendments of any relevance to the requirement of MDRV 10761(a) that a
carrier collect no rate other than the filed rate are those that remove
certain pre-existing barriers to motor contract carriage, see generally
Central & Southern Motor Freight Tariff Association, Inc. v. United States,
244 U. S. App. D. C. 226, 757 F. 2d 301, 311-312 (1985) (per curiam)--which
amendments have the practical effect of making more carriers eligible for
the pre-existing exception to the filing requirement of MDRV 10761(a),
permitting the Commission to exempt them under certain circumstances.  49
U. S. C. MDRV 10761(b) (1982 ed.).  While this plainly reflects an intent
to deregulate, it reflects an intent to deregulate within the framework of
the existing statutory scheme.  Perhaps deregulation cannot efficiently be
accomplished within that framework, but that is Congress' choice and not
the Commission's or ours.  It may well be, as Justice Stevens thinks, that
after the 1980 amendments and the various administrative changes that the
Commission has made by rule, " `[t]he skeleton of regulation remains; the
flesh has been stripped away.' "  Post, at 10, quoting Orscheln Bros. Truck
Lines, Inc. v. Zenith Electric Corp., 899 F. 2d 642, 644-645 (CA7 1990).
But it is the skeleton we are construing, and we must read it for what it
says.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------




Subject: 89-624--DISSENT, MAISLIN INDUSTRIES, U. S. v. PRIMARY STEEL

 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-624



MAISLIN INDUSTRIES, U. S., INC., et al., PETITIONERS v. PRIMARY STEEL, INC.


on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth
circuit

[June 21, 1990]



    Justice Stevens, with whom The Chief Justice joins, dissenting.
    The "filed rate doctrine" was developed in the 19th century as part of
a program to regulate the ruthless exercise of monopoly power by the
nation's railroads.  Today the Court places an interpretation on that
doctrine even more strict than the original version.  In doing so, the
Court misreads the text of the Interstate Commerce Act (Act), 49 U. S. C.
MDRV 10101 et. seq. (1982 ed.), ignores the history of motor carrier
regulation in this country, and gives no deference to the sensible
construction of the Act by six Courts of Appeals  {1} and the
administrative agency responsible for its enforcement.  Most significantly,
the majority fails to appreciate the significance of the "sea change" in
the statutory scheme that has converted a regime of regulated monopoly
pricing into a highly competitive market.  Even wearing his famous
blinders, old Dobbin would see through the tired arguments the Court
accepts today.

I
    As originally enacted in 1887, the Act provided, in part:

    "And when any such common carrier shall have established and published
its rates, fares, and charges in compliance with the provisions of this
section, it shall be unlawful for such common carrier to charge, demand,
collect, or receive from any person or persons a greater or less
compensation for the transportation of passengers or property, or for any
services in connection therewith, than is specified in such published
schedule of rates, fares, and charges as may at the time be in force."  24
Stat. 381.


    Read literally, this text commanded strict adherence to the tariffs
filed by a carrier.  From the beginning, however, the Court construed that
command as subject to the unstated exception that a filed rate would not be
enforced if the Interstate Commerce Commission (Commission) determined that
the rates were "unreasonable."  {2}  Amendments to the Act incorporated
language that expressly allows exceptions in cases in which the Commission
determines that strict enforcement would be unreasonable. {3}
    Thus, 49 U. S. C. MDRV 10761(a) (1982 ed.) now provides:

"Except as provided in this subtitle, a carrier providing transportation or
service subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission
under chapter 105 of this title shall provide that transportation or
service only if the rate for the transportation or service is contained in
a tariff that is in effect under this subchapter.  That carrier may not
charge or receive a different compensation for that transportation or
service than the rate specified in the tariff whether by returning a part
of that rate to a person, giving a person a privilege, allowing the use of
a facility that affects the value of that transportation or service, or
another device."  (Emphasis added).


    The emphasized language in the foregoing provision obviously refers,
inter alia, to 49 U. S. C. MDRV 10701(a) which states, in part:

    "A rate (other than a rail rate), classification, rule, or practice
related to transportation or service provided by a carrier subject to the
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission under chapter 105 of
this title must be reasonable."  (Emphasis added).


Furthermore, 49 U. S. C. MDRV 10704(b) (1982 ed.) expressly authorizes the
Commission, after finding that a rate or practice of a carrier is
unreasonable, to prescribe the rate or practice that the carrier must
follow. {4}
    The action of the Commission in this case faithfully tracks its
statutory grant of authority.  After considering all of the relevant
evidence, the Commission determined "that it would be an unreasonable
practice now to require Primary to pay undercharges for the difference
between the negotiated rates and the tariff rates."  App. to Pet. for Cert.
44a.  That determination was unquestionably consistent with the plain
language of the statute governing the Commission's authority.  A carrier's
failure to file negotiated rates obviously does not make it reasonable for
the carrier to quote low rates and collect higher ones; the Commission is
free to find, as it has done, that a practice of misquotation, failure to
file, and subsequent collection is unreasonable under MDRV 10701(a).
    The Court offers no reason whatsoever to doubt this conclusion.
Indeed, the Court's discussion of the statutory text consists almost
entirely of vague references to some unarticulated interplay between 15
10761(a) and 10762(a)(1), {5} see ante, at 9, an interplay which the Court
contends would be "render[ed] nugatory" if carriers are not permitted to
obtain payment of the filed rate when they have led shippers to rely upon a
lower negotiated rate.  Ante, at 15.  For the reasons I have already
stated, the text of those provisions does not generate any "interplay"
capable of sustaining so rigid an inference.  The Court virtually concedes
as much, for it recognizes that the unreasonableness of a rate is a
longstanding ground for denying collection of the filed rate, ante, at 11,
and n. 10, and refuses to hold that the unreasonableness of a practice can
never bar collection of a filed rate, ante, at 12.
    Having admitted that the doctrine synthesized from the "interplay"
between 15 10761(a) and 10762(a)(1) is susceptible of exceptions based upon
the nature of a carrier's rates and practices, the Court can argue only
that this particular exception is impermissible. {6}  The source of the
exceptions is, however, not the "interplay" that dominates the majority's
reasoning, but the combined effect of the "Except as otherwise provided"
language of MDRV 10761(a) and the express authority to determine
reasonableness granted to the Commission by MDRV 10701(a).  This second
"interplay" gets little attention from the majority, and it is difficult to
see how the text of either component might yield the distinction which the
majority insists upon drawing.  Nor can the Court mean that the exception
literally voids the obligations imposed by 15 10761(a) and 10762(a)(1)
because the Commission maintains, and the Court does not deny, that the
filed rate doctrine would still provide an effective right to recover for
undercharges in some cases.  See, e. g., NITL-Petition to Institute
Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates, 5 I. C. C. 2d 623,
629, and n. 13 (1989).  Moreover, even if the "filed rate doctrine" were
discarded entirely, a knowing or willful failure to comply with 15 10761(a)
and 10762(a)(1) may subject a carrier to prosecution. {7}
    The Court's assertion that the agency policy now before us "renders
nugatory" the "interplay" between 15 10761(a) and 10762(a)(1) therefore
amounts to no more than an observation that the policy substantially
diminishes the importance of the "filed rate doctrine" as a means for
enforcing those sections.  Consideration of the statute's structure makes
all the more clear what should already be evident from the statutory text:
the Court's observation is true but utterly irrelevant.

II
    Because no particular provision of the statute supports the Court's
position, its principal argument must be that the agency's construction of
the Act is inconsistent with the regulatory scheme as a whole.  See ante,
at 13.  There are, of course, important differences between markets in
which prices are regulated, either by private cartels or by public
authority, and those in which prices are the product of independent
decisions by competitors.  Rules requiring adherence to predetermined
prices are characteristic of regulated markets, but are incompatible with
independent pricing in a competitive market. {8}  The "filed rate doctrine"
has played an important role, not just in the segments of the
transportation industry regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
but in other regulated markets as well. {9}  It requires the courts to
respect the public agency's control over market prices and industry
practices; moreover, it significantly reduces the temptation of regulated
parties to deviate from the market-wide rules formulated by the agency.
    The filed rate doctrine has been a part of our law during the century
of regulation of the railroad industry by the Commission.  In 1935, when
Congress decided to impose economic regulation on the motor carrier
industry, partly if not primarily in order to protect the railroads from
too much competition, {10} the filed rate doctrine was applied to their
rates just as it had previously applied to the railroads.  It had the same
regulatory purpose. {11}  In its applications during the period of
regulatory control over motor carrier rate- making, the doctrine was for
the most part applied to reinforce the policies and the decisions of the
regulatory agency. {12}
    After years of debate over whether it was sound policy to substitute
regulation for competition in the motor carrier industry, Congress decided
to eliminate the regulatory barriers to free entry and individual
ratemaking.  The 1980 amendments to the Act represented a fundamental
policy choice in favor of deregulation. {13}  Overnight the application of
the filed rate doctrine in that market became an anachronism.  As Judge
Posner has explained:

    "Many years later came deregulation, which has changed the trucking
industry beyond recognition.  As a result of amendments made to the Motor
Carrier Act in 1980 and their interpretation by the Commission, the present
regime is essentially one of free competition.  No longer does the ICC seek
to nurture and protect cartel pricing and division of markets.  A motor
carrier that wants to lower its price can file a new tariff effective the
following day.  Short Notice Effectiveness for Independently Filed Motor
Carrier and Freight Forwarder Rates, 1 I. C. C. 2d 146 (1984), affirmed as
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 773 F. 2d 1561
(11th Cir. 1985).  No longer does the Commission seek to limit the number
of motor carriers, which has more than doubled in less than a decade.  Most
important, a carrier and shipper who want to get out from under tariff
regulation altogether have only to negotiate a contract of carriage, and
then the lawful price is the price in the contract rather than in any filed
tariff.  There used to be all sorts of restrictions on contract carriage,
which greatly limited it as an escape hatch from regulation.  There are no
longer.  Wheaton Van Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 731 F. 2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1984).
The skeleton of regulation remains; the flesh has been stripped away."
Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Zenith Electric Corp., 899 F. 2d 642,
644-645 (CA7 1990).


    The significance of these fundamental changes was also noted and
explained by Judge Alarcon:

"A variety of practices that previously would have been considered
discriminatory are now allowed.  For example, the ICC has recently ruled
that volume discount rates are not per se unlawful and may be justified by
cost savings to the carrier.  See Lawfulness of Volume Discount Rates by
Motor Common Carrier of Property, 365 I. C. C. 711, 715-16 (1982).
Moreover, carriers may impose geographic or product line restrictions that
must be met to obtain rate reductions.  See Rates for Named Shipper or
Receiver, 367 I. C. C. 959, 962-965 (1984).
    "In addition to increased competitive pressures, statutory changes, and
a relaxed regulatory climate, the ICC's Negotiated Rates decisions are a
practical response to the information costs faced by shippers.  The ease of
filing tariffs and the sheer number filed no longer makes it appropriate to
allocate the burden of discovering a filed rate to the shipper in all
cases.  Reduced tariff rates may now be filed to become effective on one
day's notice."  West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Weyer haeuser Co., 893 F.
2d 1016, 1026 (CA9 1990).


    The Court catalogues these reforms, ante, at 15-16, but fails to
analyze their implications for the "reasonableness" requirement of MDRV
10701(a) and, consequently, for the provisions of MDRV 10761(a).  What the
Court now misses has been succinctly set forth by Judge Alarcon:

    "The ICC's determination that the collection of undercharges
constitutes an unreasonable practice if the shipper is unaware of the filed
rate is also a reflection of changing legislative goals.  Congress modified
national transportation policy when it amended 49 U. S. C. MDRV 10101(a) in
the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.  Section 10101(a)(2) now directs the
Commission, `in regulating transportation by motor carrier, to promote
competitive and efficient transportation services in order to (A) meet the
needs of shippers, receivers, passengers, and consumers; [and] (B) allow a
variety of quality and price options to meet changing market demands and
the diverse requirements of the shipping and traveling public . . . '  49
U. S. C. MDRV 10101(a)(1)(A), (B) (1982).  In addition, MDRV 10101(a)(1)(D)
directs the ICC to encourage the establishment of reasonable transportation
rates without `unfair or destructive competitive practices.'  49 U. S. C.
MDRV 10101(a)(1)(D) (1982).  Congress intended these sections of the Motor
Carrier Act `to emphasize the importance of competition and efficiency as
the most desirable means for achieving transportation goals while, at the
same time, providing the Commission with sufficient flexibility to promote
the public interest.'  H. R. Rep. No. 96-1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12,
reprinted in 1980 U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2283, 2294.
    "Section 10701(a) provides the ICC with the mechanism to put into
effect Congress' restated goals of national transportation policy.  By
declaring the adherence to filed rates unreasonable under the circumstances
presented in this case, the ICC has demonstrated its intention to prevent
carriers from engaging in unfair competitive practices."  893 F. 2d, at
1026-1027.


    Despite the Court's puzzling suggestion that the filed rate doctrine is
essential to the "core purposes of the Act," ante, at 15, the doctrine is
instead, as the Court elsewhere seems to concede, "an anachronism in the
wake of the [Motor Carrier Act of 1980]," ante, at 18.  If plain text is a
poor basis for the Court's holding, statutory purpose is altogether worse.
As Judge Posner has explained:

    "Counsel for the carrier in this case--which is to say for the
carrier's trustee in bankruptcy--conceded at argument that the motor
carrier industry is today highly competitive.  But if so, the filed-rate
doctrine has lost its raison d'etre.  The classic explanations for the
doctrine are from a different world.  `If a mistake in naming a rate
between two given points is to be accepted as requiring the application of
that rate by the carrier, the great principle of equality in rates, to
secure which was the very purpose and object of the enactment of these
several statutes, might as well be abandoned.'  Poor v. Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy Ry., supra, 12 I. C. C. at 421.  `Stability and equality of rates
are more important to commercial interests than reduced rates.'  Id., at
422.  `Occasional hardships may result from any inelastic rule of general
application.  The principle, however, is vital in our commercial life that
there shall be one fixed and absolutely rigid rate governing the
transportation at a given time of any given commodity between two give
points.'  Id., at 423.
    "Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex.  Firms in a competitive
market cannot discriminate against weak shippers, for even the weak shipper
has, by definition of competition, alternative sources of supply to which
to turn if one of his suppliers tries to make a monopoly profit off him.
`In the more competitive, more flexible pricing atmosphere created by
[deregulation], there is little likelihood of carriers using a rate
misquotation as a means to discriminate in favor of particular shippers.'
Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates,
supra, 5 I. C. C. 2d at 625.  And since it is no longer the policy of
Congress or the ICC to foster monopoly pricing in the motor carrier
industry, no public object is served by forcing carriers to adhere to
published price schedules regardless of circumstances.  All this the
Commission found and persuasively articulated in National Industrial
Transportation League, supra, 3 I. C. C. 2d at 104-08."  Orscheln, 899 F.
2d, at 644-645.


    Judge Posner's conclusion that strict mechanical adherence to the filed
rate doctrine produces absurd results and serves no social purpose, id., at
645, is one that I share.  It is likewise shared by the agency charged with
administration of the Act.

III
    A few years ago, in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), we reiterated the importance of giving
appropriate deference to an agency's reasonable interpretation of its
governing statute.  Indeed, long before our decision in Chevron, we
recognized that even when faced with a "long history of the Commission's
construction and application of the Act contrary to its present position,"
American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 397, 415
(1967), we must defer to the Commission's interpretation of a statute which
it is responsible for administering:

"we agree that the Commission, faced with new developments or in light of
reconsideration of the relevant facts and its mandate, may alter its past
interpretation and overturn past administrative rulings and practice. . . .
. In fact, although we make no judgment as to the policy aspects of the
Commisssion's action, this kind of flexibility and adaptibility to changing
needs and patterns of transportation is an essential part of the office of
a regulatory agency."  Id., at 416.


    Four Courts of Appeals have expressly invoked Chevron in the course of
upholding the agency action challenged in this case, {14} but this Court
does not deem Chevron--or any other case involving deference to agency
action--worthy of extended discussion.  The Court dismisses Chevron by
means of a conclusory assertion that the agency's interpretation is
inconsistent with "the statutory scheme as a whole."  Ante, at 12-13.
Insofar as the Court offers any justification for that result, it does so
by relying on cases in which this Court's action was entirely consistent
with the agency's interpretation of the Act. {15}  The fact that the Court
has strictly enforced the filed rate doctrine in the many cases in which it
served the agency's regulatory purposes provides no justification for
enforcing the doctrine in a competitive market in which it frustrates the
agency's attempt to carry out the plainly expressed intent of Congress.
    The Court's failure to adhere today to the teaching of Chevron is
compounded by its misplaced reliance on Square D Co. v. Niagra Frontier
Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U. S. 409 (1986).  See ante, at 17.  In Square D,
we adhered to a longstanding settled construction of MDRV 4 of the Clayton
Act that had not been affected by any subsequent statutory amendment.  No
question of agreeing or disagreeing with agency action, or with an agency's
interpretation of a congressional policy choice, was presented.  That case
is therefore totally inapplicable to the question presented here.  Even
less persuasive authority for the Court's position is California v. FERC,
495 U. S. ---- (1990), see ante, at 13, 17, a case in which we upheld an
agency interpretation that conformed to longstanding precedent.

IV
    Finally, I must express my emphatic agreement with the Commission's
conclusion, App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a, that an unreasonable practice would
result if the carrier in this case were rewarded for violating its duty to
file a new rate promptly.  There is no evidence of discrimination in this
record; nor is there any reason to believe that any shipper or any
competing motor carrier was harmed by the negotiated rate or by the failure
to file it.  The only consequence of today's misguided decision is to
produce a bonanza for the bankruptcy bar.  "Now that off-tariff pricing is
harmless to the (de)regulatory scheme, the only purpose served by making
the statutory obligation to price in conformity with published tariffs
draconian is to provide windfalls for unsecured creditors in bankruptcy."
Orscheln, 899 F. 2d, at 646.
    As Justice Black said more than 30 years ago in similar circumstances,
"I am unable to understand why the Court strains so hard to reach so bad a
result."  T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S. 464, 481 (1959)
(dissenting opinion).  The Court's analysis is plausible only if read as a
historical excursus about a statute that no longer exists.  Nothing more
than blind adherence to language in cases that have nothing to do with the
present situation supports today's result.

    I respectfully dissent.
 
 
 
 
 
 

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1
    See Delta Traffic Service, Inc. v. Transtop, Inc., ---- F. 2d ---- (CA1
1990); Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Zenith Electric Corp., 899 F. 2d
642 (CA7 1990); Maislin v. Primary Steel, Inc., 879 F. 2d 400 (CA8 1989)
(case below); West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 893 F. 2d
1016 (CA9 1990); Seaboard System R. Co. v. United States, 794 F. 2d 635
(CA11 1986).  The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
in Seaboard System involved railroad regulation rather than motor carrier
regulation, but presented very similar issues.
    The sole exception to this consensus is In re Caravan Refrigerated
Cargo, Inc., 864 F. 2d 388 (CA5 1989).

2
    Thus, in the most frequently quoted statement of the filed rate
doctrine, we wrote:

"Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the rate of the carrier duly filed is
the only lawful charge.  Deviation from it is not permitted upon any
pretext.  Shippers and travelers are charged with notice of it, and they as
well as the carrier must abide by it, unless it is found by the Commission
to be unreasonable."  (Emphasis added).  Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.
Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 97 (1915).

Similarly, in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 163
(1922), we wrote:

"The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to a rate are
measured by the published tariff.  Unless and until suspended or set aside,
this rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and
shipper."  (Emphasis added).

3
    See, e. g., 34 Stat. 587.

4
    49 U. S. C. MDRV 10704(b)(1) (1982 ed. and Supp. V) provides in part:

"When the Commission decides that a rate charged or collected by--

"(A) a motor common carrier for providing transportation subject to its
jurisdiction under subchapter II of chapter 105 of this title by itself,
with another motor common carrier, with a rail, express, or water common
carrier, or any of them;

    . . . . .


"or that a classification, rule, or practice of that carrier, does or will
violate this chapter, the Commission shall prescribe the rate (including a
maximum or minimum rate, or both), classification, rule, or practice to be
followed."

5
    49 U. S. C. MDRV 10762(a)(1) (1982 ed.) provides:

"A motor common carrier shall publish and file with the Commission tariffs
containing the rates for transportation it may provide under this subtitle.
The Commission may prescribe other information that motor common carriers
shall include in their tariffs."

6
    The Court attempts to make hay of the fact that under MDRV 10761(a)
carriers "may not charge or receive a different compensation for that
transportation or service than the rate specified in the tariff."
According to the Court, this provision "requires the carrier to collect the
filed rate."  Ante, at 14.  That is true if the Court means that the
carrier is obligated to seek payment of the filed rate, but not if the
Court means that the carrier is entitled to receive payment of the filed
rate.  The longstanding reasonableness exception to the filed rate
doctrine--an exception not contested by the Court--makes this much clear.
Moreover, as has already been noted, the clause that prefaces MDRV 10761(a)
allows for the existence of exceptions to the collection requirement.  The
Court's argument simply begs the question before us, which is under what
conditions a valid defense to a carrier's suit may exist.
    Even less persuasive than the Court's argument from the collection
requirement is a related claim made by petitioners.  They contend that
because carriers are legally obligated to collect the filed rate, the
practice of filing suit to collect that rate cannot be unreasonable.  See,
e. g., Reply Brief for Petitioners 7-8.  This argument, too, ignores the
exceptions clause at the beginning of MDRV 10761(a).  Moreover, the
argument mischaracterizes the practice deemed unreasonable by the
Commission: a collection suit is one component of that practice, even
though the suit considered in isolation from the broader course of conduct
is not itself unreasonable.  See NITL-Petition to Institute Rulemaking on
Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates, 5 I. C. C. 2d 623, 628, n. 11
(1989); see also ante, at 4-5.
    Justice Scalia trots out the same argument again, this time harnessed
to an assertion that the exceptions clause applies only to the first
sentence of MDRV 10761(a).  Ante, at 2 (concurring opinion).  Although that
is perhaps a possible reading of MDRV 10761(a), it is obviously not the
only one.  There is no reason to believe that it is an interpretation of
the section that the Commission must accept.  In any event, Justice Scalia
admits that MDRV 10701(a)-- which imposes a reasonableness condition upon
practices and rates alike-- modifies the requirements of MDRV 10761(a), and
this admission renders moot his discussion of the exceptions clause.  Ante,
at 2-3 (concurring opinion).  In light of that admission, Justice Scalia's
argument fails for exactly the reasons set out above.

7
    See, e. g., 49 U. S. C. 15 11903 and 11904 (1982 ed.).

8
    See, e. g., Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 553,
582-583 (1936) (regulation by private agreement in violation of the Sherman
Act); California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U. S. 97, 99 (1980) (state regulation of wine prices); United Gas Pipe Line
Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U. S. 332, 338 (1956) (federal
regulation of natural gas prices).

9
    See, e. g., Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service
Co., 341 U. S. 246, 251-252 (1951) (federal regulation of prices for
electrical power); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U. S. 571,
577-578 (1981) (federal regulation of prices for natural gas); H. J. Inc.
v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. ----, ----, n. 1 (1989)
(state regulation of rates for telephone service).

10
    "Though identical statutory standards govern both motor carrier and
rail consolidations, their legislative backgrounds differ.  The demand for
motor carrier regulation came, not from shippers, as in railroads, but from
the roads themselves, who urged that virtually unregulated motor carrier
competition threatened railroad financial stability.  This view was also
supported by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Federal
Coordinator of Transportation who, in his 1934 and 1935 reports,
recommended legislation regulating interstate motor carriers.  In addition,
during hearings on proposed legislation, many truck operators, previously
opposed to Federal regulation, favored such control because they feared the
effects of unrestrained competition on the motor carrier industry itself.
The result was legislation, enacted in 1935, which from the first placed
considerable restraint on motor carrier competition.
    "Entry was controlled by certificates of convenience and necessity;
those already in the field were given a preferred position by the
grandfather clauses, assuring not only the right to continue in operation,
but also to expand within the areas or between the points which they
already served.  Moreover, the Commission was empowered to establish
minimum as well as maximum rates.  And this minimum rate power was soon
utilized by the Commission both to protect the railroads from motor carrier
competition as well as to safeguard the motor carrier industry from
`destructive' competition within its own ranks.  Indeed, from the inception
of motor carrier regulation to the present day, the power to fix minimum
rates has been more significant than the authority to fix maximum charges."
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws 265 (1955).

11
    "To understand the purpose of the filed-rate doctrine and hence the
Commission's recent efforts to relax it, on which see National Industrial
Transportation League--Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor
Common Carrier Rates, 3 I. C. C. 2d 99 (1986); Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v.
Louisville & Nashville R. R., 1 I. C. C. 2d 767 (1985), affirmed as
Seaboard System R. R. v. United States, supra; Petition to Institute
Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates, 5 I. C. C. 2d 623
(1989), one must understand the history of federal regulation of common
carriers.  Railroads have heavy fixed costs, and in their heyday faced
little effective competition from other modes of transportation.  Naturally
they tended to load the fixed costs onto those shippers who had poor
competitive alternatives and to charge low prices to those shippers who had
good alternatives by reason of (for example) being big enough to induce two
or more railroads to serve their plants.  This created a disparity in
transportation costs painful to shippers who paid high railroad rates and
were competing with shippers who paid low rates, and it also undermined the
railroads' efforts to cartelize railroad transportation.  The confluence of
interests between railroads and weak shippers resulted in a regulatory
scheme in which railroads were forbidden both to price off tariff and to
refuse service to any shipper at the tariffed rate.  Western Transportation
Co. v. Wilson & Co., supra, 682 F. 2d at 1230-31.  The scheme would have
been undermined if carriers had been permitted to negotiate secret
discounts with favored shippers.  Regular Common Carrier Conference v.
United States, 793 F. 2d 376, 379 (D. C. Cir. 1986).  To deter this was the
office of the filed-rate doctrine.  It authorized carriers to recover the
discounts regardless, which meant that the shipper could not count on being
able to keep any discount that the railroad might dangle before it.  Motor
carriers do not have heavy fixed costs, but they do not like competition
any more than railroads do, so when in 1935 they were brought under federal
regulation (in major part to protect the railroads from their competition)
they were placed under the filed-rate doctrine too."  Orscheln Bros. Truck
Lines, Inc. v. Zenith Electric Corp., 899 F. 2d 642, 643-644 (CA7 1990).

12
    As the Court's opinion makes clear, there was no tension between
judicial interpretation and agency policy in the cases that developed the
filed rate doctrine.  See ante, at 10, citing Poor v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.
Co., 12 I. C. C. 418, 421-422 (1907).  On the contrary, a recurring theme
in those cases is that the Commission, rather than the courts, should have
primary responsibility for administration of the statute.  The filed rate
doctrine was regarded in significant part as a means for ensuring that this
allocation of responsibility was respected.  See, e. g., Texas & Pacific R.
Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 440-442 (1907); Arizona
Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T., & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370, 384-385 (1932);
Baldwin v. Scott County Milling Co., 307 U. S. 478, 483-485 (1939).  The
most notable exception to this pattern is the 5-to-4 decision in T.I.M.E.
Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S. 464 (1959), in which this Court prohibited
district courts from staying collection proceedings pending agency review
of the reasonableness of a filed rate.  Although T.I.M.E. is strikingly
similar to today's decision in a host of respects, the majority does not
rely upon it.  Its reluctance to place any substantial weight upon T.I.M.E.
is easily understood, because that precedent was greatly limited by this
Court's subsequent decision in Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-ways,
Inc., 371 U. S. 84, 88-89 (1962), and what remained of it was soon
thereafter unambiguously repudiated by Congress.  See Act of Sept. 6, 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-170, 15 6-7, 79 Stat. 651-652 (codified at 49 U. S. C. MDRV
11705(b)(3) (1982 ed. and Supp. V), 49 U. S. C. MDRV 11706(c)(2) (1982
ed.)).

13
    Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793.

14
    Delta Traffic Service, Inc. v. Transtop, Inc., ---- F. 2d ----, ----
(CA1 1990); Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Zenith Electric Corp., 899
F. 2d 642, 646 (CA7 1990); Maislin v. Primary Steel, Inc., 879 F. 2d 400,
406 (CA8 1989) (case below); West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Weyerhauser
Co., 893 F. 2d 1016, 1023, 1025-1026 (CA9 1990).

15
    See, n. 12, supra.
