NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                 Syllabus

WILLY v. COASTAL CORP. et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
No. 90-1150.   Argued December 3, 1991-Decided March 3, 1992

After petitioner Willy sued respondent Coastal Corporation in Texas
 state court, alleging that Coastal fired him in violation of, inter alia,
 federal and state environmental law ``whistleblower'' provisions,
 Coastal removed the case to Federal District Court.  That court
 rejected Willy's argument that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
 and dismissed the case for failure to state a claim.  It also imposed
 sanctions against him, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
 11, based on conduct in the case that was unrelated to petitioner's
 effort to convince the court that it lacked jurisdiction.  The Court of
 Appeals concluded that the District Court lacked subject-matter
 jurisdiction, but upheld the court's decision to award sanctions and
 remanded the case for the court to determine the amount.  On a
 second appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected Willy's argument that
 the District Court had no authority to impose sanctions in the
 absence of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Held:A court may impose Rule 11 sanctions in a case in which the
 district court is later determined to be without subject-matter juris-
 diction.  Pp.3-8.
   (a)While the expansive language of Rules 1 and 81(c) indicates a
 clear intent to have the Rules, including Rule 11, apply to all district
 court civil proceedings, the Rules must be deemed to apply only if
 their application will not impermissibly expand the judicial authority
 conferred by Article III, see Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1.  Pp.3-4.
   (b)The District Court's order in this case does not lie outside the
 range of action constitutionally permitted to an Article III court.
 Willy concedes that Congress has the power to regulate the courts
 and to authorize the imposition of sanctions.  He errs in contending
 that Rule 11 sanctions must be aborted whenever it is determined
 that a court lacked jurisdiction at the time the objectionable conduct
 occurred.  A court's concern with the maintenance of orderly pro-
 cedure, even in the wake of a jurisdictional ruling later found to be
 mistaken, justifies the conclusion that the sanction here need not be
 upset.  See, e. g., United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258.
 Because it deals with the issue whether the court's rules were
 violated, the instant order is collateral to the merits of the case.
 Thus, it implicates no constitutional concern because it does not deal
 with the court's assessment of the complaint's legal merits, over
 which the court lacked jurisdiction.  See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
 Corp., 496 U.S. ___.  And the District Court's interest in having
 rules of procedure obeyed did not disappear with the subsequent
 determination that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.  United
 States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487
 U.S. 72, distinguished.  Pp.4-8.
915 F.2d 965, affirmed.

 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.



NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1150
--------
DONALD J. WILLY, PETITIONER v. COASTAL COR-
PORATION et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fifth circuit
[March 3, 1992]

  The Chief Justice  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  We granted certiorari to decide whether a federal district
court may impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a case in which the
district court is later determined to be without subject-
matter jurisdiction.  501 U. S. ___ (1991).  We conclude that
in the circumstances presented here it may do so.
  Petitioner Willy sued respondent Coastal Corporation
(Coastal) in Texas state court, raising a variety of claims
relating to Coastal's decision to terminate his employment
as -in-house- counsel.  Petitioner alleged that he had been
fired due to his refusal to participate in respondent's
violation of various federal and state environmental laws
and that this violated, among other things, the -whistle-
blower- provisions of those statutes.  Respondent removed
the case to Federal District Court, claiming original federal-
question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. 1331, 1441.
Petitioner objected to the removal, claiming that his case
did not -arise under- federal law, see 1331, but the
District Court disagreed and concluded that it had subject-
matter jurisdiction.  The District Court subsequently
granted respondent's motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6), and dismissed peti-
tioner's pendent state claims.
  At the same time, the District Court granted respondent's
motion for Rule 11 sanctions, awarding attorney's fees of
$22,625 against Willy and his attorney, Young, jointly and
severally.  The District Court found that the filings made by
plaintiff's counsel -create[d] a blur of absolute confusion.-
App. to Pet. for Cert. A-7.  These included a 1,200-page,
unindexed, unnumbered pile of materials that the District
Court determined -to be a conscious and wanton affront to
the judicial process, this Court, and opposing counsel- that
was -irresponsible at a minimum and at worst intentionally
harassing.-  Ibid.  Petitioner's sanctionable behavior also
included careless pleading, such as reliance on a non-
existent Federal Rule of Evidence.  Ibid.  None of the
sanctionable conduct was related to petitioner's initial effort
to convince the District Court that it was without subject-
matter jurisdiction.
  On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the District Court had lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction because the complaint raised no claims arising
under federal law.  Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F. 2d 1160
(1988).  It therefore reversed the District Court order
dismissing the claims and instructed that the case be
remanded to state court.  The court also upheld the District
Court's decision to award Rule 11 sanctions, although it
remanded the case to the District Court to determine the
amount.  On remand the District Court recomputed the
Rule 11 sanctions and imposed sanctions in the amount of
$19,307, the amount of attorney's fees that respondent had
incurred in responding to petitioner's sanctionable conduct.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.  915 F. 2d 965 (CA5 1990).
  On this second appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected
petitioner's contention that, in the absence of subject-matter
jurisdiction, the District Court was constitutionally without
authority to impose Rule 11 sanctions.  It concluded that
the authority to impose Rule 11 sanctions rested in the
-inherent powers- of the federal courts-those powers
```necessary to the exercise of all others.'''  Id., at 966
(quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U. S. 752, 764
(1980)).  The court concluded that the exercise of Rule 11
powers was an example of such inherent powers.  It
principally relied on our recent decision in Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. ___ (1990), in which we upheld
a Rule 11 sanction imposed for filing a frivolous complaint
even though the sanction order was entered after the
plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its suit.
  Before this Court, petitioner advances two claims.  The
first is that Congress, in acquiescing in the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, did not -authoriz[e]
recovery of fees or costs against parties who prevail on
jurisdictional grounds.-  Brief for Petitioner 18.  Petitioner
finds in both the Act and the Rules the -implicit premise
. . . that rules of practice and procedure are not necessary
for disputes beyond the judicial power conferred by Article
III.-  Id., at 28.  Phrased this way, the petitioner's conten-
tion is correct, but it does not dispose of this case.
     The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. 2072, authorizes
the Court to -prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United
States district courts . . . .-  Those rules may not -abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.-  In response, we
have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1
governs their scope.  It provides that -[t]hese rules govern
the procedure in the United States district courts in all
suits of a civil nature . . . .-  Rule 81(c) specifically provides
that the Rules -apply to civil actions removed to the United
States district courts from the state courts and govern
procedure after removal.-  This expansive language contains
no express exceptions and indicates a clear intent to have
the Rules, including Rule 11, apply to all district court civil
proceedings.
  But in Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U. S. 1 (1941), we observed
that federal courts, in adopting rules, were not free to
extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a e.
Id., at 10.  Such a caveat applies a fortiori to any effort to
extend by rule the judicial power of the United States
described in Article III of the Constitution.  The Rules,
then, must be deemed to apply only if their application will
not impermissibly expand the  judicial authority conferred
by Article III.  We must therefore examine petitioner's
second, and related contention, that the District Court
action in this case lies outside the range of action constitu-
tionally permitted to an Article III court.
     Petitioner begins by pointing out that Article III limits
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts to
certain -cases or controversies.-  Brief for Petitioner 11.  He
then contends that the District Court's exercise of judicial
power to grant Rule 11 sanctions must have been an
unconstitutional act because, in the absence of subject-
matter jurisdiction, the district court lacks -a substantive
source of judicial power, beyond that conferred by Article
III.-  Id., at 18.  Thus, according to petitioner, even had
Congress attempted to grant the courts authority to impose
sanctions in a case such as this, the grant would run afoul
of Article III.
     In making this claim, petitioner acknowledges that
there are some circumstances in which federal courts may
impose attorney's fees or costs, even where the court
eventually proves to be without subject-matter jurisdic-
tion.  He contends, however, that such instances are
limited to a narrowly prescribed category of cases and do
not include the situation in which sanctions are imposed
against a party who has successfully contested jurisdiction.
     We think petitioner's contentions flawed in several
respects.  Article I, Section 8, cl. 1, authorizes Congress to
establish the lower federal courts.  From almost the
founding days of this country, it has been firmly established
that Congress, acting pursuant to its authority to make all
laws -necessary and proper- to their establishment, also
may enact laws regulating the conduct of those courts and
the means by which their judgments are enforced.  See,
Wayman v. Southward, 10 Wheat. 1, 21-22 (1825); Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460, 473 (1965) (describing -long-recog-
nized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for
federal courts-).  Indeed, in acknowledging the many
circumstances in which sanctions can be imposed, several
of which have a statutory basis, petitioner effectively
concedes both Congress' general power to regulate the
courts and its specific power to authorize the imposition of
sanctions.  See n. 2, supra.
     This leaves only petitioner's contention that Rule 11
sanctions must be aborted because at a time after the
sanctionable conduct occurred, it was determined by the
Court of Appeals that the district court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction.  A final determination of lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction of a case in a federal court, of course,
precludes further adjudication of it.  But such a determina-
tion does not automatically wipe out all proceedings had in
the district court at a time when the district court operated
under the misapprehension that it had jurisdiction.  In
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308
U. S. 371 (1940), we held that a judgment rendered in a
case in which it was ultimately concluded that the District
Court was without jurisdiction was nonetheless res judicata
on collateral attack made by one of the parties.  See also,
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938).  In Stoll, we observed
that the practical concern with providing an end to litiga-
tion justifies a rule preventing collateral attack on subject
matter jurisdiction.  Id., at 172.
  In United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258 (1947),
we upheld a criminal contempt citation even on the as-
sumption that the district court issuing the citation was
without jurisdiction over the underlying action.  In that
case, the question was raised on direct review, and not
collateral attack.  We think the same concern expressed in
these cases-the maintenance of orderly procedure, even in
the wake of a jurisdiction ruling later found to be mis-
taken-justifies the conclusion that the sanction ordered
here need not be upset.
  The District Court order which the petitioner seeks to
upset is one that is collateral to the merits.  We recently
had occasion to examine Rule 11's scope and purpose in
great detail in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S.
___ (1990).  The challenge in that case was to an order
imposing Rule 11 sanctions for filing a frivolous complaint,
entered after the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed his
action.  In the course of our discussion we noted that -[i]t is
well established that a federal court may consider collateral
issues after an action is no longer pending. . . . [A]n imposi-
tion of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits
of an action.  Rather, it requires the determination of a
collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the
judicial process, and, if so, what sanction would be appro-
priate.- Id., at ___.  Such an order implicates no constitu-
tional concern because it -does not signify a district court's
assessment of the legal merits of the complaint.-  Ibid.  It
therefore does not raise the issue of a district court adjudi-
cating the merits of a -case or controversy- over which it
lacks jurisdiction.
  Petitioner places great weight on our decision in United
States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization,
Inc., 487 U. S. 72 (1988), a case involving a civil contempt
order entered by the District Court.  The contemnors, two
nonparty witnesses, refused to comply with a district court
document subpoena.  The District Court found them in civil
contempt and ordered them to pay a fine of $50,000 per
day.  The contemnors, as was their right, immediately
appealed the contempt order, challenging the District
Court's subject-matter jurisdiction.  We held that the Court
of Appeals was obligated to consider the jurisdictional chal-
lenge in full, rather than simply contenting itself with an
inquiry into whether the District Court colorably had
jurisdiction.  We further concluded that if the district court
was found to be lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, that the
contempt order would also fall.  Focusing on this second
part of our decision, petitioner cites Catholic Conference as
establishing the proposition that a sanction must fall if
imposed when jurisdiction is in fact absent.
  Catholic Conference does not stand for such a broad
assertion.  A civil contempt order has much different
purposes than a Rule 11 sanction.  Civil contempt is
designed to force the contemnor to comply with an order of
the court, id., at 79; Rule 11 is designed to punish a party
who has already violated the court's rules.  Cooter & Gell,
supra, at ___.  Given that civil contempt is designed to
coerce compliance with the court's decree, it is logical that
the order itself should fall with a showing that the court
was without authority to enter the decree.  Accord, United
States v. Mine Workers, supra.
  The interest in having rules of procedure obeyed, by
contrast, does not disappear upon a subsequent determina-
tion that the court was without subject-matter jurisdiction.
Courts do make mistakes; in cases such as Catholic
Conference it may be possible immediately to seek relief in
an appellate tribunal.  But where such an immediate
appeal is not authorized, there is no constitutional infirmity
under Article III in requiring those practicing before the
courts to conduct themselves in compliance with the
applicable procedural rules in the interim, and to allow the
courts to impose Rule 11 sanctions in the event of their
failure to do so.
  For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is
                                 Affirmed.

