NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                 Syllabus

COLLINS v. CITY OF HARKER HEIGHTS, TEXAS
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
No. 90-1279.  Argued November 5, 1991-Decided February 26, 1992

Larry Collins, an employee in respondent city's sanitation department,
 died of asphyxia after entering a manhole to unstop a sewer line.
 Petitioner, his widow, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983,
 alleging, inter alia, that Collins had a right under the Due Process
 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ``to be free from unreasonable
 risks of harm . . . and . . . to be protected from the [city's] custom
 and policy of deliberate indifference toward [its employees'] safety'';
 that the city had violated that right by following a custom and policy
 of not training its employees about the dangers of working in sewers
 and not providing safety equipment and warnings; and that the city
 had systematically and intentionally failed to provide the equipment
 and training required by a Texas statute.  The District Court dis-
 missed the complaint on the ground that it did not allege a constitu-
 tional violation.  Without reaching the question whether the city had
 violated Collins' constitutional rights, the Court of Appeals affirmed
 on the theory that there had been no ``abuse of governmental power,''
 which the court found to be a necessary element of a 1983 action.
Held:Because a city's customary failure to train or warn its employees
 about known hazards in the workplace does not violate the Due
 Process Clause, 1983 does not provide a remedy for a municipal
 employee who is fatally injured in the course of his employment as
 a result of the city's failure.  Pp.3-14.
   (a)This Court's cases do not support the Court of Appeals' reading
 of 1983 as requiring an abuse of governmental power separate and
 apart from the proof of a constitutional violation.  Contrary to that
 court's analysis, neither the fact that Collins was a government
 employee nor the characterization of the city's deliberate indifference
 to his safety as something other than an ``abuse of governmental
 power'' is a sufficient reason for refusing to entertain petitioner's
 federal claim under 1983.  Proper analysis requires that two issues
 be separated when a 1983 claim is asserted against a municipality:
 (1) whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation,
 and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation.
 Pp.3-4.
   (b)It is assumed for the purpose of decision that the complaint's
 use of the term ``deliberate indifference'' to characterize the city's
 failure to train its sanitation department employees is sufficient to
 hold the city responsible if the complaint has also alleged a constitu-
 tional violation.  See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378.  Pp.4-9.
   (c)The complaint has not alleged a constitutional violation.
 Neither the Due Process Clause's text-which, inter alia, guarantees
 due process in connection with any deprivation of liberty by a
 State-nor its history supports petitioner's unprecedented claim that
 the Clause imposes an independent substantive duty upon municipal-
 ities to provide certain minimal levels of safety and security in the
 workplace.  Although the ``process'' that the Clause guarantees
 includes a continuing obligation to satisfy certain minimal custodial
 standards for those who have already been deprived of their liberty,
 petitioner cannot maintain that the city deprived Collins of his liberty
 when it made, and he voluntarily accepted, an employment offer.
 Also unpersuasive is petitioner's claim that the city's alleged failure
 to train its employees, or to warn them about known risks of harm,
 was an omission that can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or
 conscience-shocking, in a constitutional sense.  Petitioner's claim is
 analogous to a fairly typical tort claim under state law, which is not
 supplanted by the Due Process Clause, see e. g., Daniels v. Williams,
 474 U.S. 327, 332-333, particularly in the area of public employ-
 ment, see, e. g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350.  In light of the
 presumption that the administration of Government programs is
 based on a rational decision-making process that takes account of
 competing forces, decisions concerning the allocation of resources to
 individual programs, such as sewer maintenance, and to particular
 aspects of those programs, such as employee training, involve a host
 of policy choices that must be made by locally elected representatives,
 rather than by federal judges interpreting the country's basic charter
 of Government.  For the same reasons, petitioner's suggestion that
 the Texas Hazard Communication Act supports her substantive due
 process claim is rejected.  Pp.9-14.
916 F.2d 284, affirmed.

 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
-------------------------------

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
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corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1279
--------
MYRA JO COLLINS, PETITIONER v. CITY OF
 HARKER HEIGHTS, TEXAS
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fifth circuit
[February 26, 1992]

  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The question presented is whether 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. 1983, provides a remedy for a
municipal employee who is fatally injured in the course of
his employment because the city customarily failed to train
or warn its employees about known hazards in the
workplace.  Even though the city's conduct may be action-
able under state law, we hold that 1983 does not apply
because such conduct does not violate the Due Process
Clause.
  On October 21, 1988, Larry Michael Collins, an employee
in the sanitation department of the city of Harker Heights,
Texas, died of asphyxia after entering a manhole to unstop
a sewer line.  Petitioner, his widow, brought this action
alleging that Collins ``had a constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable risks of harm to his body, mind and
emotions and a constitutional right to be protected from the
city of Harker Heights' custom and policy of deliberate
indifference toward the safety of its employees.''  App. 7.
Her complaint alleged that the city violated that right by
following a custom and policy of not training its employees
about the dangers of working in sewer lines and manholes,
not providing safety equipment at job sites, and not
providing safety warnings.  The complaint also alleged that
a prior incident had given the city notice of the risks of
entering the sewer lines and that the city had systemati-
cally and intentionally failed to provide the equipment and
training required by a Texas statute.  Ibid.  The District
Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that a
constitutional violation had not been alleged.  No.
W-89-CA-168 (W. D. Tex., Oct. 30, 1988), App. 20.  The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed on a differ-
ent theory.  916 F. 2d 284 (CA5 1990).  It did not reach the
question whether the city had violated Collins' constitution-
al rights because it denied recovery on the ground that
there had been no ``abuse of governmental power,'' which
the Fifth Circuit had found to be a necessary element of a
1983 action.  Id., at 287-288, and n.3.
  The contrary decision in Ruge v. City of Bellevue, 892
F. 2d 738 (CA8 1989), together with our concern about the
Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute, prompted
our grant of certiorari, 499 U. S. ___ (1991).
                      I
  Our cases do not support the Court of Appeals' reading of
1983 as requiring proof of an abuse of governmental power
separate and apart from the proof of a constitutional
violation.  Although the statute provides the citizen with an
effective remedy against those abuses of state power that
violate federal law, it does not provide a remedy for abuses
that do not violate federal law, see, e. g., Martinez v.
California, 444 U. S. 277 (1980), DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, 489 U. S. 189 (1989).
More importantly, the statute does not draw any distinction
between abusive and nonabusive federal violations.
  The Court of Appeals' analysis rests largely on the fact
that the city had, through allegedly tortious conduct,
harmed one of its employees rather than an ordinary citizen
over whom it exercised governmental power.  The employ-
ment relationship, however, is not of controlling signifi-
cance.  On the one hand, if the city had pursued a policy of
equally deliberate indifference to the safety of pedestrians
that resulted in a fatal injury to one who inadvertently
stepped into an open manhole, the Court of Appeals'
holding would not speak to this situation at all, although it
would seem that a claim by such a pedestrian should be
analyzed in a similar manner as the claim by this petition-
er.  On the other hand, a logical application of the holding
might also bar potentially meritorious claims by employees
if, for example, the city had given an employee a particu-
larly dangerous assignment in retaliation for a political
speech, cf. St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U. S. 112 (1988), or
because of his or her gender, cf. Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978).  The First
Amendment, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and other provisions of the
Federal Constitution afford protection to employees who
serve the government as well as to those who are served by
them, and 1983 provides a cause of action for all citizens
injured by an abridgement of those protections.  Neither the
fact that petitioner's decedent was a government employee
nor the characterization of the city's deliberate indifference
to his safety as something other than an ``abuse of govern-
mental power'' is a sufficient reason for refusing to enter-
tain petitioner's federal claim under 1983.
  Nevertheless, proper analysis requires us to separate two
different issues when a 1983 claim is asserted against a
municipality:  (1) whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a
constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is
responsible for that violation.  See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U. S. 808, 817 (1985) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.); id., at
828-829 (opinion of Brennan, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).  Because most of our opinions
discussing municipal policy have involved the latter issue,
it is appropriate to discuss it before considering the ques-
tion whether petitioner's complaint has alleged a constitu-
tional violation.
                     II
  Section 1983 provides a remedy against ``any person''
who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights
protected by the Constitution.  In Monell, the Court held
that Congress intended municipalities and other local
government entities to be included among those persons to
whom 1983 applies.  436 U. S., at 690.  At the same time,
the Court made it clear that municipalities may not be held
liable ``unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of
some nature caused a constitutional tort.''  Id., at 691.
The Court emphasized that
   ``a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it
   employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality
   cannot be held liable under 1983 on a respondeat
   superior theory.
       .      .       .      .      .
   ``[T]herefore, . . . a local government may not be sued
   under 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employ-
   ees or agents.  Instead, it is when execution of a
   government's policy or custom, whether made by its
   lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly
   be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury
   that the government as an entity is responsible under
   1983.-  Id., at 691, 694 (emphasis in original).

  In a series of later cases, the Court has considered
whether an alleged injury caused by municipal employees
acting under color of state law provided a proper basis for
imposing liability on a city.  In each of those cases the
Court assumed that a constitutional violation had been
adequately alleged or proved and focused its attention on
the separate issue of municipal liability.  Thus, for example,
in Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, supra, it was assumed that the
police officer had violated the decedent's constitutional
rights, but we held that the wrongful conduct of a single
officer without any policy-making authority did not estab-
lish municipal policy.  And in St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485
U. S. 112 (1988), without reaching the question whether the
adverse employment action taken against the plaintiff
violated his First Amendment rights, the Court concluded
that decisions by subordinate employees did not necessarily
reflect official policy.  On the other hand, in Pembaur v.
Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469 (1986), the Court held that the
County was responsible for unconstitutional actions taken
pursuant to decisions made by the County Prosecutor and
the County Sheriff because they were the ``officials responsi-
ble for establishing final policy with respect to the subject
matter in question,'' id., at 483-484.
  Our purpose in citing these cases is to emphasize the
separate character of the inquiry into the question of
municipal responsibility and the question whether a
constitutional violation occurred.  It was necessary to
analyze whether execution of a municipal policy inflicted
the injury in these cases because, unlike ordinary tort
litigation, the doctrine of respondeat superior was inappli-
cabhe city is not vicariously liable under 1983 for the
constitutional torts of its agents:  It is only liable when it
can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.
Because petitioner in this case relies so heavily on our
reasoning in Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378 (1989)-and
in doing so, seems to assume that the case dealt with the
constitutional issue-it is appropriate to comment specifi-
cally on that case.
  In Canton we held that a municipality can, in some
circumstances, be held liable under 1983 ``for constitution-
al violations resulting from its failure to train municipal
employees.''  Id., at 380.  Among the claims advanced by the
plaintiff in that case was a violation of the ``right, under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to
receive necessary medical attention while in police custody.''
Id., at 381.  Because we assumed arguendo that the
plaintiff's constitutional right to receive medical care had
been denied, id., at 388-389, n. 8, our opinion addressed
only the question whether the constitutional deprivation
was attributable to a municipal policy or custom.
  We began our analysis by plainly indicating that we were
not deciding the constitutional issue.

   ``In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,
   436 U. S. 658 (1978), we decided that a municipality
   can be found liable under 1983 only where the
   municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at
   issue.  Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will
   not attach under 1983.  Id., at 694-695.  `It is only
   when the ``execution of the government's policy or
   custom . . . inflicts the injury'' that the municipality
   may be held liable under 1983.'  Springfield v. Kibbe,
   480 U. S. 257, 267 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
   (quoting Monell, supra, at 694).
     ``Thus, our first inquiry in any case alleging munici-
   pal liability under 1983 is the question whether there
   is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or
   custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.''  Id.,
   at 385.
We did not suggest that all harm-causing municipal policies
are actionable under 1983 or that all such policies are
unconstitutional.  Moreover, we rejected the city's argument
that only unconstitutional policies can create municipal
liability under the statute.  Id., at 387.  Instead, we
concluded that if a city employee violates another's constitu-
tional rights, the city may be liable if it had a policy or
custom of failing to train its employees and that failure to
train caused the constitutional violation.  In particular, we
held that the inadequate training of police officers could be
characterized as the cause of the constitutional tort if-and
only if-the failure to train amounted to ``deliberate
indifference'' to the rights of persons with whom the police
come into contact.  Id., at 388.
  Although the term ``deliberate indifference'' has been used
in other contexts to define the threshold for finding a
violation of the Eighth Amendment, see Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976), as we have explained, that term
was used in the Canton case for the quite different purpose
of identifying the threshold for holding a city responsible for
the constitutional torts committed by its inadequately
trained agents.  In this case, petitioner has used that term
to characterize the city's failure to train the employees in
its sanitation department.  We assume for the purpose of
decision that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient
to provide a substitute for the doctrine of respondeat
superior as a basis for imposing liability on the city for the
tortious conduct of its agents, but that assumption does not
confront the question whether the complaint has alleged a
constitutional violation.  To that question we now turn.
                     III
  Petitioner's constitutional claim rests entirely on the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The most
familiar office of that Clause is to provide a guarantee of
fair procedure in connection with any deprivation of life,
liberty, or property by a State.  Petitioner, however, does
not advance a procedural due process claim in this case.
Instead, she relies on the substantive component of the
Clause that protects individual liberty against ``certain
government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them.''  Daniels v. Williams,
474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986).
  As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant
to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchart-
ered area are scarce and open-ended.  Regents of University
of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214, 225-226 (1985).  The
doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the
utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in
this field.  It is important, therefore, to focus on the
allegations in the complaint to determine how petitioner
describes the constitutional right at stake and what the city
allegedly did to deprive her husband of that right.
  A fair reading of petitioner's complaint does not charge
the city with a wilful violation of Collins' rights.  Petitioner
does not claim that the city or any of its agents deliberately
harmed her husband.  In fact, she does not even allege that
his supervisor instructed him to go into the sewer when the
supervisor knew or should have known that there was a
significant risk that he would be injured.  Instead, she
makes the more general allegation that the city deprived
him of life and liberty by failing to provide a reasonably
safe work environment.  Fairly analyzed, her claim
advances two theories: that the Federal Constitution
imposes a duty on the city to provide its employees with
minimal levels of safety and security in the workplace, or
that the city's ``deliberate indifference'' to Collins' safety was
arbitrary Government action that must ``shock the
conscience'' of federal judges.  Cf. Rochin v. California, 342
U. S. 165, 172 (1952).
  Neither the text nor the history of the Due Process
Clause supports petitioner's claim that the governmental
employer's duty to provide its employees with a safe
working environment is a substantive component of the Due
Process Clause.  ``[T]he Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment was intended to prevent government
`from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument
of oppression.'''  DeShaney v. Winnebago County Depart-
ment of Social Services, 489 U. S., at 196 (quoting Davidson
v. Cannon, 474 U. S. 344, 348 (1986)).  As we recognized in
DeShaney,

   ``The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's
   power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal
   levels of safety and security.  It forbids the State itself
   to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property
   without `due process of law,' but its language cannot
   fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation
   on the State to ensure that those interests do not come
   to harm through other means.  Nor does history
   support such an expansive reading of the constitutional
   text.''  489 U. S., at 195.

  Petitioner's submission that the city violated a federal
constitutional obligation to provide its employees with
certain minimal levels of safety and security is unprece-
dented.  It is quite different from the constitutional claim
advanced by plaintiffs in several of our prior cases who
argued that the State owes a duty to take care of those who
have already been deprived of their liberty.  We have held,
for example, that apart from the protection against cruel
and unusual punishment provided by the Eighth Amend-
ment, cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), the Due
Process Clause of its own force requires that conditions of
confinement satisfy certain minimal standards for pretrial
detainees, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 535, n.16, 545
(1979), for persons in mental institutions, Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 315-316 (1982), for convicted felons,
Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 94-99 (1987), and for
persons under arrest, see Revere v. Massachusetts General
Hospital, 463 U. S. 239, 244-245 (1983).  The ``process'' that
the Constitution guarantees in connection with any depriva-
tion of liberty thus includes a continuing obligation to
satisfy certain minimal custodial standards.  See DeShaney,
489 U. S., at 200.  Petitioner cannot maintain, however,
that the city deprived Collins of his liberty when it made,
and he voluntarily accepted, an offer of employment.
  We also are not persuaded that the city's alleged failure
to train its employees, or to warn them about known risks
of harm, was an omission that can properly be character-
ized as arbitrary, or conscience-shocking, in a constitutional
sense.  Petitioner's claim is analogous to a fairly typical
state law tort claim:  The city breached its duty of care to
her husband by failing to provide a safe work environment.
Because the Due Process Clause ``does not purport to
supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of
conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living
together in society,'' Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S., at 332,
we have previously rejected claims that the Due Process
Clause should be interpreted to impose federal duties that
are analogous to those traditionally imposed by state tort
law, see, e. g., id., at 332-333; Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S.
137, 146 (1979); Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 701 (1976).
The reasoning in those cases applies with special force to
claims asserted against public employers because state law,
rather than the Federal Constitution, generally governs the
substance of the employment relationship.  See, e. g.,
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 350 (1976); Board of Regents
of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577-578 (1972).
  Our refusal to characterize the city's alleged omission in
this case as arbitrary in a constitutional sense rests on the
presumption that the administration of Government
programs is based on a rational decisionmaking process
that takes account of competing social, political, and
economic forces.  Cf.  Walker v. Rowe, 791 F. 2d 507, 510
(CA7 1986).  Decisions concerning the allocation of resourc-
es to individual programs, such as sewer maintenance, and
to particular aspects of those programs, such as the training
and compensation of employees, involve a host of policy
choices that must be made by locally elected representa-
tives, rather than by federal judges interpreting the basic
charter of Government for the entire country.  The Due
Process Clause ``is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-
advised personnel decisions.''  Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S., at
350.  Nor does it guarantee municipal employees a work-
place that is free of unreasonable risks of harm.
  Finally, we reject petitioner's suggestion that the Texas
Hazard Communication Act supports her substantive
due process claim.  We assume that the Act imposed a duty
on the city to warn its sanitation employees about the
dangers of noxious gases in the sewers and to provide safety
training and protective equipment to minimize those
dangers.  We also assume, as petitioner argues, that the
Act created an entitlement that qualifies as a ``liberty
interest'' protected by the Due Process Clause.  But even
with these assumptions, petitioner's claim must fail for she
has not alleged that the deprivation of this liberty interest
was arbitrary in the constitutional sense.  Cf. Harrah
Independent School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U. S. 194, 198-199
(1979).  The reasons why the city's alleged failure to train
and warn did not constitute a constitutionally arbitrary
deprivation of Collins' life, see supra, at 12-13, apply a
fortiori to the less significant liberty interest created by the
Texas statute.
  In sum, we conclude that the Due Process Clause does
not impose an independent federal obligation upon munici-
palities to provide certain minimal levels of safety and
security in the workplace and the city's alleged failure to
train or to warn its sanitation department employees was
not arbitrary in a constitutional sense.  The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
                            It is so ordered.
-------------------------------
