NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                 Syllabus

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v.
ELIAS-ZACARIAS
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 90-1342.  Argued November 4, 1991-Decided January 22, 1992

Respondent, a native of Guatemala, was apprehended for entering the
 United States without inspection.  In his deportation proceedings, the
 Board of Immigration Appeals determined that he was ineligible for
 a discretionary grant of asylum.  In reversing that determination, the
 Court of Appeals ruled that a guerrilla organization's acts of conscrip-
 tion constitute persecution on account of political opinion and that
 respondent therefore had a well-founded fear of such persecution.
Held:A guerrilla organization's attempt to coerce a person into per-
 forming military service does not necessarily constitute ``persecution
 on account of . . . political opinion'' under 101(a)(42) of the Immigra-
 tion and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42).  Even one who
 supports the political aims of a guerrilla movement might resist
 military combat and thus become the object of such coercion.  More-
 over, persecution on account of political opinion is not established by
 the fact that the coercing guerrillas had ``political'' motives.  In order
 to satisfy 101(a)(42), the persecution must be on account of the
 victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's.  Since respondent did
 not produce evidence so compelling that no reasonable factfinder
 could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution on account of
 political opinion, the Court of Appeals had no proper basis to set
 aside the BIA's determination.  See 8  U.S.C. 1105a(a)(4); NLRB
 v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300.
 Pp.3-6.
921 F.2d 844, reversed.

 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and White, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined.
Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun and
O'Connor, JJ., joined.
___________________________

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1342
--------
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
PETITIONER v. JAIRO JONATHAN
ELIAS ZACARIAS
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the ninth circuit
[January 22, 1992]

  Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The principal question presented by this case is whether
a guerrilla organization's attempt to coerce a person into
performing military service necessarily constitutes -persecu-
tion on account of . . . political opinion- under 101(a)(42)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added, 94 Stat.
102, 8 U. S. C. 1101(a)(42).
                     I
  Respondent Elias-Zacarias, a native of Guatemala, was
apprehended in July 1987 for entering the United States
without inspection.  In deportation proceedings brought by
petitioner Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
Elias-Zacarias conceded his deportability but requested
asylum and withholding of deportation.
  The Immigration Judge summarized Elias-Zacarias'
testimony as follows:
   -[A]round the end of January in 1987 [when Elias-
   Zacarias was 18], two armed, uniformed guerrillas with
   handkerchiefs covering part of their faces came to his
   home.  Only he and his parents were there. . . .  [T]he
   guerrillas asked his parents and himself to join with
   them, but they all refused.  The guerrillas asked them
   why and told them that they would be back, and that
   they should think it over about joining them.
     -[Elias-Zacarias] did not want to join the guerrillas
   because the guerrillas are against the government and
   he was afraid that the government would retaliate
   against him and his family if he did join the guerrillas.
   [H]e left Guatemala at the end of March [1987] . . .
   because he was afraid that the guerrillas would re-
   turn.-
The Immigration Judge understood from this testimony
that Elias-Zacarias' request for asylum and for withholding
of deportation was -based on this one attempted recruit-
ment by the guerrillas.-  She concluded that Elias-Zacarias
had failed to demonstrate persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion, and was not eligible for asylum.  See 8 U. S. C.
 1101(a)(42), 1158(a).  She further concluded that he did
not qualify for withholding of deportation.
  The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) summarily
dismissed Elias-Zacarias' appeal on procedural grounds.
Elias-Zacarias then moved the BIA to reopen his deporta-
tion hearing so that he could submit new evidence that,
following his departure from Guatemala, the guerrillas had
twice returned to his family's home in continued efforts to
recruit him.  The BIA denied reopening on the ground that
even with this new evidence Elias-Zacarias had failed to
make a prima facie showing of eligibility for asylum and
had failed to show that the results of his deportation
hearing would be changed.
  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, treating the
BIA's denial of the motion to reopen as an affirmance on
the merits of the Immigration Judge's ruling, reversed.  921
F. 2d 844 (1990).  The court ruled that acts of conscription
by a nongovernmental group constitute persecution on
account of political opinion, and determined that Elias-
Zacarias had a -well-founded fear- of such conscription.  Id.,
at 850-852.  We granted certiorari.  500 U. S. ___ (1991).
                    II
  Section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U. S. C. 1158(a), authorizes the Attorney General, in his
discretion, to grant asylum to an alien who is a -refugee- as
defined in the Act, i. e., an alien who is unable or unwilling
to return to his home country -because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.-  101(a)(42)(A), 8 U. S. C. 1101(a)(42)(A).
See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 423, 428, n. 5
(1987).  The BIA's determination that Elias-Zacarias was
not eligible for asylum must be upheld if -supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the
record considered as a whole.-  8 U. S. C. 1105a(a)(4).  It
can be reversed only if the evidence presented by Elias-
Zacarias was such that a reasonable factfinder would have
to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed.
NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U. S.
292, 300 (1939).
   The Court of Appeals found reversal warranted.  In its
view, a guerrilla organization's attempt to conscript a
person into its military forces necessarily constitutes
-persecution on account of . . . political opinion,- because
-the person resisting forced recruitment is expressing a
political opinion hostile to the persecutor and because the
persecutors' motive in carrying out the kidnapping is
political.-  921 F. 2d, at 850.  The first half of this seems to
us untrue, and the second half irrelevant.
  Even a person who supports a guerrilla movement might
resist recruitment for a variety of reasons-fear of combat,
a desire to remain with one's family and friends, a desire to
earn a better living in civilian life, to mention only a few.
The record in the present case not only failed to show a
political motive on Elias-Zacarias' part; it showed the
opposite.  He testified that he refused to join the guerrillas
because he was afraid that the government would retaliate
against him and his family if he did so.  Nor is there any
indication (assuming, arguendo, it would suffice) that the
guerrillas erroneously believed that Elias-Zacarias' refusal
was politically based.
  As for the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the guerrillas'
-motive in carrying out the kidnapping is political-: It
apparently meant by this that the guerrillas seek to fill
their ranks in order to carry on their war against the
government and pursue their political goals.  See 921 F. 2d,
at 850 (citing Arteaga v. INS, 836 F. 2d 1227, 1232, n. 8
(CA9 1988)); 921 F. 2d, at 852.  But that does not render
the forced recruitment -persecution on account of . . .
political opinion.-  In construing statutes, -we must, of
course, start with the assumption that the legislative
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words
used.-  Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962); see
Cardoza-Fonseca, supra, at 431; INS v. Phinpathya, 464
U. S. 183, 189 (1984).  The ordinary meaning of the phrase
-persecution on account of . . . political opinion- in
101(a)(42) is persecution on account of the victim's political
opinion, not the persecutor's.  If a Nazi regime persecutes
Jews, it is not, within the ordinary meaning of language,
engaging in persecution on account of political opinion; and
if a fundamentalist Moslem regime persecutes democrats,
it is not engaging in persecution on account of religion.
Thus, the mere existence of a generalized -political- motive
underlying the guerrillas' forced recruitment is inadequate
to establish (and, indeed, goes far fute) the proposition
that Elias-Zacarias fears persecution on account of political
opinion, as 101(a)(42) requires.
  Elias-Zacarias appears to argue that not taking sides
with any political faction is itself the affirmative expression
of a political opinion.  That seems to us not ordinarily so,
since we do not agree with the dissent that only a -narrow,
grudging construction of the concept of `political opinion,'-
post, at 4, would distinguish it from such quite different
concepts as indifference, indecisiveness and risk-averseness.
But we need not decide whether the evidence compels the
conclusion that Elias-Zacarias held a political opinion.
Even if it does, Elias-Zacarias still has to establish that the
record also compels the conclusion that he has a -well-
founded fear- that the guerrillas will persecute him because
of that political opinion, rather than because of his refusal
to fight with them.  He has not done so with the degree of
clarity necessary to permit reversal of a BIA finding to the
contrary; indeed, he has not done so at all.
  Elias-Zacarias objects that he cannot be expected to
provide direct proof of his persecutors' motives.  We do not
require that.  But since the statute makes motive critical,
he must provide some evidence of it, direct or circumstan-
tial.  And if he seeks to obtain judicial reversal of the BIA's
determination, he must show that the evidence he present-
ed was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.  That he has
not done.
  The BIA's determination should therefore have been
upheld in all respects, and we reverse the Court of Appeals'
judgment to the contrary.
It is so ordered.
-------------------------------
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1342
--------
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
PETITIONER v. JAIRO JONATHAN
ELIAS-ZACARIAS
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the ninth circuit
[January 22, 1992]

  Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun and
Justice O'Connor join, dissenting.
  Respondent refused to join a guerrilla organization that
engaged in forced recruitment in Guatemala.  He fled the
country because he was afraid the guerrillas would return
and ``take me and kill me.''  After his departure, armed
guerrillas visited his family on two occasions searching for
him.  In testimony that the hearing officer credited, he
stated that he is still afraid to return to Guatemala because
``these people'' can come back to ``take me or kill me.''
  It is undisputed that respondent has a well-founded fear
that he will be harmed, if not killed, if he returns to
Guatemala.  It is also undisputed that the cause of that
harm, if it should occur, is the guerrilla organization's
displeasure with his refusal to join them in their armed
insurrection against the government.  The question of law
that the case presents is whether respondent's well-founded
fear is a ``fear of persecution on account of . . . political
opinion'' within the meaning of 101(a)(42) of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Act.
   If respondent were to prevail, as he did in the Court of
Appeals, 921 F. 2d 844 (CA9 1990), he would be classified
as a ``refugee'' and therefore be eligible for a grant of
asylum.  He would not be automatically entitled to that
relief, however, because ``the Attorney General is not
required to grant asylum to everyone who meets the
definition of refugee.''  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S.
421, 428, n. 5 (1987) (emphasis in original).  Instead, 208
of the Act provides that the Attorney General may, ``in [his]
discretion,'' grant asylum to refugees.

   Today the Court holds that respondent's fear of persecu-
tion is not ``on account of . . . political opinion'' for two
reasons.  First, he failed to prove that his refusal to join the
guerrillas was politically motivated; indeed, he testified that
he was at least in motivated by a fear that government
forces would retaliate against him or his family if he joined
the guerrillas.  See ante, at 3-4.  Second, he failed to prove
that his persecutors' motives were political.  In particular,
the Court holds that the persecutors' implicit threat to
retaliate against respondent ``because of his refusal to fight
with them,'' ante, at 4-5, is not persecution on account of
political opinion.  I disagree with both parts of the Court's
reasoning.
                      I
  A political opinion can be expressed negatively as well as
affirmatively.  A refusal to support a cause-by staying
home on election day, by refusing to take an oath of
allegiance, or by refusing to step forward at an induction
center-can express a political opinion as effectively as an
affirmative statement or affirmative conduct.  Even if the
refusal is motivated by nothing more than a simple desire
to continue living an ordinary life with one's family, it is
the kind of political expression that the asylum provisions
of the statute were intended to protect.
  As the Court of Appeals explained in Bolanos-Hernandez
v. INS, 767 F. 2d 1277 (CA9 1985):
     ``Choosing to remain neutral is no less a political
   decision than is choosing to affiliate with a particular
   political faction.  Just as a nation's decision to remain
   neutral is a political one, see, e. g., Neutrality Act of
   1939, 22  U. S. C.  441-465 (1982), so is an indivi-
   dual's.  When a person is aware of contending political
   forces and affirmatively chooses not to join any faction,
   that choice is a political one.  A rule that one must
   identify with one of two dominant warring political
   factions in order to possess a political opinion, when
   many persons may, in fact, be opposed to the views and
   policies of both, would frustrate one of the basic
   objectives of the Refugee Act of 1980-to provide
   protection to all victims of persecution regardless of
   ideology.  Moreover, construing `political opinion' in so
   short-sighted and grudging a manner could result in
   limiting the benefits under the ameliorative provisions
   of our immigration laws to those who join one political
   extreme or another; moderates who choose to sit out a
   battle would not qualify.''  Id., at 1286 (emphasis in
   original; footnote omitted).
  The narrow, grudging construction of the concept of
``political opinion'' that the Court adopts today is inconsis-
tent with the basic approach to this statute that the Court
endorsed in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra.  In that case,
relying heavily on the fact that an alien's status as a
``refugee'' merely makes him eligible for a discretionary
grant of asylum-as contrasted with the entitlement to a
withholding of deportation authorized by 243(h) of the
Act-the Court held that the alien's burden of proving a
well-founded fear of persecution did not require proof that
persecution was more likely than not to occur.  We ex-
plained:
   ``Our analysis of the plain language of the Act, its
   symmetry with the United Nations Protocol, and its
   legislative history, lead inexorably to the conclusion
   that to show a `well-founded fear of persecution,' an
   alien need not prove that it is more likely than not that
   he or she will be persecuted in his or her home country.
   We find these ordinary canons of statutory construction
   compelling, even without regard to the longstanding
   principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in
   deportation statutes in favor of the alien.  See INS v.
   Errico, 385 U. S. 214, 225 (1966); Costello v. INS, 376
   U. S. 120, 128 (1964); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333
   U. S. 6, 10 (1948).
     ``Deportation is always a harsh measure; it is all the
   more replete with danger when the alien makes a claim
   that he or she will be subject to death or persecution if
   forced to return to his or her home country.  In enact-
   ing the Refugee Act of 1980 Congress sought to `give
   the United States sufficient flexibility to respond to
   situations involving political or religious dissidents and
   detainees throughout the world.'  H. R. Rep., at 9.  Our
   holding today increases that flexibility by rejecting the
   Government's contention that the Attorney General
   may not even consider granting asylum to one who fails
   to satisfy the strict 243(h) standard.  Whether or not
   a `refugee' is eventually granted asylum is a matter
   which Congress has left for the Attorney General to
   decide.  But it is clear that Congress did not intend to
   restrict eligibility for that relief to those who could
   prove that it is more likely than not that they will be
   persecuted if deported.''  480 U. S., at 449-450.
  Similar reasoning should resolve any doubts concerning
the political character of an alien's refusal to take arms
against a legitimate government in favor of the alien.  In
my opinion, the record in this case is more than adequate
to support the conclusion that this respondent's refusal was
a form of expressive conduct that constituted the statement
of a ``political opinion'' within the meaning of 208(a).
                     II
  It follows as night follows day that the guerrillas' implied
threat to ``take'' him or to ``kill'' him if he did not change his
position constituted threatened persecution ``on account of''
that political opinion.  As the Court of Appeals explained in
Bolanos-Hernandez, supra:
   ``It does not matter to the persecutors what the individ-
   ual's motivation is.  The guerrillas in El Salvador do
   not inquire into the reasoning process of those who
   insist on remaining neutral and refuse to join their
   cause.  They are concerned only with an act that consti-
   tutes an overt manifestation of a political opinion.
   Persecution because of that overt manifestation is
   persecution because of a political opinion.''  767 F. 2d,
   at 1287.
  It is important to emphasize that the statute does not
require that an applicant for asylum prove exactly why his
persecutors would act against him; it only requires him to
show that he has a ``well-founded fear of persecution on
account of . . . political opinion.''  As we recognized in INS
v. Cardoza Fonseca, the applicant meets this burden if he
shows that there is a ```reasonable possibility''' that he will
be persecuted on account of his political opinion.  480 U. S.,
at 440 (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U. S. 407, 425 (1984)).
Because respondent expressed a political opinion by
refusing to join the guerrillas, and they responded by
threatening to ``take'' or to ``kill'' him if he did not change
his mind, his fear that the guerrillas will persecute him on
account of his political opinion is well founded.
  Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
-------------------------------

