NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. R. L. C.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit
No. 90-1577.   Argued December 10, 1991-Decided March 24, 1992

Because certain conduct of respondent R. L. C. at age 16 would have
 constituted the crime of involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C.
 1112(a) and 1153 if committed by an adult, the District Court held
 that he had committed an act of juvenile delinquency within the
 meaning of the Juvenile Delinquency Act.  In light of a provision of
 that Act requiring the length of official detention in certain circum-
 stances to be limited to ``the maximum term of imprisonment that
 would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as
 an adult,'' 5037(c)(1)(B), the court committed R. L. C. to detention
 for three years, the maximum sentence for involuntary manslaughter
 under 1112(b).  Reading 5037(c)(1)(B) to bar a juvenile term longer
 than the sentence a court could impose on a similarly situated adult
 after applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and finding
 that the Guidelines would yield a maximum sentence of 21 months
 for an adult in R. L. C.'s circumstances, the Court of Appeals vacated
 his sentence and remanded for resentencing.
Held:The judgment is affirmed.
915 F.2d 320, affirmed.
   Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
 Parts I, II-A, and III, concluding:
   1.Plain-meaning analysis does not compel adoption of the Govern-
 ment's construction that the word ``authorized'' in 5037(c)(1)(B) must
 refer to the maximum term of imprisonment provided for by the
 statute defining the offense.  At least equally consistent, and argu-
 ably more natural, is the construction that ``authorized'' refers to the
 result of applying all statutes with a required bearing on the sentenc-
 ing decision, including not only those that empower the court to
 sentence but those that limit the legitimacy of its exercise of that
 power, including 3553(b) which requires application of the Guide-
 lines and caps an adult sentence at the top of the relevant Guideline
 range, absent circumstances warranting departure.  Thus, the most
 that can be said from examining the text in its present form is that
 the Government may claim its preferred construction to be one
 possible resolution of statutory ambiguity.  Pp.3-5.
   2.The 5037(B) limitation refers to the maximum sentence
 that could be imposed if the juvenile were being sentenced after
 application of the Guidelines.  Although determining the maximum
 permissible sentence under 5037(c)(1)(B) will require sentencing and
 reviewing courts to determine an appropriate Guideline range in
 juvenile-delinquency proceedings, it does not require plenary applica-
 tion of the Guidelines to juvenile delinquents.  Where the statutory
 provision applies, a sentencing court's concern with the Guidelines
 goes solely to the upper limit of the proper Guideline range as setting
 the maximum term for which a juvenile may be committed to official
 detention, absent circumstances that would warrant departure under
 3553(b).  Pp.13-14.
   Justice Souter, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice White,
 and Justice Stevens, delivered an opinion with respect to Parts
 II-B and II-C, concluding that:
   1.The textual evolution of 5037(c)(1)(B) and the relevant legisla-
 tive history reinforce the conclusion that the section is better under-
 stood to refer to the maximum sentence permitted under 3553(b).
 Whereas the predecessor of 5037(c) spoke in terms of the ``maximum
 term which could have been imposed on an adult'' (emphasis added),
 the current version's reference to ``the juvenile,'' on its face suggests
 a change in reference from abstract considerations to a focused
 inquiry into the circumstances of the particular juvenile.  Although
 an intervening version referred to the maximum sentence ``that would
 be authorized by section 3581(b) if the juvenile had been tried and
 convicted as an adult'' (emphasis added), the emphasized language
 was quickly deleted, resulting in the present statutory text.  The
 legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended the deletion
 to conform juvenile and adult maximum sentences, in that 3581(b),
 which catalogs such sentences for federal offenses by reference to
 their relative seriousness, could in some circumstances have appeared
 to authorize a longer sentence for a juvenile than an adult would
 have received.  Absent promulgation of the Guidelines, the deletion
 might have left the question of the ``authorized'' maximum to be
 determined by reference to the penalty provided by the statute
 creating the offense.  However, Congress' purpose today can be
 achieved only by reading ``authorized'' to refer to the maximum
 sentence that may be imposed consistently with 3553(b), which will
 generally provide a ceiling more favorable to the juvenile than that
 contained in the offense-defining statute.  It hardly seems likely that
 Congress adopted the current 5037(c) without intending the recently
 enacted Guidelines scheme to be considered for the purpose of
 conforming juvenile and adult sentences.  Pp.5-12.
   2.No ambiguity about the statute's intended scope survives the
 foregoing analysis, but, if any did, the construction yielding the
 shorter sentence would be chosen under the rule of lenity.  That
 rule's application is unnecessary in this case, however, since this
 Court has ``always reserved lenity for those situations in which a
 reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after
 resort to `the language and structure, legislative history, and motivat-
 ing policies' of the statute.''  Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. ___,
 ___ (citation omitted).  Pp.12-13.
   Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas,
 concluded that it is not consistent with the rule of lenity to construe
 a textually ambiguous penal statute against a criminal defendant on
 the basis of legislative history.  Once it is determined that the
 statutory text is ambiguous, the rule requires that the more lenient
 interpretation prevail.  In approving reliance on a statute's ``motivat-
 ing policies,'' Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. ___, ___, seems
 contrary to Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422.  And insofar
 as Moskal requires consideration of legislative history at all, it
 compromises the purposes of the lenity rule:  to assure that criminal
 statutes provide fair warning of what conduct is rendered illegal, see,
 e. g., McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, and to assure that
 society, through its representatives, has genuinely called for the
 punishment to be meted out, see e. g., United States v. Bass,
 404 U.S. 336, 348.  While the Court has considered legislative
 history in construing criminal statutes before, it appears that only
 one case, Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, has relied on
 legislative history to ``clarify'' an ambiguous statute against a crimi-
 nal defendant's interest.  Dixson does not discuss the implications of
 its decision, and both of the cases it cites in supposed support of its
 holding found the statute at hand not to be facially ambiguous.
 Pp.1-4.
   Justice Thomas agreed with Justice Scalia that the use of
 legislative history to construe an otherwise ambiguous penal statute
 against a criminal defendant is difficult to reconcile with the rule of
 lenity.  The rule operates, however, only if ambiguity remains even
 after a court has applied established principles of construction to the
 statutory text.  See, e. g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. ___,
 ___.  Although knowledge of these principles is imputed to the
 citizenry, there appears scant justification for also requiring knowl-
 edge of extra-legal materials such as legislative history.  Pp.1-2.

 Souter, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, and III, in which
Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thom-
as, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-B and II-C, in
which Rehnquist, C. J., and White and Stevens, JJ., joined.  Scalia,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
in which Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined.  Thomas, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.  O'Connor,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined.
-------------------------------


Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1577
--------
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. R. L. C.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eighth circuit
[March 24, 1992]

  Justice Souter announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts
I, II-A, and III, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-B
and II-C, in which The Chief Justice, Justice White, and
Justice Stevens join.
  The provisions of the Juvenile Delinquency Act require
the length of official detention in certain circumstances to
be limited to -the maximum term of imprisonment that
would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and
convicted as an adult.- 18 U. S. C. 5037(c)(1)(B).  We hold
that this limitation refers to the maximum sentence that
could be imposed if the juvenile were being sentenced after
application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
                                   I
         Early in the morning of November 5, 1989, after a night
of drinking, the then-16-year-old respondent R. L. C. and
another juvenile stole a car with which they struck another
automobile, fatally injuring one of its passengers, 2-year-old
La Tesha Mountain.  R. L. C. is a member of the Red Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians, and these events took place on
the Red Lake Indian Reservation, which is within Indian
country as defined by federal law.  These circumstances
provide federal jurisdiction in this case.  See 18 U. S. C.
1151, 1162, 1153.  Upon certifying that a proceeding was
authorized in federal court under 5032 on the ground that
no state court had jurisdiction over the offense, the Govern-
ment charged R. L. C. with an act of juvenile delinquency.
         After a bench trial, the District Court found R. L. C. to be
a juvenile who had driven the car recklessly while intoxicat-
ed and without the owner's authorization, causing Mount-
ain's death.  R. L. C. was held to have committed an act of
juvenile delinquency within the meaning of 5031, since his
acts would have been the crime of involuntary manslaugh-
ter in violation of 18 U. S. C. 1112(a) and 1153 if commit-
ted by an adult.  The maximum sentence for involuntary
manslaughter under 18 U. S. C. 1112(b) is three years.  At
R. L. C.'s dispositional hearing, the District Court granted
the Government's request to impose the maximum penalty
for the respondent's delinquency and accordingly committed
him to official detention for three years.
         Despite the manslaughter statute's provision for an adult
sentence of that length, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, 915 F. 2d 320 (1990), vacated
R. L. C.'s sentence and remanded for resentencing, after
concluding that 36 months exceeded the cap imposed by
5037(c)(1)(B) upon the period of detention to which a
juvenile delinquent may be sentenced.  Although the statute
merely provides that juvenile detention may not extend
beyond -the maximum term of imprisonment that would be
authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as
an adult,- the Court of Appeals read this language to bar
a juvenile term longer than the sentence a court could have
imposed on a similarly situated adult after applying the
United States Sentencing Guidelines.  Under the Guide-
lines, involuntary manslaughter caused by recklessness has
a base offense level of 14.  United States Sentencing
Commission, Guidelines Manual, 2A1.4(a)(2) (Nov. 1991).
The court found, and the Government agrees, see Brief for
United States 22, n. 5, that because R. L. C. had the lowest
possible criminal history level, Category I, the Guidelines
would yield a sentencing range of 15-21 months for a
similarly situated adult.  The Court of Appeals therefore
concluded that the maximum period of detention to which
R. L. C. could be sentenced was 21 months.
         The Government sought no stay of mandate from the
Court of Appeals, and on remand the District Court
imposed detention for 18 months.  Although C. has
now served this time, his failure to complete the 3-year
detention originally imposed and the possibility that the
remainder of it could be imposed saves the case from
mootness.  See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462
U. S. 579, 581, n. 2 (1983).  We granted the Government's
petition for certiorari, 501 U. S. ____ (1991), to resolve the
conflict between the Eighth Circuit's holding in this case
and the Ninth Circuit's position, adopted in United States
v. Marco L., 868 F. 2d 1121, cert. denied, 493 U. S. 956
(1989), and endorsed by the Government.
                                  II
                                   A
         The Government suggests a straightforward enquiry into
plain meaning to explain what is -authorized.-  It argues
that the word -authorized- must mean the maximum term
of imprisonment provided for by the statute defining the
offense, since only Congress can -authorize- a term of
imprisonment in punishment for a crime.  As against the
position that the Sentencing Guidelines now circumscribe
a trial court's authority, the Government insists that our
concern must be with the affirmative authority for imposing
a sentence, which necessarily stems from statutory law.  It
maintains that in any event the Sentencing Commission's
congressional authorization to establish sentencing guide-
lines does not create affirmative authority to set punish-
ments for crime, and that the Guidelines do not purport to
authorize the punishments to which they relate.
         But this is too easy.  The answer to any suggestion that
the statutory character of a specific penalty provision gives
it primacy over administrative sentencing guidelines is that
the mandate to apply the Guidelines is itself statutory.  See
18 U. S. C. 3553(b).  More significantly, the Government's
argument that -authorization- refers only to what is
affirmatively provided by penal statutes, without reference
to the Sentencing Guidelines to be applied under statutory
mandate, seems to us to beg the question.  Of course it is
true that no penalty would be -authorized- without a
statute providing specifically for the penal consequences of
defined criminal activity.  The question, however, is
whether Congress intended the courts to treat the upper
limit of such a penalty as -authorized- even when proper
application of a statutorily mandated guideline in an adult
case would bar imposition up to the limit, and an unwar-
ranted upward departure from the proper guideline range
would be reversible error.  18 U. S. C. 3742.  Here it
suffices to say that the Government's construction is by no
means plain.  The text is at least equally consistent with
treating -authorized- to refer to the result of applying all
statutes with a required bearing on the sentencing decision,
including not only those that empower the court to sentence
but those that limit the legitimacy of its exercise of that
power.  This, indeed, is arguably the more natural construc-
tion.
         Plain-meaning analysis does not, then, provide the Gov-
ernment with a favorable answer.  The most that can be
said from examining the text in its present form is that the
Government may claim its preferred construction to be one
possible resolution of statutory ambiguity.
                                   B
         On the assumption that ambiguity exists, we turn to
examine the textual evolution of the limitation in question
and the legislative history that may explain or elucidate
it.  The predecessor of 5037(c) as included in the Juve-
nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 provid-
ed that a juvenile adjudged delinquent could be committed
to the custody of the Attorney General for a period -not [to]
extend beyond the juvenile's twenty-first birthday or the
maximum term which could have been imposed on an adult
convicted of the same offense, whichever is sooner.-  18
U. S. C. 5037(b) (1982 ed.) (emphasis added).  In its
current form, the statute refers to the -maximum term of
imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile had
been tried and convicted as an adult.-  18 U. S. C. 5037(c)
(emphasis added).  On its face, the current language
suggests a change in reference from abstract consideration
of the penalty permitted in punishment of the adult offense,
to a focused inquiry into the maximum that would be
available in the circumstances of the particular juvenile
before the court.  The intervening history supports this
reading.
         With the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (chapter II of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473,
214(a), 98 Stat. 2013), 5037 was rewritten.  As 5037(c)(1)(B),
its relevant provision became -the maximum term of
imprisonment that would be authorized by section 3581(b)
if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult.-
18 U. S. C. 5037 (c)(1)(B), (c)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 ed., Supp. II)
(emphasis added).  The emphasized language was quickly
deleted, however, by the Criminal Law and Procedure
Technical Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-646,
21(a)(2), 100 Stat. 3596 (Technical Amendments Act),
resulting in the present statutory text, -the maximum term
of imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile
had been tried and convicted as an adult.-  It thus lost the
reference to 3581(b), which would have guided the
sentencing court in identifying the -authorized- term of
imprisonment.
         R. L. C. argues that this loss is highly significant.
Section 3581(b) was and still is part of a classification
system adopted in 1984 for use in setting the incidents of
punishment for federal offenses by reference to letter grades
reflecting their relative seriousness.  One provision, for
example, sets the maximum period of supervised release for
each letter grade. 18 U. S. C. 3583.  Section 3581(b) sets
out the maximum term of imprisonment for each letter
grade, providing, for instance, that the authorized term of
imprisonment for a Class C felony is not more than 12
years, for a Class D not more than 6, and for a Class E not
more than 3.
         The deletion of the reference to 3581(b) with its specific
catalog of statutory maximums would seem to go against
the Government's position.  Since, for example, a juvenile
who had committed what would have been an adult Class
E felony would apparently have been subject to three years
of detention, because 3581(b) -authorized- up to three
years of imprisonment for an adult, the deletion of the
reference to 3581(b) would appear to indicate some con-
gressional intent to broaden the range of enquiry when
determining what was authorized.
         The Government, however, finds a different purpose,
disclosed in the section-by-section analysis prepared by the
Department of Justice to accompany the bill that became
the Technical Amendments Act.  The Department's analysis
included this explanation for the proposal to delete the
reference to 3581(b): -Because of the effect of 18 U. S. C.
3559(b)(2), deleting the reference to 18 U. S. C. 3581(b)
will tie the maximum sentences for juveniles to the maxi-
mum for adults, rather than making juvenile sentences
more severe than adult sentences.-  131 Cong. Rec. 14177
(1985).  Congress had enacted 3559 to reconcile the new
sentencing schedule, providing for the incidents of convic-
tion according to the offense's assigned letter grade, with
the pre-existing body of federal criminal statutes, which of
course included no assignments of letter grades to the
particular offenses they created.  Section 3559(a) provides
a formula for assigning the missing letter based on the
maximum term of imprisonment set by the statute creating
the offense.  Thus, as it stood at the time of the Technical
Amendments Act, it read:
``(a) Classification
             ``An offense that is not specifically classified by a
letter grade in the section defining it, is classified-
             ``(1) if the maximum term of imprisonment autho-
rized is-
             ``(A) life imprisonment, or if the maximum penalty is
death, as a Class A felony;
             ``(B) twenty years or more, as a Class B felony;
             ``(C) less than twenty years but ten or more years, as
a Class C felony;
             ``(D) less than ten years but five or more years, as a
Class D felony;
             ``(E) less than five years but more than one year, as
a Class E felony;
             ``(F) one year or less but more than six months, as a
Class A misdemeanor;
             ``(G) six months or less but more than thirty days, as
a Class B misdemeanor;
             ``(H) thirty days or less but more than five days, as a
Class C misdemeanor; or
             ``(I) five days or less, or if no imprisonment is autho-
rized, as an infraction.
``(b) Effect of classification
             ``An offense classified under subsection (a) carries all
the incidents assigned to the applicable letter designa-
tion except that:
             ``(1) the maximum fine that may be imposed is the
fine authorized by the statute describing the offense, or
by this chapter, whichever is the greater; and
             ``(2) the maximum term of imprisonment is the term
authorized by the statute describing the offense.''  18
U. S. C. 3559 (1982 ed., Supp. II).
         The Government explains that limiting the length of a
juvenile detention to that authorized for an adult under
3581(b) could in some circumstances have appeared to
authorize a longer sentence than an adult could have
received, when the offense involved was assigned no letter
grade in its defining statute.  Thus an offense created
without letter grade and carrying a maximum term of two
years would be treated under 3559(a) as a class E felony.
Section 3581(b) provides that a class E felony carried a
maximum of three years.  Regardless of that classification,
3559(b)(2) (1982 ed., Supp. II) would certainly preclude
sentencing any adult offender to more than two years.
Tension would arise, however, where a juvenile had
committed the act constituting the offense.  Insofar as
5037(c) capped the juvenile detention by reference to what
was authorized for an adult, the maximum would have been
two years; but insofar as it capped it by reference to what
was authorized by 3581(b), the limit might have appeared
to  be three.  It was to break this tension, according to the
Government, that the reference to 3581(b) was deleted
guaranteeing that no juvenile would be given detention
longer than the maximum adult sentence authorized by the
statute creating the offense.  The amendment also, the
Government says, left the law clear in its reference to the
statute creating the offense as the measure of an -autho-
rized- sentence.  This conclusion is said to be confirmed by
a statement in the House Report that the amendment
-delet[es an] incorrect cross-referenc[e],- H. R. Rep. No.
99-797, p. 21 (1986), which, the Government argues,
-suggests that no substantive change was intended.- Brief
for United States 20, n. 4.
  We agree with the Government's argument up to a point.
A sentencing court could certainly have been confused by
the reference to 3581(b).  A sentencing judge considering
a juvenile defendant charged with an offense bearing no
letter classification, and told to look for -the maximum term
of imprisonment that would be authorized [according to
letter grade] by section 3581(b),- would have turned first to
3559(a) to obtain a letter classification.  The court perhaps
would have felt obliged to ignore the provision of 3559(b)
that -the maximum term of imprisonment is the term
authorized by the statute describing the offense,- in favor
of a longer term provided for the appropriate letter grade in
3581(b).  Indeed, the sentencing judge would have been
faced with this puzzle in virtually every case, since the
system of classifying by letter grades adopted in 1984 was
only to be used in future legislation defining federal
criminal offenses.  See Brief for United States 16.  No
federal offense on the books at the time the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 was adopted carried a letter grade in its
defining statute, and Congress has used the device only
rarely in the ensuing years.
  Thus, while it included a reference to 3581(b), 5037(c)
was ambiguous.  This ambiguity was resolved by an
amendment that, absent promulgation of the Guidelines,
might have left the question of the -authorized- maximum
term of imprisonment to be determined only by reference to
the penalty provided by the statute creating the offense,
whether expressed as a term of years or simply by reference
to letter grade.  The legislative history does not prove,
however, that Congress intended -authorized- to refer solely
to the statute defining the offense despite the enactment of
a statute requiring application of the Sentencing Guide-
lines, a provision that will generally provide a ceiling more
favorable to the juvenile than that contained in the offense-
defining statute.
  Indeed, the contrary intent would seem the better
inference.  The Justice Department analysis of the Techni-
cal Amendments Act, upon which the Government relies,
went on to say that -deleting the reference to 18 U. S. C.
3581(b) will tie the maximum sentences for juveniles to
the maximum for adults, rather than making juvenile
sentences more severe than adult sentences.-  131 Cong.
Rec. 14177 (1985).  This is an expression of purpose that
today can be achieved only by reading -authorized- to refer
to the maximum period of imprisonment that may be
imposed consistently with 18 U. S. C.  3553(b).  That
statute provides that -[t]he court shall impose a sentence
. . . within the range- established for the category of offense
as set forth in the Guidelines, -unless the court finds that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consider-
ation by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from
that described.-  18 U. S. C. 3553(b).
  The point is reinforced by other elements of the legisla-
tive history.  The Senate Report accompanying the 1986
Technical Amendments Act states that the amendment
-makes that juvenile sentences are to be of equal
length as those for adult offenders committing the same
crime.-  S. Rep. No. 99-278, p. 3 (1986).  This, in turn,
reflects the statement in the Senate Report accompanying
the Sentencing Reform Act, that the changes in juvenile
sentencing law were included -in order to conform it to the
changes made in adult sentencing laws.-  S. Rep. No.
98-225, p. 155 (1983).  The most fundamental of the
Sentencing Reform Act's changes was, of course, the
creation of the Sentencing Commission, authorized to
promulgate the guidelines required for use by sentencing
courts.  It hardly seems likely that Congress adopted the
current 5037(c) with a purpose to conform juvenile and
adult maximum sentences without intending the recently
authorized Guidelines scheme to be considered for that
purpose.  The legislative history thus reinforces our initial
conclusion that 5037 is better understood to refer to the
maximum sentence permitted under the statute requiring
application of the Guidelines.
                     C
  We do not think any ambiguity survives.  If any did,
however, we would choose the construction yielding the
shorter sentence by resting on the venerable rule of lenity,
see, e. g., United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347-348
(1971), rooted in ```the instinctive distaste against men
languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said
they should,''' id., at 348 (quoting H. Friendly, Benchmarks
209 (1967)).  While the rule has been applied not only to
resolve issues about the substantive scope of criminal stat-
utes, but to answer questions about the severity of sentenc-
ing, see Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381, 387 (1980),
its application is unnecessary in this case, since -we have
always reserved lenity for those situations in which a
reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope
even after resort to `the language and structure, legislative
history, and motivating policies' of the statute.-  Moskal v.
United States, 498 U. S. ____, ____ (1990) (slip op., at 4)
(citation omitted).
                    III
  We hold therefore that application of the language in
5037(c)(1)(B) permitting detention for a period not to
exceed -the maximum term of imprisonment that would be
authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as
an adult- refers to the maximum length of sentence to
which a similarly situated adult would be subject if convict-
ed of the adult counterpart of the offense and sentenced
under the statute requiring application of the Guidelines,
18 U. S. C. 3553(b).  Although determining the maximum
permissible sentence under 5037(c)(1)(B) will therefore
require sentencing and reviewing courts to determine an
appropriate guideline range in juvenile-delinquency pro-
ceedings, we emphasize that it does not require plenary
application of the Guidelines to juvenile delinquents.
Where that statutory provision applies, a sentencing court's
concern with the Guidelines goes solely to the upper limit
of the proper guideline range as setting the maximum term
for which a juvenile may be committed to official detention,
absent circumstances that would warrant departure under
3553(b).
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
                                 Affirmed.
-------------------------------


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1577
--------
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. R. L. C.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eighth circuit
[March 24, 1992]

  Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Kennedy and
Justice Thomas join, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
  In my view it is not consistent with the rule of lenity to
construe a textually ambiguous penal statute against a
criminal defendant on the basis of legislative history.
Because Justice Souter's opinion assumes the contrary, I
join only Parts I, II-A, and III, and concur in the judgment.
  The Court begins its analysis, quite properly, by examin-
ing the language of 18 U. S. C. 5037(c)(1)(B)-which
proves to be ambiguous.  Reasonable doubt remains, the
Court concludes, as to whether the provision refers (i) to the
maximum punishment that could be imposed if the juvenile
were being sentenced under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (15-21 months) or (ii) to the maximum punish-
ment authorized by the statute defining the offense, see 18
U. S. C. 1112(a) (36 months).  Ante, at 5.  With that
conclusion I agree-and that conclusion should end the
matter.  The rule of lenity, in my view, prescribes the result
when a criminal statute is ambiguous: the more lenient
interpretation must prevail.
  Yet the plurality continues.  Armed with its warrant of
textual ambiguity, the plurality conducts a search of
5037's legislative history  to determine whether that
clarifies the statute.  Happily for this defendant, the
plurality's extratextual inquiry is benign: It uncovers
evidence that the ``better understood'' reading of 5037 is
the more lenient one.  Ante, at 12.  But this methodology
contemplates as well a different ending, one in which
something said in a Committee Report causes the criminal
law to be stricter than the text of the law displays.
According to the plurality, ``we resort to the [rule of lenity]
only when `a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's
intended scope even after resort to ``the language and
structure, legislative history, and motivating policies'' of the
statute.'''  Ante, at 12 (quoting Moskal v. United States, 498
U. S. ---, --- (1990) (slip op., at 4)) (citation omitted).  I
doubt that Moskal accurately characterizes the law in this
area, and I am certain that its treatment of ``the venerable
rule of lenity,'' ante, at 12, does not venerate the important
values the old rule serves.
  The Moskal formulation of the rule, in approving reliance
on a statute's ``motivating policies'' (an obscure phrase),
seems contrary to our statement in Hughey v. United
States, 495 U. S. 411, 422 (1990), that ``[e]ven [where] the
statutory language . . . [is] ambiguous, longstanding princi-
ples of lenity . . . preclude our resolution of the ambiguity
against [the criminal defendant] on the basis of general
declarations of policy in the statute and legislative history.''
And insofar as Moskal requires consideration of legislative
history at all, it compromises what we have described to be
purposes of the lenity rule.  ``[A] fair warning,'' we have
said, ``should be given to the world in language that the
common world will understand, of what the law intends to
do if a certain line is passed.  To make the warning fair, so
far as possible the line should be clear.''  McBoyle v. United
States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931).  ``[T]he rule of lenity ensures
that criminal statutes will provide fair warning concerning
conduct rendered illegal.''  Liparota v. United States, 471
U. S. 419, 427 (1985).  It may well be true that in most
cases the proposition that the words of the United States
Code or the Statutes at Large give adequate notice to the
citizen is something of a fiction, see McBoyle, supra, at 27,
albeit one required in any system of law; but necessary
fiction descends to needless farce when the public is
charged even with knowledge of Committee Reports.
  Moskal's mode of analysis also disserves the rule of
lenity's other purpose: assuring that the society, through
its representatives, has genuinely called for the punishment
to be meted out.  ``[B]ecause of the seriousness of crim-
inal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually
represents the moral condemnation of the community,
legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.''
United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 348 (1971).  See also
Liparota, supra, at 427; United States v. Wiltberger, 5
Wheat. 76, 95 (1820).  The rule reflects, as the plurality
acknowledges, `````the instinctive distaste against men
languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said
they should.'''''  Ante, at 12 (quoting Bass, supra, at 348,
and H. Friendly, Benchmarks 209 (1967)).  But legislative
history can never provide assurance against that unaccept-
able result.  After all, ``[a] statute is a statute,'' ante, at 12,
n. 5, and no matter how ``authoritative'' the history may
be-even if it is that veritable Rosetta Stone of legislative
archaeology, a crystal clear Committee Report-one can
never be sure that the legislators who voted for the text of
the bill were aware of it.  The only thing that was authori-
tatively adopted for sure was the text of the enactment;
the rest is necessarily speculation.  Where it is doubtful
whether the text includes the penalty, the penalty ought
not be imposed.  ``[T]he moral condemnation of the commu-
nity,'' Bass, supra, at 348, is no more reflected in the views
of a majority of a single committee of congressmen (assum-
ing, of course, they have genuinely considered what their
staff has produced) than it is reflected in the views of a
majority of an appellate court; we should feel no less
concerned about ``men languishing in prison'' at the direc-
tion of the one than of the other.
  We have in a number of cases other than Moskal done
what the plurality has done here: inquired into legislative
history and invoked it to support or at least permit the
more lenient reading.  But only once, to my knowledge,
have we relied on legislative history to ``clarify'' a statute,
explicitly found to be facially ambiguous, against the
interest of a criminal defendant.  In Dixson v. United
States, 465 U. S. 482, 500-501, n. 19 (1984), the Court
relied on legislative history to determine that defendants,
officers of a corporation responsible for administering
federal block grants, were ``public officials'' within the
meaning of 18 U. S. C. 201(a).  The opinion does not
trouble to discuss the ``fair warning'' or ``condemnation of
the community'' implications of its decision, and both of the
cases it cites in supposed support of its holding found the
statute at hand not to be facially ambiguous.  See United
States v. Moore, 423 U. S. 122, 131 (1975) (``By its terms
841 reaches `any person'' and ``does not exempt (as it could
have) `all registrants' or `all persons registered under this
Act'''); United States v. Brown, 333 U. S. 18, 22 (1948) (``The
legislation reflects an unmistakable intention to provide
punishment for escape or attempted escape to be superim-
posed upon the punishment meted out for previous offenses.
This appears from the face of the statute itself'').  I think
Dixson weak (indeed, utterly unreasoned) foundation for a
rule of construction that permits legislative history to
satisfy the ancient requirement that criminal statutes
speak ``plainly and unmistakably,'' United States v.
Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476, 485 (1917); see also Bass, supra,
at 348.
  In sum, I would not embrace, as the plurality does, the
Moskal formulation of this canon of construction, lest lower
courts take the dictum to heart.  I would acknowledge the
tension in our precedents, the absence of an examination of
the consequences of the Moskal mode of analysis, and the
consequent conclusion that Moskal may not be good law.
-------------------------------


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1577
--------
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. R. L. C.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eighth circuit
[March 24, 1992]

  Justice Thomas, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
  I agree with Justice Scalia that the use of legislative
history to construe an otherwise ambiguous penal statute
against a criminal defendant is difficult to reconcile with
the rule of lenity.  I write separately, however, to empha-
size that the rule is not triggered merely because a statute
appears textually ambiguous on its face.  Just last Term, we
reaffirmed that the rule operates only ```at the end of the
process''' of construction, Chapman v. United States, 500
U. S. ___, ___ (1991) (slip op., at 9) (quoting Callanan v.
United States, 364 U. S. 587, 596 (1961)), if ambiguity
remains ``even after a court has ```seize[d] every thing from
which aid can be derived,''''' ibid. (quoting United States v.
Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347 (1971), in turn quoting United
States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805)).  Thus, although
we require Congress to enact ``clear and definite'' penal
statutes, United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,
344 U. S. 218, 221-222 (1952), we also consult our own
``well-established principles of statutory construction,''
Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. ___, ___ (1991)
(slip op., at 14), in determining whether the relevant text is
clear and definite.  See, e.g., id., at ___ (slip op., at 8)
(applying the rule in Arnold v. United States, 9 Cranch 104,
119-120 (1815), that statutes become effective immediately);
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U. S. 333, 337-342 (1981)
(applying the rule in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 304 (1932), to establish the permissibility of multiple
punishments).
  These cases, I think, demonstrate that we must presume
familiarity not only with the United States Code, see ante,
at 2, but also with the United States Reports, in which we
have developed innumerable rules of construction powerful
enough to make clear an otherwise ambiguous penal
statute.  Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843, n.9 (1984) (``clear
congressional intent'' may be discerned by application of
``traditional tools of statutory construction'').  Like Cong-
ress's statutes, the decisions of this Court are law, the
knowledge of which we have always imputed to the citizen-
ry.  At issue here, though, is a rule that would also require
knowledge of committee reports and floor statements, which
are not law.  I agree with Justice Scalia that there
appears scant justification for extending the ``necessary
fiction'' that citizens know the law, see ante, at 2-3, to such
extra-legal materials.
-------------------------------


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1577
--------
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. R. L. C.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eighth circuit
[March 24, 1992]

  Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Blackmun joins,
dissenting.
  By failing to interpret 18 U.S.C. 5037(c)(1)(B) in light of
the statutory scheme of which it is a part, the Court
interprets a ``technical amendment'' to make sweeping
changes to the process and focus of juvenile sentencing.
Instead, the Court should honor Congress' clear intention
to leave settled practice in juvenile sentencing undisturbed.
    When Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act in
1984, it authorized the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion (Sentencing Commission or Commission) to overhaul
the discretionary system of adult sentencing.  As an
important aspect of this overhaul, Guidelines sentencing
formalizes sentencing procedures.  The Commission
explains:
    ``In pre-guidelines practice, factors relevant to sentenc-
    ing were often determined in an informal fashion.  The
    informality was to some extent explained by the fact
    that particular offense and offender characteristics
    rarely had a highly specific or required sentencing
    consequence.  This situation will no longer exist under
    sentencing guidelines.  The court's resolution of disputed
    sentencing factors will usually have a measurable effect
    on the applicable punishment.  More formality is
    therefore unavoidable if the sentencing process is to be
    accurate and fair.''  United States Sentencing Commis-
    sion, Guidelines Manual, (Nov. 1991) 6A1.3, comment.
  Another significant change permits an appeal when the
Guidelines are incorrectly applied or departed from, 18
U.S.C. 3742; under prior law, a sentence within statutory
limits was not generally subject to review.  United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972).  Thus, factual findings
made at adult sentencing hearings can be challenged on
appeal.
  When Congress made these fundamental changes in
sentencing, it repealed the Youth Corrections Act, Pub. L.
98-473, Title II, 218(a)(8), 98 Stat. 2027 (1984), which
gave special treatment to defendants under 22.  Congress
did not, however, repeal the Juvenile Delinquency Act,
which applies to defendants under 18, and clearly indicated
that the Commission was only to study the feasibility of
sentencing guidelines for juveniles, see 28 U.S.C.
995(a)(1)-(a)(9), a process which is still in progress.  Brief
for United States 11, n. 1.  Thus, Congress did not intend
the Guidelines to apply to juveniles.  Section 5037(c)(1)(B)
must be interpreted against this backdrop.
  Before the Sentencing Reform Act, 5037(c)(1)(B) limited
juvenile sentences by the correlative adult statutory
maximum.  As part of the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress
made clear that this past practice would remain the same
by limiting juvenile sentences to: ``the maximum term of
imprisonment that would be authorized by section 3581(b)
if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult,'' 18
U.S.C. 5037(c)(1)(B) (1982 ed., Supp. II) (emphasis added).
The reference to 3581(b), which classifies offenses and sets
out maximum terms, clarified that the statutory maximum
of the offense, not the Guideline maximum, would still limit
the juvenile's sentence.  Thus, consonant with its decision
to leave juvenile sentencing in place, Congress did not
change 5037(c)(1)(B) to require sentencing judges in
juvenile cases to calculate Guideline maximum sentences.
  As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 6-11, the cross-
reference to 3581(b) added by the Sentencing Reform Act
created a new ambiguity as to whether the maximum
sentence referred to was that authorized in the particular
offense statute, or in the offense classification statute.  To
resolve the ambiguity, the cross-reference was deleted in
1986 as one of numerous technical amendments.  The Court
reads this technical amendment as changing 3581's
reference from the statutory maximum to the Guideline
maximum, even though before the amendment the statute
clearly did not refer to the Guideline maximum.  While the
original version of 5037(c)(1)(B) was ambiguous in other
respects, there was never any question that 5037(c)(1)(B)
referred to the adult statutory maximum.  There is no
indication that Congress intended to change pre-existing
practice.  Section 5037(c)(1)(B), read in this context, still
unambiguously refers to the statutory maximum.  And
because 5037(c)(1)(B) is unambiguous in this respect, the
rule of lenity does not apply here.  Moskal v. United States,
498 U.S. ___, ___ (1990) (Court may look to structure of
statute to ascertain the sense of a provision before resorting
to rule of lenity).  The Court, however, construes
5037(c)(1)(B) to change pre-existing practice only by
reading it in a vacuum apart from the rest of the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act, thus violating the canon of construction
that ``the words of a statute must be read in their context
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme.''  Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S.
803, 809 (1989).
  The practical implications of the Court's reading demon-
strate why its construction runs contrary to Congress'
decision not to apply the Guidelines to juveniles.  Requiring
a district court to calculate a Guideline maximum for each
juvenile imports formal factfinding procedures foreign to the
discretionary sentencing system Congress intended to
retain.  Juvenile proceedings, in contrast to adult proceed-
ings, have traditionally aspired to be ``intimate, informal
[and] protective.''  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,
545 (1971).  One reason for the traditional informality of
juvenile proceedings is that the focus of sentencing is on
treatment, not punishment.  The presumption is that
juveniles are still teachable and not yet ``hardened crimi-
nals.''  S. Rep. No. 1989, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 1 (1938).  See
McKeiver, supra; 18 U.S.C. 5039 (``Whenever possible, the
Attorney General shall commit a juvenile to a foster home
or community-based facility located in or near his home
community'').  As a result, the sentencing considerations
relevant to juveniles are far different from those relevant to
adults.
  The Court asserts, naively it seems to me, that it is not
requiring ``plenary application'' of the Guidelines, ante, at
14, and makes the process of determining the Guideline
maximum seem easy-a court need only look at the offense
the juvenile was found guilty of violating and his criminal
history.  Ante, at 3.  In practice, however, calculating a
Guideline maximum is much more complicated.  Even in
this relatively straightforward case, respondent was said to
have stolen the car he was driving.  Although apparently
not placed in issue at the sentencing hearing, that conduct
might, if proven and connected to the offense of which
respondent was convicted, enhance the applicable Guideline
maximum as ``relevant conduct.''  See USSG 1B1.3.
Respondent's role in the offense might also warrant an
adjustment of the Guideline maximum.  3B1.1, 3B1.2.
The District Court made a determination that respondent
had not accepted responsibility, and that finding changed
the calculation of the Guideline maximum.  Tr. 3 (Jan. 25,
1991), 3E1.1.  The District Court also had to take into
account factors not considered by the Guidelines in deter-
mining whether or not a departure was warranted, which
would increase or decrease the ``maximum'' sentence by an
undiscernible ``reasonable'' amount.  Tr. 3-4, 18 U.S.C.
3553(b).  In short, the Guideline maximum is not static or
readily ascertainable, but depends on particularized
findings of fact and discretionary determinations made by
the sentencing judge.
  These determinations marequire adversarial
evidentiary hearings.  Yet such formal factual investiga-
tions are not provided for by the Juvenile Delinquency Act.
There is no indication in the statute that the judge is
required to support the sentence with particular findings.
USSG 6A1.3 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32(a)(1), as amended after the Guidelines, do provide for an
adversarial sentencing procedure for adults that accommo-
dates Guideline factfinding.  Rule 32 does not apply when
it conflicts with provisions of the Juvenile Delinquency Act,
however, see Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 54(b)(5), and it seems to
me a serious question whether adversarial factfinding is
what Congress had in mind for juvenile sentencing.  An
even more serious question is whether Congress intended
juveniles to be able to appeal the findings of fact that
determine the Guideline maximum.  Yet the Court's
decision would seem to require provision for such appeals.
  In addition, a Guideline maximum for an adult incorpo-
rates factors the Sentencing Commission has found irrele-
vant to juvenile sentencing, see, e.g., USSG 4B1.1 (career
offender status inapplicable to defendants under 18), and
does not incorporate factors Congress has found relevant to
juvenile sentencing, see, e.g., USSG 5H1.1, 5H1.6 (age
and family ties irrelevant to Guideline sentencing).  As a
result, the Guideline maximum for an adult cannot serve as
a useful point of comparison.  In sum, the cumbersome
process of determining a comparable Guideline maximum
threatens to dominate the juvenile sentencing hearing at
the expense of considerations more relevant to juveniles.
  I cannot infer that Congress meant to overhaul and
refocus the procedures of juvenile sentencing in such a
fundamental way merely by deleting a cross-reference in a
technical amendment, especially when Congress expressly
left juvenile sentencing out of the scope of the Sentencing
Reform Act and directed the Commission to examine how
sentencing guidelines might be tailored to juveniles.
  This case is admittedly unusual in that respondent was
sentenced to a longer sentence than a similarly situated
adult.  Before the Guidelines were enacted, however, such
anomalies were not unknown:  A juvenile could receive a
longer sentence than a similarly situated adult, as long as
the sentence was within the statutory maximum.  We
should not try to address the disparity presented in this
particular case by changing all juvenile sentencing in ways
that Congress did not intend.  Instead, we should wait for
the Sentencing Commission and Congress to decide whether
to fashion appropriate guidelines for juveniles.  For this
reason, I respectfully dissent.
-------------------------------
