NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. WILSON
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 90-1745.   Argued January 15, 1992-Decided March 24, 1992

In sentencing respondent Wilson to prison for violating the Hobbs Act,
 the District Court denied his request for credit under 18 U.S.C.
 3585(b) for the time he had spent in presentence detention by
 Tennessee authorities.  After a state trial court credited such time
 against his prison term for state-law convictions, the Court of Ap-
 peals reversed the District Court's ruling, holding that he had a right
 to federal credit and that the District Court should have awarded it
 to him.
Held:It is the Attorney General who computes the amount of the
 3585(b) credit after the defendant has begun to serve his sentence.
 Pp.2-7.
   (a)Effective in 1987, 3585(b)-which specifies, inter alia, that ``[a]
 defendant shall be given credit toward [his] term of imprisonment for
 any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the
 sentence commences,'' if such time ``has not been credited against
 another sentence'' (emphasis added)-replaced a statute which had
 provided, among other things, that ``[t]he Attorney General shall give
 any such person credit'' (emphasis added).  Under the predecessor
 statute, the Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons (BOP),
 computed the amount of credit after taking custody of the sentenced
 federal offender.  Pp.2-3.
   (b)Section 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute
 the credit at sentencing.  By stating crucial verbs in the past and
 present perfect tenses, the section indicates that the computation
 must occur after the defendant begins his sentence.  A sentencing
 court, therefore, cannot apply the section.  Indeed, the District Court
 here could not have made the necessary computation at sentencing,
 since the credit is based on how much time a defendant ``has spent''
 (not ``will have spent'') prior to beginning his sentence.  The court did
 not then know when the state-court proceedings would end or when
 the federal authorities would take Wilson into custody, and only
 could have speculated about the amount of time that he would spend
 in detention.  Moreover, it is immaterial that such detention ``ha[d]
 not been credited'' against a state sentence at the time of Wilson's
 federal sentencing, since basing the award of credit on the relative
 timing of sentencing proceedings would result in arbitrary awards.
 Pp.4-5.
   (c)In light of the sentencing court's inability to compute the credit,
 the Attorney General must continue to make the calculation as he
 did in the past, even though 3585(b) no longer mentions him.  The
 offender has a right to certain jail-time credit under the section, and
 BOP must know how much of a sentence remains in order to fulfill
 its statutory duty of administering the sentence.  Congress' conver-
 sion of the former statute's active language into the passive voice in
 3585(b) is a slim ground for presuming an intention to change well-
 established procedures for determining the credit.  Pp.5-6.
   (d)The general presumption that Congress contemplates a change
 whenever it amends a statute is overcome in this case by the forego-
 ing analysis.  Because the statute was entirely rewritten, and be-
 cause any other interpretation would require this Court to stretch
 3585(b)'s language, it is likely that the former reference to the
 Attorney General was simply lost in the shuffle.  This interpretation
 does not render the 1987 revision meaningless, since Congress altered
 the predecessor statute in at least three other ways.  Pp.6-7.
916 F.2d 1115, reversed.

 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.,
joined.  Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White, J.,
joined.
-------------------------------


Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1745
--------
UNITED STATES, ONER v. RICHARD WILSON
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the sixth circuit
[March 24, 1992]

  Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
  A defendant convicted of a federal crime has a right
under 18 U. S. C. 3585(b) to receive credit for certain time
spent in official detention before his sentence begins.  In
this case, we must decide whether the District Court
calculates the credit at the time of sentencing or whether
the Attorney General computes it after the defendant has
begun to serve his sentence.

                            I
  In the summer and early fall of 1988, respondent Richard
Wilson committed several crimes in Putnam County,
Tennessee.  The precise details of these crimes do not
concern us here.  It suffices to state that Tennessee authori-
ties arrested Wilson on October 5, 1988, and held him in
jail pending the outcome of federal and state prosecutions.
After certain preliminary proceedings, Wilson eventually
pleaded guilty to various federal and state criminal charges.
  On November 29, 1989, the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee sentenced Wilson to 96
months' imprisonment for violation of the Hobbs Act, 18
U. S. C. 1951.  The District Court denied Wilson's request
for credit for time served during his presentence state
custody.  On December 12, 1989, a Tennessee trial court
sentenced Wilson to several years' imprisonment for robbery
and two other felonies.  In contrast to the District Court,
the state court granted Wilson 429 days of credit toward his
state sentence.  Later that day, Tennessee authorities
transferred Wilson to federal custody, and he began serving
his federal sentence.
Wilson appealed the District Court's refusal to give him
credit for the time that he had spent in state custody.
Reversing the District Court, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Wilson had a right
to credit and that the District Court should have awarded
it to him.  916 F. 2d 1115 (1990).  We granted certiorari,
502 U. S. -- (1991), and now reverse.

                II
The Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP), has responsibility for imprisoning federal offenders.
See 18 U. S. C. 3621(a).  From 1966 until 1987, a provi-
sion codified at 18 U. S. C. 3568 (1982 ed.) required the
Attorney General to award federal prisoners credit for
certain time spent in jail prior to the commencement of
their sentences.  This provision, in part, stated:
``The Attorney General shall give any such person credit
toward service of his sentence for any days spent in
custody in connection with the offense or acts for which
sentence was imposed.''  Pub. L. 89-465, 4, 80 Stat.
217 (emphasis added).
The Attorney General implemented this provision by
computing the amount of credit after taking custody of the
sentenced federal offender.  Although the federal courts
could review the Attorney General's determination, the
sentencing court did not participate in computation of the
credit.  See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 425 F. 2d 1388,
1389-1390 (CA5 1970).
In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C. 3551
et seq., which became effective in 1987, Congress rewrote
3568 and recodified it at 3585(b).  Unlike its predecessor,
3585(b) does not mention the Attorney General.  Written
in the passive voice, it states:
``A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of
a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in
official detention prior to the date the sentence com-
mences-
``(1)as a result of the offense for which the sentence
was imposed; or
``(2)as a result of any other charge for which the
defendant was arrested after the commission of the
offense for which the sentence was imposed;
``that has not been credited against another sen-
tence.''  18 U. S. C. 3585(b) (emphasis added).
In describing the defendant's right to receive jail-time
credit in this manner, the provision has created doubt about
whether district courts now may award credit when
imposing a sentence.  The question has significance in this
case because the final clause of 3585(b) allows a defendant
to receive credit only for detention time ``that has not been
credited against another sentence.''  When the District
Court imposed Wilson's 96-month sentence on November
29, 1989, Wilson had not yet received credit for his deten-
tion time from the Tennessee courts.  However, by the time
the Attorney General imprisoned Wilson on December 12,
1989, the Tennessee trial court had awarded Wilson 429
days of credit.  As a result, Wilson could receive a larger
credit if the statute permitted crediting at sentencing, and
thus before the detention time had been credited against
another sentence.
The United States argues that it is the Attorney General
who computes the amount of the credit after the defendant
begins his sentence and that the Court of Appeals erred in
ordering the District Court to award credit to Wilson.
Wilson counters that 3585(b) authorizes the District Court
to compute the amount of the credit at sentencing.  We
agree with the United States.

                 A
We do not accept Wilson's argument that 3585(b)
authorizes a district court to award credit at sentencing.
Section 3585(b) indicates that a defendant may receive
credit against a sentence that ``was imposed.''  It also
specifies that the amount of the credit depends on the time
that the defendant ``has spent'' in official detention ``prior to
the date the sentence commences.''  Congress' use of a verb
tense is significant in construing statutes.  See, e.g., Otte v.
United States, 419 U. S. 43, 49-50 (1974); Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation Inc., 484
U. S. 49, 63-64, n. 4 (1987).  By using these verbs in the
past and present perfect tenses, Congress has indicated that
computation of the credit must occur after the defendant
begins his sentence.  A district court, therefore, cannot
apply 3585(b) at sentencing.
Federal defendants do not always begin to serve their
sentences immediately.  In this case, the District Court
sentenced Wilson on November 29, 1989, but Wilson did not
begin his sentence until December 12, 1989.  At sentencing,
the District Court only could have speculated about the
amount of time that Wilson would spend in detention prior
to the commencement of his sentence; the court did not
know when the state-court proceedings would end or when
the federal authorities would take Wilson into custody.
Because 3585(b) bases the credit on how much time a
defendant ``has spent'' (not ``will have spent'') prior to
beginning his sentence, the District Court could not
compute the amount of the credit at sentencing.
The final phrase of 3585(b) confirms this interpretation.
As noted above, it authorizes credit only for time that ``has
not been credited against another sentence.''  Wilson argues
that this phrase does not prevent him from receiving credit
because his official detention ``ha[d] not been credited''
against the state sentence when the District Court imposed
the federal sentence.  Under this logic, however, if the
District Court had sentenced Wilson a few weeks later than
it did, he would not have received credit under 3585(b).
This interpretation of the statute would make the award of
credit arbitrary, a result not to presumed lightly.  See
United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 580 (1981) (absurd
results are to be avoided).  We can imagine no reason why
Congress would desire the presentence detention credit,
which determines how much time an offender spends in
prison, to depend on the timing of his sentencing.  For these
reasons, we conclude that 3585(b) does not authorize a
district court to compute the credit at sentencing.

                 B
We agree with the United States that the Attorney
General must continue to compute the credit under
3585(b) as he did under the former 3568.  When Con-
gress writes a statute in the passive voice, it often fails to
indicate who must take a required action.  This silence can
make the meaning of a statute somewhat difficult to
ascertain.  See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Train, 430 U. S. 112, 128 (1977); Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 102-103 (1979).  Yet,
even though 3585(b) no longer mentions the Attorney
General, we do not see how he can avoid determining the
amount of a defendant's jail-time credit.
After a District Court sentences a federal offender, the
Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons, has the
responsibility for administering the sentence.  See 18
U. S. C. 3621(a) (``A person who has been sentenced to a
term of imprisonment . . . shall be committed to the custody
of the Bureau of Prisons until the expiration of the term im-
posed'').  To fulfill this duty, the Bureau of Prisons must
know how much of the sentence the offender has left to
serve.  Because the offender has a right to certain jail-time
credit under 3585(b), and because the district court cannot
determine the amount of the credit at sentencing, the
Attorney General has no choice but to make the determina-
tion as an administrative matter when imprisoning the
defendant.
Crediting jail-time against federal sentences long has
operated in this manner.  After Congress enacted 3568 in
1966, the Bureau of Prisons developed detailed procedures
and guidelines for determining the credit available to
prisoners.  See Apps. B and C to Brief for United States
(stating BOP's procedures for computing jail-time credit
determinations); see also United States v. Lucas, 898 F. 2d
1554 (CA11 1990).  Federal regulations have afforded
prisoners administrative review of the computation of their
credits, see 28 CFR 542.10-542.16 (1990); Lucas, supra,
at 1556, and prisoners have been able to seek judicial
review of these computations after exhausting their
administrative remedies, see United States v. Bayless, 940
F. 2d 300, 304-305 (CA8 1991); United States v. Flanagan,
868 F. 2d 1544, 1546 (CA11 1989); United States v. Marti-
nez, 837 F. 2d 861, 865-866 (CA9 1988).  Congress' conver-
sion of an active sentence in 3586 into a passive sentence
in 3585(b) strikes us as a rather slim ground for presum-
ing an intention to change these well-established proce-
dures.  ``It is not lightly to be assumed that Congress
intended to depart from a long established policy.''  Robert-
son v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U. S. 619, 627 (1925).

                 C Wilson argues that our conclusion conflicts with the
familiar maxim that, when Congress alters the words of a statute, it must
intend to change the statute's meaning. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.
S. 16, 23-24 (1983). He asserts that, by removing the explicit reference to
the Attorney General when it enacted 3585(b), Congress expressed a desire to
remove the Attorney General from the process of computing sentences.
Otherwise, Wilson con- tends, Congress would have had no reason to modify the
provision as it did.  We have no difficulty with the general presumption that
Congress contemplates a change when-ever it amends a statute.  In this case,
however, we find that presumption overcome by our conclusions that the
District Court cannot perform the necessary calculation at the time of
sentencing and that the Attorney General, in implementing the defendant's
sentence, cannot avoid computing the credit.  We candidly acknowledge that we
do not know what happened to the reference to the Attorney General during the
revision.  We do know that Congress entirely rewrote 3568 when it changed it
to its present form in 3585(b). It rearranged its clauses, rephrased its
central idea in the passive voice, and more than doubled its length.  In view
of these changes, and because any other interpretation would require us to
stretch the meaning of the words that 3585(b) now includes, we think it
likely that the former reference to the Attorney General was simply lost in
the shuffle.  Our interpretation of 3585(b), however, does not render the
1987 revision meaningless.  Congress altered 3568 in at least three ways when
it enacted 3585(b).  First, Congress replaced the term ``custody'' with the
term ``official detention.''  Second, Congress made clear that a defendant
could not receive a double credit for his detention time. Third, Congress
enlarged the class of defendants eligible to receive credit.  Under the old
law, a defendant could receive credit only for time spent in custody in
connection with ``the offense . . . for which sentence was imposed.''  Under
the new law, a defendant may receive credit both for this time and for time
spent in official detention in connection with ``any other charge for which
the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the
sentence was imposed.''  In light of these revisions, and for the foregoing
reasons, we conclude that the Attorney General may continue to compute the
amount of the credit.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
                               Reversed.
-------------------------------


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1745
--------
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. RICHARD WILSON
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the sixth circuit
[March 24, 1992]

  Justice Stevens, with whom Justice White joins,
dissenting.
  Today's rigid interpretation of a remedial statute is not
supported by the text, legislative history, or underlying
policies of the statute.  In Crandon v. United States, 494
U. S. 152, 158 (1990), this Court said that ``[i]n determining
the meaning of [a] statute, we look not only to the particu-
lar statutory language, but to the design of the statute as
a whole and to its object and policy.''  The Court has failed
to do this today.  The statute at issue, 18 U. S. C. 3585(b),
gives the convicted defendant a right to have his term of
imprisonment shortened by the amount of time he has
already spent in either federal or state custody as a result
of his offense, provided that the time has not already been
credited against another sentence.
  The defendant's right to the full credit authorized by
the statute is obviously an important right.  Both the At-
torney General and the sentencing judge have a duty to
respect and protect that right.  Moreover, it is clear that in
the event there is a dispute between the parties over the
right to a credit, the dispute must be resolved by the court.
No one contends that the Attorney General has unreview-
able discretion to determine the appropriate credit in any
case.
  In most cases, the calculation of the credit is a routine,
ministerial task that will not give rise to any dispute.
Occasionally, however, as this case demonstrates, there may
be a legitimate difference of opinion either about the
meaning of the statute or about the relevant facts.  Such
a dispute must, of course, be resolved by the judge.  The
only question that remains, then, is when the judge shall
resolve the issue-at the time of sentencing, when the
defendant is represented by counsel, or at some later date,
after the defendant has begun to serve his sentence.
  The credit at issue in this case was a period of almost 14
months that respondent had spent in state custody before
he entered into a plea agreement with the federal pros-

ecutor.  Prior to the amendment of 3585(b), which be-
came effective in 1987, the statute-at least as construed by
the Sixth Circuit where this case arose-did not authorize
a credit for time spent in state custody.  See United States
v. Blankenship, 733 F. 2d 433, 434 (1984).  Consistent
with that pre-amendment practice, the District Court
denied respondent's request for credit for the 14 months
that he had spent in state custody.  There are two points
that emerge from that ruling: First, the District Court
erroneously construed the amended statute, and second, the
legal question that the District Court decided was ripe for
decision at the time of sentencing.
  In its opinion today, the Court emphasizes the fact that
the state court later awarded respondent credit for his 14
months in pretrial detention, arguing that he therefore
would not have been entitled to a federal credit if the
federal determination had been made after the state
sentence was imposed.  See ante, at 3, 4-5.  This argument
is misleading for three reasons.  First, if the Federal
District Court had granted respondent's request, it seems
unlikely that the state court would also have allowed the
credit.  Second, although the Court assumes that the risk
of a double credit could be avoided by postponing the credit
determination until after the convicted defendant begins to
serve his federal sentence, that assumption is erroneous
because state proceedings frequently do not terminate until
after a defendant begins to serve his federal sentence or,
indeed, in some cases, until after the defendant has been
released from federal custody.  Third, when a correct
federal sentence, including a correct credit for pretrial
custody, has been imposed, the subsequent action of a state
court concerning the amount of punishment for any state
offenses the defendant may have committed is purely a
matter of state concern.
  In this case, for example, if the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines had prescribed a sentence of less than 14
months, and if the District Court, or indeed the Attorney
General, had awarded respondent the proper credit, and
therefore released him from custody, it would be bizarre to
conclude that the Federal Government should rearrest him
if a Tennessee court subsequently decided to give him the
same credit because he would already have served almost
14 months in custody, thus fulfilling his federal sentence.
The possibility that a state court will allow the same credit
that a federal court allows exists whenever a state sentence
is imposed after the federal credit determination is made,
whether it is made by the trial judge or by the Attorney
General and whether it is made at the sentencing hearing
or at the commencement of the federal sentence.  The
likelihood that the state court will allow a second credit
after a federal credit has been allowed seems remote no
matter when or by whom the federal determination is
made.  More importantly, the existence of a hypothetical
risk of double credits in rare cases involving overlapping
state and federal jurisdiction is not a sufficient reason for
refusing to give effect to the plain language of the statute
in cases in which no such problem is presented.

                      I
  The Court's entire analysis rests on an incorrect premise.
The Court assumes that the statute mandates one of two
starkly different procedures:  either the credit determination
must always be made by the Attorney General after the
defendant has begun to serve his sentence, or it must
always be made by the sentencing judge at the time of
sentencing.  Neither of these procedures is compelled by the
statutory text.  An ordinary reading of the statute's plain
language (``[a] defendant shall be given credit toward the
service of a term of imprisonment . . . .'') suggests that the
judge has ample authority to delegate the task of calculat-
ing the credit to a probation officer or to the prosecutor,
subject, of course, to judicial review, or to make it himself
in the first instance.  Surely there is nothing in the statuto-
ry text that purports to deprive the judge of discretion to
follow whichever procedure seems best suited to the
particular facts of a given case.  The text, which uses the
passive voice, does not specify who will make the decision
about jail credit.  Certainly we should give effect to
Congress' choice of words, and understand that the text, as
written, does not identify a particular decisionmaker, and
therefore, the appropriate decisionmaker may be either the
judge or the Attorney General depending on the circum-
stances.
  The statute does indicate that the decision should be
made after ``the sentence was imposed'' and that the credit
shall include time spent in official detention ``prior to the
date the sentence commences'' even if some of that time is
after the sentencing hearing.  If, as is true in most cases,
the convicted defendant begins to serve his sentence
immediately after it is imposed, it is perfectly consistent
with the text in such cases to have the judge determine the
credit at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing.  Even if
the commencement of the sentence is postponed until a
later date, an order specifying the amount of the credit to
which the defendant was then entitled, and directing that
an additional credit be given if appropriate, would also
conform to the statutory text.  The statute does not prohibit
the judge from resolving the issue at any time after the
sentence has been imposed.  In short, the text does not
mandate any particular procedure that must be followed in
every case.
  Although Congress' use of the passive voice clearly leaves
open the question of who the decisionmaker is with respect
to jail credit, the placement of 3585 in Subchapter D-
Imprisonment, in which ``the court'' is called upon to
determine the sentence (3581), impose the sentence
(3582), include a term of supervised release (3583), and
determine whether the term is to run concurrently or
consecutively in the case of multiple sentences (3584),
clearly points to the judge as the person who is to calculate
credit (3585) in the first instance.  Congress could have
made this perfectly clear by repeating the phrase ``the
court'' in 3585, but that was made almost unnecessary by
placing 3585 in a subchapter in which the court clearly
had responsibility for every action that needed to be taken,
but could also delegate actions to the appropriate authori-
ties.
                     II
  The Court's textual argument amounts to nothing more
than an assertion that because sometimes all issues relating
to the credit determination will not be ripe for decision at
the time of sentencing, the trial court never has authority
to make the credit determination even in cases that are ripe
for decision.  Because this reasoning is so plainly flawed,
the Court's holding must rest on its understanding of the
legislative history.  The history on which the Court relies
includes no relevant comments in the Committee Reports or
the debates.  It consists only of the fact that prior to 1987
the statute directed the Attorney General to make the
credit determination.  See ante, at 2.  It seems to me,
however, that that smidgen of history merely raises the
issue without answering it.  The fact that Congress careful-
ly rewrote the relevant section in a way that makes the
defendant's right significantly more valuable tends to
support the conclusion that the changes in language were
deliberate and should not be ignored.  See Union Bank v.
Wolas, 502 U. S. - (1991); United States Railroad Retire-
ment Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 179 (1980).  Recognizing
the District Court's authority to enter an appropriate order
at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing is entirely
consistent with a congressional purpose to enhance the
value of this right.
                     III
  No statutory policy would be adversely affected by
recognizing the District Court's authority to make the
initial credit determination in appropriate cases, and in
fact, two important policies would be served.  First, as the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has observed, see
n. 10, supra, allowing the district court, in its discretion, to
compute the credit when the sentence is imposed furthers
the interest in providing prisoners with prompt, accurate,
and precise information about the time they must spend in
prison.  This policy is expressly identified in the Senate
Report describing the value of a procedure ``whereby the
offender, the victim, and society all know the prison release
date at the time of the initial sentencing by the court,
subject to minor adjustments based on prison behavior
called `good time.'''  S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 46 (1983).
  Second, and of even greater importance, allowing the
District Court to make the credit determination furthers the
interest in uniform and evenhanded sentencing that is the
centerpiece of the entire Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
When there are disputed issues that must be resolved by a
judge, an adversarial proceeding, in which the parties are
represented by counsel and the proceeding takes place in
open court and on the record, is the best guarantee of a fair
and accurate decision.  The convicted defendant is repre-
sented by trial counsel at the time of sentencing, but
usually must fend for himself after he is incarcerated.
Committing the decision to the Attorney General after the
defendant has begun to serve his sentence, particularly if
he must serve his sentence in some facility remote from the
district of conviction, can only minimize the effective
participation of defense counsel.  Indeed, it may generate
meritless pro se claims for credit that could be avoided by
prompt consideration at sentencing, as well as complicate
and delay the disposition of meritorious claims.  A flexible
approach that allows the judge to decide when and how the
credit determination should be made is fully consistent with
the purposes of the statute and with its text.
  For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.


 
-------------------------------

