NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

YEE et al. v. CITY OF ESCONDIDO, CALIFORNIA
certiorari to the court of appeal of california,
fourth appellate district
No. 90-1947.   Argued January 22, 1992-Decided April 1, 1992

The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause generally requires just compen-
 sation where the government authorizes a physical occupation of
 property.  But where the Government merely regulates the property's
 use, compensation is required only if considerations such as the
 regulation's purpose or the extent to which it deprives the owner of
 the property's economic use suggests that the regulation has unfairly
 singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne
 by the public as a whole.  Petitioners, mobile home park owners in
 respondent Escondido, California, rent pads of land to mobile home
 owners.  When the homes are sold, the new owners generally contin-
 ue to rent the pads.  Under the California Mobilehome Residency
 Law, the bases upon which a park owner may terminate a mobile
 home owner's tenancy are limited to, inter alia, nonpayment of rent
 and the park owner's desire to change the use of his land.  The park
 owner may not require the removal of a mobile home when it is sold
 and may neither charge a transfer fee for the sale nor disapprove of
 a purchaser who is able to pay rent.  The state law does not limit the
 rent the park owner may charge, but Escondido has a rent control
 ordinance setting mobile home rents back to their 1986 levels and
 prohibiting rent increases without the City Council's approval.  The
 Superior Court dismissed lawsuits filed by petitioners and others
 challenging the ordinance, rejecting the argument that the ordinance
 effected a physical taking by depriving park owners of all use and
 occupancy of their property and granting to their tenants, and their
 tenants' successors, the right to physically permanently occupy and
 use the property.  The Court of Appeal affirmed.
Held:
   1.The rent control ordinance does not authorize an unwanted
 physical occupation of petitioners' property and thus does not amount
 to a per se taking.  Petitioners' argument-that the rent control
 ordinance authorizes a physical taking because, coupled with the
 state law's restrictions, it increases a mobile home's value by giving
 the homeowner the right to occupy the pad indefinitely at a sub-
 market rent-is unpersuasive.  The government effects a physical
 taking only where it requires the landowner to submit to the physical
 occupation of his land.  Here, petitioners have voluntarily rented
 their land to mobile home owners and are not required to continue
 to do so by either the City or the State.  On their face, the laws at
 issue merely regulate petitioners' use of their land by regulating the
 relationship between landlord and tenant.  Any transfer of wealth
 from park owners to incumbent mobile home owners in the form of
 sub-market rent does not itself convert regulation into physical
 invasion.  Additional contentions made by petitioners-that the
 ordinance benefits current mobile home owners but not future
 owners, who must purchase the homes at premiums resulting from
 the homes' increased value, and that the ordinance deprives petition-
 ers of the ability to choose their incoming tenants-might have some
 bearing on whether the ordinance causes a regulatory taking, but
 have nothing to do with whether it causes a physical taking.  More-
 over, the finding in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
 458 U.S. 419, 439, n. 17-that a physical taking claim cannot be
 defeated by an argument that a landlord can avoid a statute's
 restrictions by ceasing to rent his property, because his ability to rent
 may not be conditioned on forfeiting the right to compensation for a
 physical occupation-has no relevance here, where there has been no
 physical taking.  Since petitioners have made no attempt to change
 how their land is used, this case also presents no occasion to consider
 whether the statute, as applied, prevents them from making a
 change.  Pp.5-11.
   2.Petitioners' claim that the ordinance constitutes a denial of
 substantive due process is not properly before this Court because it
 was not raised below or addressed by the state courts.  The question
 whether this Court's customary refusal to consider claims not raised
 or addressed below is a jurisdictional or prudential rule need not be
 resolved here, because even if the rule were prudential, it would be
 adhered to in this case.  Pp.11-12.
   3.Also improperly before this Court is petitioners' claim that the
 ordinance constitutes a regulatory taking.  The regulatory taking
 claim is ripe for review; and the fact that it was not raised below
 does not mean that it could not be properly raised before this Court,
 since once petitioners properly raised a taking claim, they could have
 formulated, in this Court, any argument they liked in support of that
 claim.  Nonetheless, the claim will not be considered because, under
 this Court's Rule 14.1(a), only questions set forth, or fairly included,
 in the petition for certiorari are considered.  Rule 14.1(a) is pruden-
 tial, but is disregarded only where reasons of urgency or economy
 suggest the need to address the unpresented question in the case
 under consideration.  The Rule provides the respondent with notice
 of the grounds on which certiorari is sought, thus relieving him of
 the expense of unnecessary litigation on the merits and the burden
 of opposing certiorari on unpresented questions.  It also assists the
 Court in selecting the cases in which certiorari will be granted.  By
 forcing the parties to focus on the questions the Court views as
 particularly important, the Rule enables the Court to use its resourc-
 es efficiently.  Petitioners' question presented was whether the lower
 court erred in finding no physical taking, and the regulatory taking
 claim is related to, but not fairly included in, that question.  Thus,
 petitioners must overcome the very heavy presumption against
 consideration of the regulatory taking claim, which they have not
 done.  While that claim is important, lower courts have not reached
 conflicting results on the claim as they have on the physical taking
 claim.  Prudence also dictates awaiting a case in which the issue was
 fully litigated below, to have the benefit of developed arguments and
 lower court opinions squarely addressing the question.  Thus, the
 regulatory taking issue should be left for the California courts to
 address in the first instance.  Pp.12-17.
224 Cal.App.3d 1349, 274 Cal.Rptr.551, affirmed.

 O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehn-
quist, C. J., and White, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.,
joined.  Blackmun, J., and Souter, J., filed opinions concurring in the
judgment.
-------------------------------


Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1947
--------
JOHN K. YEE, et al., PETITIONERS v. CITY OF
ESCONDIDO, CALIFORNIA
on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal of
california, fourth appellate district
[April 1, 1992]

  Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides:
``[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.''  Most of our cases interpreting
the Clause fall within two distinct classes.  Where the
government authorizes a physical occupation of property (or
actually takes title), the Takings Clause generally requires
compensation.  See, e. g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 426 (1982).  But where the
government merely regulates the use of property, compen-
sation is required only if considerations such as the purpose
of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the
owner of the economic use of the property suggest that the
regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to
bear a burden that should be borne by the public as a
whole.  See, e. g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U. S. 104, 123-125 (1978).  The first category of
cases requires courts to apply a clear rule; the second
necessarily entails complex factual assessments of the
purposes and economic effects of government actions.
  Petitioners own mobile home parks in Escondido, Califor-
nia.  They contend that a local rent control ordinance, when
viewed against the backdrop of California's Mobile home
Residency Law, amounts to a physical occupation of their
property entitling them to compensation under the first
category of cases discussed above.

                            I
  The term ``mobile home'' is somewhat misleading.  Mobile
homes are largely immobile as a practical matter, because
the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the
value of the mobile home itself.  They are generally placed
permanently in parks; once in place, only about one in
every hundred mobile homes is ever moved.  Hirsch &
Hirsch, Legal-Economic Analysis of Rent Controls in a
Mobile Home Context: Placement Values and Vacancy
Decontrol, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 399, 405 (1988).  A mobile
home owner typically rents a plot of land, called a ``pad,''
from the owner of a mobile home park.  The park owner
provides private roads within the park, common facilities
such as washing machines or a swimming pool, and often
utilities.  The mobile home owner often invests in site-
specific improvements such as a driveway, steps, walkways,
porches, or landscaping.  When the mobile home owner
wishes to move, the mobile home is usually sold in place,
and the purchaser continues to rent the pad on which the
mobile home is located.
  In 1978, California enacted its Mobilehome Residency
Law, Cal. Civ. Code Ann. 798 (West 1982 and Supp. 1991).
The Legislature found ``that, because of the high cost of
moving mobilehomes, the potential for damage resulting
therefrom, the requirements relating to the installation of
mobilehomes, and the cost of landscaping or lot preparation,
it is necessary that the owners of mobilehomes occupied
within mobilehome parks be provided with the unique
protection from actual or constructive eviction afforded by
the provisions of this chapter.''  798.55(a).
The Mobilehome Residency Law limits the bases upon
which a park owner may terminate a mobile home owner's
tenancy.  These include the nonpayment of rent, the mobile
home owner's violation of law or park rules, and the park
owner's desire to change the use of his land.  798.56.
While a rental agreement is in effect, however, the park
owner generally may not require the removal of a mobile-
home when it is sold.  798.73.  The park owner may
neither charge a transfer fee for the sale, 798.72, nor
disapprove of the purchaser, provided that the purchaser
has the ability to pay the rent, 798.74.  The Mobilehome
Residency Law contains a number of other detailed provi-
sions, but none limit the rent the park owner may charge.
     In the wake of the Mobilehome Residency Law, various
communities in California adopted mobilehome rent control
ordinances.  See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra, at 408-411.  The
voters of Escondido did the same in 1988 by approving
Proposition K, the rent control ordinance challenged here.
The ordinance sets rents back to their 1986 levels, and
prohibits rent increases without the approval of the City
Council.  Park owners may apply to the Council for rent
increases at any time.  The Council must approve any
increases it determines to be ``just, fair and reasonable,''
after considering the following nonexclusive list of factors:
(1) changes in the Consumer Price Index; (2) the rent
charged for comparable mobile home pads in Escondido; (3)
the length of time since the last rent increase; (4) the cost
of any capital improvements related to the pad or pads at
issue; (5) changes in property taxes; (6) changes in any rent
paid by the park owner for the land; (7) changes in utility
charges; (8) changes in operating and maintenance expens-
es; (9) the need for repairs other than for ordinary wear and
tear; (10) the amount and quality of services provided to the
affected tenant; and (11) any lawful existing lease.  Ordi-
nance 4(g), App. 11-12.
     Petitioners John and Irene Yee own the Friendly Hills
and Sunset Terrace Mobile Home Parks, both of which are
located in the city of Escondido.  A few months after the
adoption of Escondido's rent control ordinance, they filed
suit in San Diego County Superior Court.  According to the
complaint, ``[t]he rent control law has had the effect of
depriving the plaintiffs of all use and occupancy of [their]
real property and granting to the tenants of mobilehomes
presently in The Park, as well as the successors in interest
of such tenants, the right to physically permanently occupy
and use the real property of Plaintiff.''  Id., at 3, -6.  The
Yees requested damages of six million dollars, a declaration
that the rent control ordinance is unconstitutional, and an
injunction barring the ordinance's enforcement.  Id., at 5-6.
     In their opposition to the city's demurrer, the Yees relied
almost entirely on Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F. 2d
1270 (CA9 1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 940 (1988), which
had held that a similar mobile home rent control ordinance
effected a physical taking under Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982).  The Yees
candidly admitted that ``in fact, the Hall decision was used
[as] a guide in drafting the present Complaint.''  2 Tr. 318,
Points & Authorities in Opposition to Demurrer 4.  The
Superior Court nevertheless sustained the city's demurrer
and dismissed the Yees' complaint.  App. to Pet. for Cert.
C-42.
     The Yees were not alone.  Eleven other park owners filed
similar suits against the city shortly afterwards, and all
were dismissed.  By stipulation, all 12 cases were consoli-
dated for appeal; the parties agreed that all would be
submitted for decision by the California Court of Appeal on
the briefs and oral argument in the Yee case.
     The Court of Appeal affirmed, in an opinion primarily
devoted to expressing the court's disagreement with the
reasoning of Hall.  The court concluded:  ``Loretto in no way
suggests that the Escondido ordinance authorizes a perma-
nent physical occupation of the landlord's property and
therefore constitutes a per se taking.''  224 Cal. App. 3d
1349, 1358 (1990).  The California Supreme Court denied
review.  App. to Pet. for Cert. B-41.
     Eight of the twelve park owners, including the Yees,
joined in a petition for certiorari.  We granted certiorari,
502 U. S. ___ (1991), to resolve the conflict between the
decision below and those of two of the federal Courts of
Appeals, in Hall, supra, and Pinewood Estates of Michigan
v. Barnegat Township Leveling Board, 898 F. 2d 347 (CA3
1990).
                                 II
     Petitioners do not claim that the ordinary rent control
statutes regulating housing throughout the country violate
the Takings Clause.  Brief for Petitioners 7, 10.  Cf. Pennell
v. San Jose, 485 U. S. 1, 12, n. 6 (1988); Loretto supra, at
440.  Instead, their argument is predicated on the unusual
economic relationship between park owners and mobile
home owners.  Park owners may no longer set rents or
decide who their tenants will be.  As a result, according to
petitioners, any reduction in the rent for a mobile home pad
causes a corresponding increase in the value of a mobile
home, because the mobilehome owner now owns, in addition
to a mobile home, the right to occupy a pad at a rent below
the value that would be set by the free market.  Cf. Hirsch
& Hirsch, 35 UCLA L. Rev., at 425.  Because under the
California Mobilehome Residency Law the park owner
cannot evict a mobile home owner or easily convert the
property to other uses, the argument goes, the mobile home
owner is effectively a perpetual tenant of the park, and the
increase in the mobile home's value thus represents the
right to occupy a pad at below-market rent indefinitely.
And because the Mobilehome Residency Law permits the
mobile home owner to sell the mobile home in place, the
mobile home owner can receive a premium from the pur-
chaser corresponding to this increase in value.  The amount
of this premium is not limited by the Mobilehome Residency
Law or the Escondido ordinance.  As a result, petitioners
conclude, the rent control ordinance has transferred a
discrete interest in land-the right to occupy the land
indefinitely at a sub-market rent-from the park owner to
the mobile home owner.  Petitioners contend that what has
been transferred from park owner to mobile home owner is
no less than a right of physical occupation of the park
owner's land.
     This argument, while perhaps within the scope of our
regulatory taking cases, cannot be squared easily with our
cases on physical takings.  The government effects a
physical taking only where it requires the landowner to
submit to the physical occupation of his land.  ``This
element of required acquiescence is at the heart of the
concept of occupation.''  FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480
U. S. 245, 252 (1987).  Thus whether the government floods
a landowner's property, Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13
Wall. 166 (1872), or does no more than require the land-
owner to suffer the installation of a cable, Loretto, supra,
the Takings Clause requires compensation if the govern-
ment authorizes a compelled physical invasion of property.
     But the Escondido rent control ordinance, even when
considered in conjunction with the California Mobilehome
Residency Law, authorizes no such thing.  Petitioneruntarily
rented their land to mobile home owners.  At
least on the face of the regulatory scheme, neither the City
nor the State compels petitioners, once they have rented
their property to tenants, to continue doing so.  To the
contrary, the Mobilehome Residency Law provides that a
park owner who wishes to change the use of his land may
evict his tenants, albeit with six or twelve months notice.
Cal. Civ. Code Ann. 798.56(g).  Put bluntly, no govern-
ment has required any physical invasion of petitioners'
property.  Petitioners' tenants were invited by petitioners,
not forced upon them by the government.  See Florida
Power, supra, at 252-253.  While the ``right to exclude'' is
doubtless, as petitioners assert, ``one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly character-
ized as property,'' Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S.
164, 176 (1979), we do not find that right to have been
taken from petitioners on the mere face of the Escondido
ordinance.
     Petitioners suggest that the statutory procedure for
changing the use of a mobile home park is in practice ``a
kind of gauntlet,'' in that they are not in fact free to change
the use of their land.  Reply Brief for Petitioners 10, n. 16.
Because petitioners do not claim to have run that gauntlet,
however, this case provides no occasion to consider how the
procedure has been applied to petitioners' property, and we
accordingly confine ourselves to the face of the statute.  See
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S.
470, 493-495 (1987).  A different case would be presented
were the statute, on its face or as applied, to compel a
landowner over objection to rent his property or to refrain
in perpetuity from terminating a tenancy.  See Florida
Power, supra, at 251-252, n. 6; see also Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825, 831-832 (1987); Fresh Pond
Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U. S. 875, 877
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
     On their face, the state and local laws at issue here
merely regulate petitioners' use of their land by regulating
the relationship between landlord and tenant.  ``This Court
has consistently affirmed that States have broad power to
regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-
tenant relationship in particular without paying compensa-
tion for all economic injuries that such regulation entails.''
Loretto, 458 U. S., at 440.  See also Florida Power, supra,
at 252 (``statutes regulating the economic relations of
landlords and tenants are not per se takings'').  When a
landowner decides to rent his land to tenants, the govern-
ment may place ceilings on the rents the landowner can
charge, see, e. g., Pennell, supra, at 12, n. 6, or require the
landowner to accept tenants he does not like, see, e. g.,
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241,
261 (1964), without automatically having to pay compensa-
tion.  See also Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U. S. 74, 82-84 (1980).  Such forms of regulation are
analyzed by engaging in the ``essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries'' necessary to determine whether a regulatory
taking has occurred.  Kaiser Aetna, supra, at 175.  In the
words of Justice Holmes, ``while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.''  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922).
     Petitioners emphasize that the ordinance transfers wealth
from park owners to incumbent mobile home owners.  Other
forms of land use regulation, however, can also be said to
transfer wealth from the one who is regulated to another.
Ordinary rent control often transfers wealth from landlords
to tenants by reducing the landlords' income and the
tenants' monthly payments, although it does not cause a
one-time transfer of value as occurs with mobile homes.
Traditional zoning regulations can transfer wealth from
those whose activities are prohibited to their neighbors;
when a property owner is barred from mining coal on his
land, for example, the value of his property may decline but
the value of his neighbor's property may rise.  The mobile
home owner's ability to sell the mobile home at a premium
may make this wealth transfer more visible than in the
ordinary case, see Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of
Efficient Regulation, 54 Brooklyn L. Rev. 741, 758-759
(1988), but the existence of the transfer in itself does not
convert regulation into physical invasion.
     Petitioners also rely heavily on their allegation that the
ordinance benefits incumbent mobile home owners without
benefiting future mobile home owners, who will be forced to
purchase mobile homes at premiums.  Mobile homes, like
motor vehicles, ordinarily decline in value with age.  But
the effect of the rent control ordinance, coupled with the
restrictions on the park owner's freedom to reject new
tenants, is to increase significantly the value of the mobile
home.  This increased value normally benefits only the
tenant in possession at the time the rent control is imposed.
See Hirsch & Hirsch, 35 UCLA L. Rev., at 430-431.
Petitioners are correct in citing the existence of this
premium as a difference between the alleged effect of the
Escondido ordinance and that of an ordinary apartment
rent control statute.  Most apartment tenants do not sell
anything to their successors (and are often prohibited from
charging ``key money''), so a typical rent control statute will
transfer wealth from the landlord to the incumbent tenant
and all future tenants.  By contrast, petitioners contend
that the Escondido ordinance transfers wealth only to the
incumbent mobile home owner.  This effect might have
some bearing on whether the ordinance causes a regulatory
taking, as it may shed some light on whether there is a
sufficient nexus between the effect of the ordinance and the
objectives it is supposed to advance.  See Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Comm'n, supra, at 834-835.  But it has nothing
to do with whether the ordinance causes a physical taking.
Whether the ordinance benefits only current mobile home
owners or all mobile home owners, it does not require
petitioners to submit to the physical occupation of their
land.
     The same may be said of petitioners' contention that the
ordinance amounts to compelled physical occupation
because it deprives petitioners of the ability to choose their
incoming tenants.  Again, this effect may be relevant to a
regulatory taking argument, as it may be one factor a
reviewing court would wish to consider in determining
whether the ordinance unjustly imposes a burden on
petitioners that should ``be compensated by the government,
rather than remain[ing] disproportionately concentrated on
a few persons.''  Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U. S., at 124.  But it does not convert regulation into
the unwanted physical occupation of land.  Because they
voluntarily open their property to occupation by others,
petitioners cannot assert a per se right to compensation
based on their inability to exclude particular individuals.
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S.,
at 261; see also id., at 259 (``appellant has no `right' to
select its guests as it sees fit, free from governmental
regulation''); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U. S., at 82-84.
     Petitioners' final line of argument rests on a footnote in
Loretto, in which we rejected the contention that ``the
landlord could avoid the requirements of [the statute
forcing her to permit cable to be permanently placed on her
property] by ceasing to rent the building to tenants.''  We
found this possibility insufficient to defeat a physical taking
claim, because ``a landlord's ability to rent his property may
not be conditioned on his forfeiting the right to compensa-
tion for a physical occupation.''  Loretto, 458 U. S., at 439,
n. 17.  Petitioners argue that if they have to leave the
mobile home park business in order to avoid the strictures
of the Escondido ordinance, their ability to rent their
property has in fact been conditioned on such a forfeiture.
This argument fails at its base, however, because there has
simply been no compelled physical occupation giving rise to
a right to compensation that petitioners could have forfeit-
ed.  Had the city required such an occupation, of course,
petitioners would have a right to compensation, and the city
might then lack the power to condition petitioners' ability
to run mobile home parks on their waiver of this right.  Cf.
Nollan, 483 U. S., at 837.  But because the ordinance does
not effect a physical taking in the first place, this footnote
in Loretto does not help petitioners.
     With respect to physical takings, then, this case is not far
removed from FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U. S. 245
(1987), in which the respondent had voluntarily leased
space on its utility poles to a cable television company for
the installation of cables.  The Federal Government,
exercising its statutory authority to regulate pole attach-
ment agreements, substantially reduced the annual rent.
We rejected the respondent's claim that ``it is a taking
under Loretto for a tenant invited to lease at a rent of $7.15
to remain at the regulated rent of $1.79.''  Id., at 252.  We
explained that ``it is the invitation, not the rent, that makes
the difference.  The line which separates [this case] from
Loretto is the unambiguous distinction between a . . . lessee
and an interloper with a government license.''  Id., at
252-253.  The distinction is equally unambiguous here.
The Escondido rent control ordinance, even considered
against the backdrop of California's Mobilehome Residency
Law, does not authorize an unwanted physical occupation
of petitioners' property.  It is a regulation of petitioners' use
of their property, and thus does not amount to a per se
taking.
                                 III
     In this Court, petitioners attempt to challenge the
ordinance on two additional grounds:  They argue that it
constitutes a denial of substantive due process and a
regulatory taking.  Neither of these claims is properly
before us.  The first was not raised or addressed below, and
the second is not fairly included in the question on which
we granted certiorari.
                                  A
     The Yees did not include a due process claim in their
complaint.  Nor did petitioners raise a due process claim in
the Court of Appeal.  It was not until their petition for
review in the California Supreme Court that petitioners
finally raised a substantive due process claim.  But the
California Supreme Court denied discretionary review.
Such a denial, as in this Court, expresses no view as to the
merits.  See People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 890-891, 506
P. 2d 232, 236 (1973).  In short, petitioners did not raise a
substantive due process claim in the state courts, and no
state court has addressed such a claim.
     In reviewing the judgments of state courts under the
jurisdictional grant of 28 U. S. C. 1257, the Court has,
with very rare exceptions, refused to consider petitioners'
claims that were not raised or addressed below.  Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 218-220 (1983).  While we have
expressed inconsistent views as to whether this rule is
jurisdictional or prudential in cases arising from state
courts, see ibid., we need not resolve the question here.  (In
cases arising from federal courts, the rule is prudential
only.  See, e. g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 17, n. 2
(1980).)  Even if the rule were prudential, we would adhere
to it in this case.  Because petitioners did not raise their
substantive due process claim below, and because the state
courts did not address it, we will not consider it here.

                                  B
     As a preliminary matter, we must address respondent's
assertion that a regulatory taking claim is unripe because
petitioners have not sought rent increases.  While respon-
dent is correct that a claim that the ordinance effects a
regulatory taking as applied to petitioners' property would
be unripe for this reason, see Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U. S. 172, 186-197 (1985), petitioners mount a facial
challenge to the ordinance.  They allege in this Court that
the ordinance does not ```substantially advance''' a ```legiti-
mate state interest''' no matter how it is applied.  See
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, supra, at 834; Agins
v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980).  As this allegation
does not depend on the extent to which petitioners are
deprived of the economic use of their particular pieces of
property or the extent to which these particular petitioners
are compensated, petitioners' facial challenge is ripe.  See
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S.,
at 495; Agins, supra, at 260.
     We must also reject respondent's contention that the
regulatory taking argument is not properly before us
because it was not made below.  It is unclear whether
petitioners made this argument below: Portions of their
complaint and briefing can be read either to argue a
regulatory taking or to support their physical taking
argument.  For the same reason it is equally ambiguous
whether the Court of Appeal addressed the issue.  Yet
petitioners' regulatory taking argument stands in a posture
different from their substantive due process claim.
     Petitioners unquestionably raised a taking claim in the
state courts.  The question whether the rent control
ordinance took their property without compensation, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, is thus
properly before us.  Once a federal claim is properly
presented, a party can make any argument in support of
that claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments
they made below.  Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Cren-
shaw, 486 U. S. 71, 78, n. 2 (1988); Gates, supra, at
219-220; Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 197-198
(1899).  Petitioners' arguments that the ordinance consti-
tutes a taking in two different ways, by physical occupation
and by regulation, are narate claims.  They are rather
separate arguments in support of a single claim-that the
ordinance effects an unconstitutional taking.  Having raised
a taking claim in the state courts, therefore, petitioners
could have formulated any argument they liked in support
of that claim here.
     A litigant seeking review in this Court of a claim properly
raised in the lower courts thus generally possesses the
ability to frame the question to be decided in any way he
chooses, without being limited to the manner in which the
question was framed below.  While we have on occasion
rephrased the question presented by a petitioner, see, e. g.,
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 502 U. S. ___ (1992), or requested
the parties to address an important question of law not
raised in the petition for certiorari, see, e. g., Payne v.
Tennessee, 498 U. S. ___ (1991), by and large it is the
petitioner himself who controls the scope of the question
presented.  The petitioner can generally frame the question
as broadly or as narrowly as he sees fit.
     The framing of the question presented has significant
consequences, however, because under this Court's Rule
14.1(a), ``[o]nly the questions set forth in the petition, or
fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court.''
While ``[t]he statement of any question presented will be
deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly
included therein,'' ibid., we ordinarily do not consider
questions outside those presented in the petition for
certiorari.  See, e. g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420,
443, n. 38 (1984).  This rule is prudential in nature, but we
disregard it ``only in the most exceptional cases,'' Stone v.
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 481, n. 15 (1976), where reasons of
urgency or of economy suggest the need to address the
unpresented question in the case under consideration.
     Rule 14.1(a) serves two important and related purposes.
First, it provides the respondent with notice of the grounds
upon which the petitioner is seeking certiorari, and enables
the respondent to sharpen the arguments as to why
certiorari should not be granted.  Were we routinely to
consider questions beyond those raised in the petition, the
respondent would lack any opportunity in advance of
litigation on the merits to argue that such questions are not
worthy of review.  Where, as is not unusual, the decision
below involves issues on which the petitioner does not seek
certiorari, the respondent would face the formidable task of
opposing certiorari on every issue the Court might conceiv-
ably find present in the case.  By forcing the petitioner to
choose his questions at the outset, Rule 14.1(a) relieves the
respondent of the expense of unnecessary litigation on the
merits and the burden of opposing certiorari on unpresen-
ted questions.
     Second, Rule 14.1(a) assists the Court in selecting the
cases in which certiorari will be granted.  Last Term alone
we received over 5,000 petitions for certiorari, but we have
the capacity to decide only a small fraction of these cases on
the merits.  To use our resources most efficiently, we must
grant certiorari only in those cases that will enable us to
resolve particularly important questions.  Were we routine-
ly to entertain questions not presented in the petition for
certiorari, much of this efficiency would vanish, as parties
who feared an inability to prevail on the question presented
would be encouraged to fill their limited briefing space and
argument time with discussion of issues other than the one
on which certiorari was granted.  Rule 14.1(a) forces the
parties to focus on the questions the Court has viewed as
particularly important, thus enabling us to make efficient
use of our resources.
     We granted certiorari on a single question pertaining to
the Takings Clause:  ``Two federal courts of appeal have
held that the transfer of a premium value to a departing
mobilehome tenant, representing the value of the right to
occupy at a reduced rate under local mobilehome rent
control ordinances, constitute[s] an impermissible taking.
Was it error for the state appellate court to disregard the
rulings and hold that there was no taking under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments?''  This was the question
presented by petitioners.  Pet. for Cert. i.  It asks whether
the court below erred in disagreeing with the holdings of
the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuits in
Pinewood Estates of Michigan v. Barnegat Township
Leveling Board, 898 F. 2d 347 (CA3 1990), and Hall v. City
of Santa Barbara, 833 F. 2d 1270 (CA9 1987), cert. denied,
485 U. S. 940 (1988).  These cases, in turn, held that mobile
home ordinances effected physical takings, not regulatory
takings.  Fairly construed, then, petitioners' question
presented is the equivalent of the question ``Did the court
below err in finding no physical taking?''
     Whether or not the ordinance effects a regulatory taking
is a question related to the one petitioners presented, and
perhaps complementary to the one petitioners presented,
but it is not ``fairly included therein.''  Consideration of
whether a regulatory taking occurred would not assist in
resolving whether a physical taking occurred as well;
neither of the two questions is subsidiary to the other.
Both might be subsidiary to a question embracing both-
Was there a taking?-but they exist side by side, neither
encompassing the other.  Cf. American National Bank &
Trust Co. of Chicago v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U. S. 606, 608
(1985) (question whether complaint adequately alleges
conduct of racketeering enterprise is not fairly included in
question whether statute requires that plaintiff suffer
damages through defendant's conduct of such an enter-
prise).
     Rule 14.1(a) accordingly creates a heavy presumption
against our consideration of petitioners' claim that the
ordinance causes a regulatory taking.  Petitioners have not
overcome that presumption.  While the regulatory taking
question is no doubt important, from an institutional
perspective it is not as important as the physical taking
question.  The lower courts have not reached conflicting
results, so far as we know, on whether similar mobile home
rent control ordinances effect regulatory takings.  They
have reached conflicting results over whether such ordi-
nances cause physical takings; such a conflict is, of course,
a substantial reason for granting certiorari under this
Court's Rule 10.  Moreover, the conflict is between two
courts whose jurisdiction includes California, the State with
the largest population and one with a relatively high
percentage of the nation's mobile homes.  Forum-shopping
is thus of particular concern.  See Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City
of Los Angeles, 948 F. 2d 575, 579 (CA9 1991) (mobile home
park owners may file physical taking suits in either state
or federal court).  Prudence also dictates awaiting a case in
which the issue was fully litigated below, so that we will
have the benefit of developed arguments on both sides and
lower court opinions squarely addressing the question.  See
Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc., 494 U. S. 545, 552,
n. 3 (1990) (``Applying our analysis . . . to the facts of a
particular case without the benefit of a full record or lower
court determinations is not a sensible exercise of this
Court's discretion'').  In fact, were we to address the issue
here, we would apparently be the first court in the nation
to determine whether an ordinance like this one effects a
regulatory taking.  We will accordingly follow Rule 14.1(a),
and consider only the question petitioners raised in seeking
certiorari.  We leave the regulatory taking issue for the
California courts to address in the first instance.

                                 IV
     We made this observation in Loretto:
          ``Our holding today is very narrow.  We affirm the
        traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation
        of property is a taking.  In such a case, the property
        owner entertains a historically rooted expectation of
        compensation, and the character of the invasion is
        qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other
        category of property regulation.  We do not, however,
        question the equally substantial authority upholding a
        State's broad power to impose appropriate restrictions
        upon an owner's use of his property.''  458 U. S., at 441.
 We respected this distinction again in Florida Power,
where we held that no taking occurs under Loretto when a
tenant invited to lease at one rent remains at a lower
regulated rent.  Florida Power, 480 U. S., at 252-253.  We
continue to observe the distinction today.  Because the
Escondido rent control ordinance does not compel a land-
owner to suffer the physical occupation of his property, it
does not effect a per se taking under Loretto.  The judgment
of the Court of Appeal is accordingly
                                                       Affirmed.
-------------------------------


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1947
--------
JOHN K. YEE, et al., PETITIONERS v. CITY OF
ESCONDIDO, CALIFORNIA
on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal of
california, fourth appellate district
[April 1, 1992]

  Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment.
  I agree with the Court that the Escondido Ordinance is
not a taking under this Court's analysis in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
I also conclude that the substantive due process and
regulatory taking claims are not properly raised in this
Court.  For that reason, I, unlike the Court, do not decide
whether the regulatory taking claim is or is not ripe, or
which of petitioners' arguments would or would not be
relevant to such a claim.
-------------------------------


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1947
--------
JOHN K. YEE, et al., PETITIONERS v. CITY OF
ESCONDIDO, CALIFORNIA
on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal of
california, fourth appellate district
[April 1, 1992]

  Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment.
  I concur in the judgment and would join the Court's
opinion except for its references to the relevance and
significance of petitioners' allegations to a claim of regula-
tory taking.
-------------------------------
