 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

          Syllabus

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA
 CONSCIOUSNESS, INC. et al. v. LEE,
SUPERINTENDENT OF PORT AUTHORITY POLICE
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
          the second circuit
No. 91-155.   Argued March 25, 1992"Decided June 26, 1992

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which owns and
operates three major airports in the New York City area and controls
certain terminal areas at the airports (hereinafter terminals), adopted
a regulation forbidding, inter alia, the repetitive solicitation of money
within the terminals.  However, solicitation is permitted on the
sidewalks outside the terminal buildings.  Petitioner International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., a not-for-profit religious
corporation whose members, among other things, solicit funds in
public places to support their movement, brought suit seeking declar-
atory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the
regulation deprived them of their First Amendment rights.  The
District Court granted petitioner summary judgment, concluding that
the terminals were public fora, and that the regulation banning
solicitation failed because it was not narrowly tailored to support a
compelling state interest.  The Court of Appeals reversed as here
relevant.  It determined that the terminals are not public fora, and
found that the ban on solicitation was reasonable.
Held:
1.An airport terminal operated by a public authority is a non-
public forum, and thus a ban on solicitation need only satisfy a
reasonableness standard.  Pp.4-10.
(a)The extent to which the Port Authority can restrict expres-
sive activity on its property depends on the nature of the forum.
Regulation of traditional public fora or designated public fora sur-
vives only if it is narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state
interest, but limitations on expressive activity conducted on any other
government-owned property need only be reasonable to survive.
Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37,
45, 46.  Pp.4-5.
(b)Neither by tradition nor purpose can the terminals be de-
scribed as public fora.  Airports have not historically been made
available for speech activity.  Given the lateness with which the
modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies as
a property that has ``immemorially . . . time out of mind'' been held
in the public trust and used for the purposes of expressive activity.
See Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496,
515.  Nor have airport operators opened terminals to such activities,
see Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 473
U.S. 788, 802, as evidenced by the operators' frequent and continu-
ing litigation in this area.  Pp.6-7.
(c)That speech activities may have historically occurred at
``transportation nodes'' such as rail and bus stations, wharves, and
Ellis Island is not relevant.  Many of these sites traditionally have
had private ownership.  In addition, equating airports with other
transportation centers would not take into account differences among
the various facilities that may affect the extent to which such facili-
ties can accommodate expressive activity.  It is unsurprising to find
differences among the facilities.  The Port Authority, other airport
builders and managers, and the Federal Government all share the
view that terminals are dedicated to the facilitation of efficient air
travel, not the solicitation of contributions.  Pp.7-10.
2.The Port Authority's ban on solicitation is reasonable.  Solicita-
tion may have a disruptive effect on business by slowing the path of
both those who must decide whether to contribute and those who
must alter their paths to avoid the solicitation.  In addition, a
solicitor may cause duress by targeting the most vulnerable persons
or commit fraud by concealing his affiliation or shortchanging pur-
chasers.  The fact that the targets are likely to be on a tight sched-
ule, and thus are unlikely to stop and complain to authorities,
compounds the problem.  The Port Authority has determined that it
can best achieve its legitimate interest in monitoring solicitation
activity to assure that travelers are not interfered with unduly by
limiting solicitation to the sidewalk areas outside the terminals.
That area is frequented by an overwhelming percentage of airport
users, making petitioner's access to the general public quite complete.
Moreover, it would be odd to conclude that the regulation is unrea-
sonable when the Port Authority has otherwise assured access to a
universally travelled area.  While the inconvenience caused by
petitioner may seem small, the Port Authority could reasonably worry
that the incremental effects of having one group and then another
seek such access could prove quite disruptive.  Pp.10-12.
925 F.2d 576, affirmed in part.

Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined.  O'Connor, J., filed a
concurring opinion.  Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, in Part I of which Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, JJ.,
joined.  Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun and
Stevens, JJ., joined.


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
           SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
                       No. 91-155
                        --------
          INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA
        CONSCIOUSNESS, INC., and BRIAN RUMBAUGH,
               PETITIONERS v. WALTER LEE
        on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
                  appeals for the second circuit
                          [June 26, 1992]

       Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
       In this case we consider whether an airport terminal
operated by a public authority is a public forum and
whether a regulation prohibiting solicitation in the interior
of an airport terminal violates the First Amendment.
       The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute.
Petitioner International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. (ISKCON) is a not-for-profit religious corporation whose
members perform a ritual known as sankirtan.  The ritual
consists of  `going into public places, disseminating reli-
gious literature and soliciting funds to support the religion.'''
925 F. 2d 576, 577 (CA2 1991).  The primary
purpose of this ritual is raising funds for the movement.
Ibid.
       Respondent Walter Lee, now deceased, was the police
superintendent of the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey and was charged with enforcing the regulation at
issue.  The Port Authority owns and operates three major
airports in the greater New York City area:  John F.
Kennedy International Airport (Kennedy), La Guardia
Airport (La Guardia), and Newark International Airport
(Newark).  The three airports collectively form one of the
world's busiest metropolitan airport complexes.  They serve
approximately 8% of this country's domestic airline market
and more than 50% of the trans-Atlantic market.  By
decade's end they are expected to serve at least 110 million
passengers annually.  Id., at 578.
       The airports are funded by user fees and operated to
make a regulated profit.  Id., at 581.  Most space at the
three airports is leased to commercial airlines, which bear
primary responsibility for the leasehold.  The Port Authori-
ty retains control over unleased portions, including La
Guardia's Central Terminal Building, portions of Kennedy's
International Arrivals Building, and Newark's North
Terminal Building (we refer to these areas collectively as
the  terminals).  The terminals are generally accessible to
the general public and contain various commercial estab-
lishments such as restaurants, snack stands, bars, news-
stands, and stores of various types.  Id., at 578.  Virtually
all who visit the terminals do so for purposes related to air
travel.  These visitors principally include passengers, those
meeting or seeing off passengers, flight crews, and terminal
employees.  Ibid.
       The Port Authority has adopted a regulation forbidding
within the terminals the repetitive solicitation of money or
distribution of literature.  The regulation states:
``1.  The following conduct is prohibited within the
interior areas of buildings or structures at an air
terminal if conducted by a person to or with passers-by
in a continuous or repetitive manner:
``(a)  The sale or distribution of any merchandise,
including but not limited to jewelry, food stuffs, can-
dles, flowers, badges and clothing.
``(b)  The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures,
pamphlets, books or any other printed or written
material.
``(c)  Solicitation and receipt of funds.''  Id., at 578-579.

        The regulation governs only the terminals; the Port
Authority permits solicitation and distribution on the
sidewalks outside the terminal buildings.  The regulation
effectively prohibits petitioner from performing sankirtan in
the terminals.  As a result, petitioner brought suit seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C. 1983,
alleging that the regulation worked to deprive them of
rights guaranteed under the First Amendment.  The
District Court analyzed the claim under the  traditional
public forum doctrine.  It concluded that the terminals
were akin to public streets, 721 F. Supp. 572, 577 (SDNY
1989), the quintessential traditional public fora.  This
conclusion in turn meant that the Port Authority's terminal
regulation could be sustained only if it was narrowly
tailored to support a compelling state interest.  Id., at 579.
In the absence of any argument that the blanket prohibition
constituted such narrow tailoring, the District Court
granted petitioner summary judgment.  Ibid.
       The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in
part.  925 F. 2d 576 (1991).  Relying on our recent decision
in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U. S. ___ (1990), a divided
panel concluded that the terminals are not public fora.  As
a result, the restrictions were required only to satisfy a
standard of reasonableness.  The Court of Appeals then
concluded that, presented with the issue, this Court would
find that the ban on solicitation was reasonable, but the
ban on distribution was not.  Petitioner sought certiorari
respecting the Court of Appeals' decision that the terminals
are not public fora and upholding the solicitation ban.
Respondent cross-petitioned respecting the court's holding
striking down the distribution ban.  We granted both
petitions, 502 U. S. ___ (1992), to resolve whether airport
terminals are public fora, a question on which the Circuits
have split and on which we once before granted certiorari
but ultimately failed to reach.  Board of Airport Comm'rs of
Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U. S. 569 (1987).
  It is uncontested that the solicitation at issue in this case
is a form of speech protected under the First Amendment.
Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Kokinda, supra, at ___ (citing
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S.
620, 629 (1980)); Riley v. National Federation of Blind of
N.C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 788-789 (1988).  But it is also
well settled that the government need not permit all forms
of speech on property that it owns and controls.  United
States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns.,
453 U. S. 114, 129 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828
(1976).  Where the government is acting as a proprietor,
managing its internal operations, rather than acting as
lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action
will not be subjected to the heightened review to which its
actions as a lawmaker may be subject.  Kokinda, supra, at
___ (plurality opinion) (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961)).  Thus, we
have upheld a ban on political advertisements in city-
operated transit vehicles, Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U. S. 298 (1974), even though the city permitted other
types of advertising on those vehicles.  Similarly, we have
permitted a school district to limit access to an internal
mail system used to communicate with teachers employed
by the district.  Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U. S. 37 (1983).
       These cases reflect, either implicitly or explicitly, a
 forum-based approach for assessing restrictions that the
government seeks to place on the use of its property.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 800 (1985).  Under this approach,
regulation of speech on government property that has
traditionally been available for public expression is subject
to the highest scrutiny.  Such regulations survive only if
they are narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state
interest.  Perry, supra, at 45.  The second category of public
property is the designated public forum, whether of a
limited or unlimited character " property that the state
has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the
public.  Ibid.  Regulation of such property is subject to the
same limitations as that governing a traditional public
forum.  Id., at 46.  Finally, there is all remaining public
property.  Limitations on expressive activity conducted on
this last category of property must survive only a much
more limited review.  The challenged regulation need only
be reasonable, as long as the regulation is not an effort to
suppress the speaker's activity due to disagreement with
the speaker's view.  Ibid.
       The parties do not disagree that this is the proper
framework.  Rather, they disagree whether the airport
terminals are public fora or nonpublic fora.  They also
disagree whether the regulation survives the  reasonable-
ness review governing nonpublic fora, should that prove
the appropriate category.  Like the Court of Appeals, we
conclude that the terminals are nonpublic fora and that the
regulation reasonably limits solicitation.
       The suggestion that the government has a high burden in
justifying speech restrictions relating to traditional public
fora made its first appearance in Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515, 516 (1939).
Justice Roberts, concluding that individuals have a right to
use  streets and parks for communication of views,
reasoned that such a right flowed from the fact that  streets
and parks . . . have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.  We confirmed
this observation in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 481
(1988), where we held that a residential street was a public
forum.
       Our recent cases provide additional guidance on the
characteristics of a public forum.  In Cornelius we noted
that a traditional public forum is property that has as  a
principal purpose . . . the free exchange of ideas.  473
U. S., at 800.  Moreover, consistent with the notion that the
government " like other property owners "  has power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which
it is lawfully dedicated, Greer, supra, at 836, the govern-
ment does not create a public forum by inaction.  Nor is a
public forum created  whenever members of the public are
permitted freely to visit a place owned or operated by the
Government.  Ibid.  The decision to create a public forum
must instead be made  by intentionally opening a nontradi-
tional forum for public discourse.  Cornelius, supra, at 802.
Finally, we have recognized that the location of property
also has bearing because separation from acknowledged
public areas may serve to indicate that the separated
property is a special enclave, subject to greater restriction.
United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 179-180 (1983).
       These precedents foreclose the conclusion that airport
terminals are public fora.  Reflecting the general growth of
the air travel industry, airport terminals have only recently
achieved their contemporary size and character.  See H.V.
Hubbard, M. McClintock, & F.B. Williams, Airports:  Their
Location, Administration and Legal Basis, 8 (1930) (noting
that the United States had only 807 airports in 1930).  But
given the lateness with which the modern air terminal has
made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for the description
of having  immemorially . . . time out of mind been held in
the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity.
Hague, supra, at 515.  Moreover, even within the rather
short history of air transport, it is only  [i]n recent years
[that] it has become a common practice for various religious
and non-profit organizations to use commercial airports as
a forum for the distribution of literature, the solicitation of
funds, the proselytizing of new members, and other similar
activities.  45 Fed. Reg. 35314 (1980).  Thus, the tradition
of airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have
historically been made available for speech activity.  Nor
can we say that these particular terminals, or airport
terminals generally, have been intentionally opened by
their operators to such activity; the frequent and continuing
litigation evidencing the operators' objections belies any
such claim.  See n.2, supra.  In short, there can be no
argument that society's time-tested judgment, expressed
through acquiescence in a continuing practice, has resolved
the issue in petitioner's favor.
       Petitioner attempts to circumvent the history and practice
governing airport activity by pointing our attention to the
variety of speech activity that it claims historically occurred
at various  transportation nodes such as rail stations, bus
stations, wharves, and Ellis Island.  Even if we were
inclined to accept petitioner's historical account describing
speech activity at these locations, an account respondent
contests, we think that such evidence is of little import for
two reasons.  First, much of the evidence is irrelevant to
public fora analysis, because sites such as bus and rail
terminals traditionally have had private ownership.  See
United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455
U. S. 678, 687 (1982); H.R. Grant & C.W. Bohi, The
Country Railroad Station in America, 11-15 (1978);
United States Dept. of Transportation, The Intercity Bus
Terminal Study 31 (Dec. 1984).  The development of
privately owned parks that ban speech activity would not
change the public fora status of publicly held parks.  But
the reverse is also true.  The practices of privately held
transportation centers do not bear on the government's
regulatory authority over a publicly owned airport.
       Second, the relevant unit for our inquiry is an airport, not
 transportation nodes generally.  When new methods of
transportation develop, new methods for accommodating
that transportation are also likely to be needed.  And with
each new step, it therefore will be a new inquiry whether
the transportation necessities are compatible with various
kinds of expressive activity.  To make a category of  trans-
portation nodes, therefore, would unjustifiably elide what
may prove to be critical differences of which we should
rightfully take account.  The  security magnet, for exam-
ple, is an airport commonplace that lacks a counterpart in
bus terminals and train stations.  And public access to air
terminals is also not infrequently restricted " just last year
the Federal Aviation Administration required airports for
a 4-month period to limit access to areas normally publicly
accessible.  See 14 CFR 107.11(f) (1991) and United States
Dept. of Transportation News Release, Office of the Assis-
tant Secretary for Public Affairs, January 18, 1991.  To
blithely equate airports with other transportation centers,
therefore, would be a mistake.
     The differences among such facilities are unsurprising
since, as the Court of Appeals noted, airports are commer-
cial establishments funded by users fees and designed to
make a regulated profit, 925 F. 2d, at 581, and where
nearly all who visit do so for some travel related purpose.
Id., at 578.  As commercial enterprises, airports must
provide services attractive to the marketplace.  In light of
this, it cannot fairly be said that an airport terminal has as
a principal purpose  promoting the free exchange of ideas.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., 473 U. S. 788 (1985).  To the contrary, the record
demonstrates that Port Authority management considers
the purpose of the terminals to be the facilitation of
passenger air travel, not the promotion of expression.
Sloane Affidavit, 11, 2 App. 464; Defendant's Civil Rule
3(g) Statement, 39, 2 App. 453.  Even if we look beyond
the intent of the Port Authority to the manner in which the
terminals have been operated, the terminals have never
been dedicated (except under the threat of court order) to
expression in the form sought to be exercised here: i.e.,
the solicitation of contributions and the distribution of
literature.
       The terminals here are far from atypical.  Airport
builders and managers focus their efforts on providing
terminals that will contribute to efficient air travel.  See,
e.g., R. Horonjeff & F. McKelvey, Planning and Design of
Airports 326 (3d. ed. 1983)( [t]he terminal is used to process
passengers and baggage for the interface with aircraft and
the ground transportation modes).  The Federal Govern-
ment is in accord; the Secretary of Transportation has been
directed to publish a plan for airport development necessary
 to anticipate and meet the needs of civil aeronautics, to
meet requirements of the national defense . . . and to meet
identified needs of the Postal Service.  49 U. S. C. App.
2203(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also, 45 Fed. Reg. 35317
(1980) ( [t]he purpose for which the [Dulles and National
airport] terminal[s] was built and maintained is to process
and serve air travelers efficiently).  Although many
airports have expanded their function beyond merely
contributing to efficient air travel, few have included among
their purposes the designation of a forum for solicitation
and distribution activities.  See supra, at 7.  Thus, we think
that neither by tradition nor purpose can the terminals be
described as satisfying the standards we have previously set
out for identifying a public forum.
       The restrictions here challenged, therefore, need only
satisfy a requirement of reasonableness.  We reiterate what
we stated in Kokinda, the restriction ```need only be reason-
able; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reason-
able limitation.'  496 U. S., at ___ (plurality opinion)
(quoting Cornelius, supra, at 808).  We have no doubt that
under this standard the prohibition on solicitation passes
muster.
       We have on many prior occasions noted the disruptive
effect that solicitation may have on business.   Solicitation
requires action by those who would respond: The individual
solicited must decide whether or not to contribute (which
itself might involve reading the solicitor's literature or
hearing his pitch), and then, having decided to do so, reach
for a wallet, search it for money, write a check, or produce
a credit card.  Kokinda, supra, at ___; see Heffron, 452
U. S., at 663 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).  Passengers who wish to avoid the solicitor
may have to alter their path, slowing both themselves and
those around them.  The result is that the normal flow of
traffic is impeded.  Id., at 653.  This is especially so in an
airport, where  air travelers, who are often weighted down
by cumbersome baggage . . . may be hurrying to catch a
plane or to arrange ground transportation.  925 F. 2d, at
582.  Delays may be particularly costly in this setting, as a
flight missed by only a few minutes can result in hours
worth of subsequent inconvenience.
       In addition, face-to-face solicitation presents risks of
duress that are an appropriate target of regulation.  The
skillful, and unprincipled, solicitor can target the most
vulnerable, including those accompanying children or those
suffering physical impairment and who cannot easily avoid
the solicitation.  See, e.g., International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 159-163
(NDNY 1980), rev'd on other grounds 650 F. 2d 430 (CA2
1981).  The unsavory solicitor can also commit fraud
through concealment of his affiliation or through deliberate
efforts to shortchange those who agree to purchase.  506 F.
Supp., 159-163.  See 45 Fed. Reg. 35314-35315 (1980).
Compounding this problem is the fact that, in an airport,
the targets of such activity frequently are on tight sched-
ules.  This in turn makes such visitors unlikely to stop and
formally complain to airport authorities.  As a result, the
airport faces considerable difficulty in achieving its legiti-
mate interest in monitoring solicitation activity to assure
that travelers are not interfered with unduly.
       The Port Authority has concluded that its interest in
monitoring the activities can best be accomplished by
limiting solicitation and distribution to the sidewalk areas
outside the terminals.  Sloane Supp. Affidavit, 11, 2 App.
514.  This sidewalk area is frequented by an overwhelming
percentage of airport users, see id., at 14, 2 App. 515-516
(noting that no more than 3% of air travelers passing
through the terminals are doing so on intraterminal flights,
i. e. transferring planes).  Thus the resulting access of those
who would solicit the general public is quite complete.  In
turn we think it would be odd to conclude that the Port
Authority's terminal regulation is unreasonable despite the
Port Authority having otherwise assured access to an area
universally traveled.
       The inconveniences to passengers and the burdens on
Port Authority officials flowing from solicitation activity
may seem small, but viewed against the fact that  pedestri-
an congestion is one of the greatest problems facing the
three terminals, 925 F. 2d, at 582, the Port Authority could
reasonably worry that even such incremental effects would
prove quite disruptive.  Moreover,  the justification for the
Rule should not be measured by the disorder that would
result from granting an exemption solely to ISKCON.
Heffron, supra, at 652.  For if petitioner is given access, so
too must other groups.   Obviously, there would be a much
larger threat to the State's interest in crowd control if all
other religious, nonreligious, and noncommercial organiza-
tions could likewise move freely.  452 U. S., at 653.  As a
result, we conclude that the solicitation ban is reasonable.
       For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals sustaining the ban on solicitation in Port Authority
terminals is
                                                   Affirmed.



          SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
                 Nos. 91-155 and 91-339
                        --------
          INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA
         CONSCIOUSNESS, INC., and BRIAN RUMBAUGH,
                            PETITIONERS
     91-155                     v.
                            WALTER LEE

                WALTER LEE, SUPERINTENDENT OF PORT
                         AUTHORITY POLICE
     91-339                     v.
              INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CON-
                                            SCIOUSNESS, INC., et al.
       on writs of certiorari to the united states court of
                  appeals for the second circuit
                          [June 26, 1992]

       Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Blackmun,
Justice Stevens, and Justice Souter join as to Part I,
concurring in the judgment.
       While I concur in the judgment affirming in this case, my
analysis differs in substantial respects from that of the
Court.  In my view the airport corridors and shopping areas
outside of the passenger security zones, areas operated by
the Port Authority, are public forums, and speech in those
places is entitled to protection against all government
regulation inconsistent with public forum principles.  The
Port Authority's blanket prohibition on the distribution or
sale of literature cannot meet those stringent standards,
and I agree it is invalid under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.  The Port Authority's rule disallowing in-
person solicitation of money for immediate payment,
however, is in my view a narrow and valid regulation of the
time, place, and manner of protected speech in this forum,
or else is a valid regulation of the nonspeech element of
expressive conduct.  I would sustain the Port Authority's
ban on solicitation and receipt of funds.
                                 I
       An earlier opinion expressed my concern that  [i]f our
public forum jurisprudence is to retain vitality, we must
recognize that certain objective characteristics of Govern-
ment property and its customary use by the public may
control the status of the property.  United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U. S. 720, 737 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in judgment).  The case before us does not heed that
principle.  Our public forum doctrine ought not to be a
jurisprudence of categories rather than ideas or convert
what was once an analysis protective of expression into one
which grants the government authority to restrict speech by
fiat.  I believe that the Court's public forum analysis in this
case is inconsistent with the values underlying the speech
and press clauses of the First Amendment.
       Our public forum analysis has its origins in Justice
Roberts' rather sweeping dictum in Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939); see also
ante, at 6.  The doctrine was not stated with much precision
or elaboration, though, until our more recent decisions in
Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460
U. S. 37 (1983), and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788 (1985).  These cases
describe a three part analysis to designate government-
owned property as either a traditional public forum, a
designated public forum, or a nonpublic forum.  Perry,
supra, at 45-46; ante, at 5.  The Court today holds that
traditional public forums are limited to public property
which have as  `a principal purpose . . . the free exchange
of ideas'; ante, at 6 (quoting Cornelius, supra, at 800),
ante, at 1 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); and that this purpose
must be evidenced by a long-standing historical practice of
permitting speech.  Ante, at 7; ante, at 1-2 (opinion of
O'Connor, J.).  The Court also holds that designated
forums consist of property which the government intends to
open for public discourse.  Ante, at 6, citing Cornelius,
supra, at 802; ante, at 2 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).  All
other types of property are, in the Court's view, nonpublic
forums (in other words, not public forums), and govern-
ment-imposed restrictions of speech in these places will be
upheld so long as reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.  Under
this categorical view the application of public-forum
analysis to airport terminals seems easy.  Airports are of
course public spaces of recent vintage, and so there can be
no time-honored tradition associated with airports of
permitting free speech.  Ante, at 7.  And because govern-
ments have often attempted to restrict speech within
airports, it follows a fortiori under the Court's analysis that
they cannot be so-called  designated forums.  Ibid.  So, the
Court concludes, airports must be nonpublic forums, subject
to minimal First Amendment protection.
       This analysis is flawed at its very beginning.  It leaves
the government with almost unlimited authority to restrict
speech on its property by doing nothing more than articu-
lating a non-speech-related purpose for the area, and it
leaves almost no scope for the development of new public
forums absent the rare approval of the government.  The
Court's error lies in its conclusion that the public-forum
status of public property depends on the government's
defined purpose for the property, or on an explicit decision
by the government to dedicate the property to expressive
activity.  In my view,  the inquiry must be an objective one,
based on the actual, physical characteristics and uses of the
property.  The fact that in our public-forum cases we
discuss and analyze these precise characteristics tends to
support my position.  Perry, supra, at 46-48; Cornelius,
supra, at 804-806; Kokinda, supra, at 727-729 (plurality
opinion).
    The First Amendment is a limitation on government, not
a grant of power.  Its design is to prevent the government
from controlling speech.  Yet under the Court's view the
authority of the government to control speech on its
property is paramount, for in almost all cases the critical
step in the Court's analysis is a classification of the
property that turns on the government's own definition or
decision, unconstrained by an independent duty to respect
the speech its citizens can voice there.  The Court acknowl-
edges as much, by reintroducing today into our First
Amendment law a strict doctrinal line between the propri-
etary and regulatory functions of government which I
thought had been abandoned long ago.  Ante, at 4-5;
compare Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U. S. 43 (1897); with
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, supra, at
515; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 115-116 (1972).
       The Court's approach is contrary to the underlying
purposes of the public forum doctrine.  The liberties
protected by our doctrine derive from the Assembly, as well
as the Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment,
and are essential to a functioning democracy.  See Kalven,
The Concept of the Public Forum:  Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
S. Ct. Rev. 1, 14, 19.  Public places are of necessity the
locus for discussion of public issues, as well as protest
against arbitrary government action.  At the heart of our
jurisprudence lies the principle that in a free nation citizens
must have the right to gather and speak with other persons
in public places.  The recognition that certain government-
owned property is a public forum provides open notice to
citizens that their freedoms may be exercised there without
fear of a censorial government, adding tangible reinforce-
ment to the idea that we are a free people.
       A fundamental tenet of our Constitution is that the
government is subject to constraints which private persons
are not.  The public forum doctrine vindicates that principle
by recognizing limits on the government's control over
speech activities on property suitable for free expression.
The doctrine focuses on the physical characteristics of the
property because government ownership is the source of its
purported authority to regulate speech.  The right of speech
protected by the doctrine, however, comes not from a
Supreme Court dictum but from the constitutional recogni-
tion that the government cannot impose silence on a free
people.
       The Court's analysis rests on an inaccurate view of
history.  The notion that traditional public forums are
property which have public discourse as their principal
purpose is a most doubtful fiction.  The types of property
that we have recognized as the quintessential public forums
are streets, parks, and sidewalks.  Cornelius, 473 U. S., at
802; Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 480-481 (1988).  It
would seem apparent that the principal purpose of streets
and sidewalks, like airports, is to facilitate transportation,
not public discourse, and we have recognized as much.
Schneider v. State, supra, at 160.  Similarly, the purpose for
the creation of public parks may be as much for beauty and
open space as for discourse.  Thus under the Court's
analysis, even the quintessential public forums would
appear to lack the necessary elements of what the Court
defines as a public forum.
       The effect of the Court's narrow view of the first category
of public forums is compounded by its description of the
second purported category, the so-called  designated forum.
The requirements for such a designation are so stringent
that I cannot be certain whether the category has any
content left at all.  In any event, it seems evident that
under the Court's analysis today few if any types of
property other than those already recognized as public
forums will be accorded that status.
       The Court's answer to these objections appears to be a
recourse to history as justifying its recognition of streets,
parks, and sidewalks, but apparently no other types of
government property, as traditional public forums.  Ante, at
7-8.  The Court ignores the fact that the purpose of the
public forum doctrine is to give effect to the broad command
of the First Amendment to protect speech from governmen-
tal interference.  The jurisprudence is rooted in historic
practice, but it is not tied to a narrow textual command
limiting the recognition of new forums.  In my view the
policies underlying the doctrine cannot be given effect
unless we recognize that open, public spaces and thorough-
fares which are suitable for discourse may be public forums,
whatever their historical pedigree and without concern for
a precise classification of the property.  There is support in
our precedents for such a view.  See Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298, 303 (1974) (plurality
opinion); Hague, 307 U. S., at 515 (speaking of  streets and
public places as forums).  Without this recognition our
forum doctrine retains no relevance in times of fast-chang-
ing technology and increasing insularity.  In a country
where most citizens travel by automobile, and parks all too
often become locales for crime rather than social inter-
course, our failure to recognize the possibility that new
types of government property may be appropriate forums
for speech will lead to a serious curtailment of our expres-
sive activity.
       One of the places left in our mobile society that is
suitable for discourse is a metropolitan airport.  It is of
particular importance to recognize that such spaces are
public forums because in these days an airport is one of the
few government-owned spaces where many persons have
extensive contact with other members of the public.  Given
that private spaces of similar character are not subject to
the dictates of the First Amendment, see Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U. S. 507 (1976), it is critical that we preserve these
areas for protected speech.  In my view, our public forum
doctrine must recognize this reality, and allow the creation
of public forums which do not fit within the narrow tradi-
tion of streets, sidewalks, and parks.  We have allowed
flexibility in our doctrine to meet changing technologies in
other areas of constitutional interpretation, see, e.g., Katz
v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), and I believe we
must do the same with the First Amendment.
       I agree with the Court that government property of a type
which by history and tradition has been available for speech
activity must continue to be recognized as a public forum.
Ante, at 7.  In my view, however, constitutional protection
is not confined to these properties alone.  Under the proper
circumstances I would accord public forum status to other
forms of property, regardless of its ancient or contemporary
origins and whether or not it fits within a narrow historic
tradition.  If the objective, physical characteristics of the
property at issue and the actual public access and uses
which have been permitted by the government indicate that
expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible
with those uses, the property is a public forum.  The most
important considerations in this analysis are whether the
property shares physical similarities with more traditional
public forums, whether the government has permitted or
acquiesced in broad public access to the property, and
whether expressive activity would tend to interfere in a
significant way with the uses to which the government has
as a factual matter dedicated the property.  In conducting
the last inquiry, courts  must consider the consistency of
those uses with expressive activities in general, rather than
the specific sort of speech at issue in the case before it;
otherwise the analysis would be one not of classification but
rather of case-by-case balancing, and would provide little
guidance to the State regarding its discretion to regulate
speech.  Courts must also consider the availability of
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions in under-
taking this compatibility analysis.  The possibility of some
theoretical inconsistency between expressive activities and
the property's uses should not bar a finding of a public
forum, if those inconsistencies can be avoided through
simple and permitted regulations.
    The second category of the Court's jurisprudence, the so-
called designated forum, provides little, if any, additional
protection for speech.  Where government property does not
satisfy the criteria of a public forum, the government
retains the power to dedicate the property for speech,
whether for all expressive activity or for limited purposes
only.  See ante, at 5; Perry, 460 U. S., at 45-46; Southeast-
ern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 (1975).  I do
not quarrel with the fact that speech must often be restrict-
ed on property of this kind to retain the purpose for which
it has been designated.  And I recognize that when property
has been designated for a particular expressive use, the
government may choose to eliminate that designation.  But
this increases the need to protect speech in other places,
where discourse may occur free of such restrictions.  In
some sense the government always retains authority to
close a public forum, by selling the property, changing its
physical character, or changing its principal use.  Otherwise
the State would be prohibited from closing a park, or
eliminating a street or sidewalk, which no one has under-
stood the public forum doctrine to require.  The difference
is that when property is a protected public forum the State
may not by fiat assert broad control over speech or expres-
sive activities; it must alter the objective physical character
or uses of the property, and bear the attendant costs, to
change the property's forum status.
       Under this analysis, it is evident that the public spaces
of the Port Authority's airports are public forums.  First,
the District Court made detailed findings regarding the
physical similarities between the Port Authority's airports
and public streets.  721 F. Supp. 572, 576-577 (SDNY
1989).  These findings show that the public spaces in the
airports are broad, public thoroughfares full of people and
lined with stores and other commercial activities.  An
airport corridor is of course not a street, but that is not the
proper inquiry.  The question is one of physical similarities,
sufficient to suggest that the airport corridor should be a
public forum for the same reasons that streets and side-
walks have been treated as public forums by the people who
use them.
       Second, the airport areas involved here are open to the
public without restriction.  Ibid.  Plaintiffs do not seek
access to the secured areas of the airports, nor do I suggest
that these areas would be public forums.  And while most
people who come to the Port Authority's airports do so for
a reason related to air travel, either because they are
passengers or because they are picking up or dropping off
passengers, this does not distinguish an airport from streets
or sidewalks, which most people use for travel.  See supra,
at ---.  Further, the group visiting the airports encom-
passes a vast portion of the public:  In 1986 the Authority's
three airports served over 78 million passengers.  It is the
very breadth and extent of the public's use of airports that
makes it imperative to protect speech rights there.  Of
course, airport operators retain authority to restrict public
access when necessary, for instance to respond to special
security concerns.  But if the Port Authority allows the uses
and open access to airports that is shown on this record, it
cannot argue that some vestigial power to change its
practices bars the conclusion that its airports are public
forums, any more than the power to bulldoze a park bars a
finding that a public forum exists so long as the open use
does.
       Third, and perhaps most important, it is apparent from
the record, and from the recent history of airports, that
when adequate time, place, and manner regulations are in
place, expressive activity is quite compatible with the uses
of major airports.  The Port Authority's primary argument
to the contrary is that the problem of congestion in its
airports' corridors makes expressive activity inconsistent
with the airports' primary purpose, which is to facilitate air
travel.  The First Amendment is often inconvenient.  But
that is besides the point.  Inconvenience does not absolve
the government of its obligation to tolerate speech.  The
Authority makes no showing that any real impediments to
the smooth functioning of the airports cannot be cured with
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.  In fact,
the history of the Authority's own airports, as well as other
major airports in this country, leaves little doubt that such
a solution is quite feasible.  The Port Authority has for
many years permitted expressive activities by the plaintiffs
and others, without any apparent interference with its
ability to meet its transportation purposes.  App. 462,
469-470; see also ante, at 8 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).  The
Federal Aviation Authority, in its operation of the airports
of the Nation's capital, has issued rules which allow
regulated expressive activity within specified areas, without
any suggestion that the speech would be incompatible with
the airports' business.  14 CFR 159.93, 159.94 (1992).
And in fact expressive activity has been a commonplace
feature of our Nation's major airports for many years, in
part because of the wide consensus among the Courts of
Appeals, prior to the decision in this case, that the public
spaces of airports are public forums.  See, e.g., Chicago
Area Military Project v. Chicago, 508 F. 2d 921 (CA7), cert.
denied, 421 U. S. 992 (1975); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.
2d 619 (CA5 1981), cert. dism'd, 458 U. S. 1124 (1982);
United States Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural
Council v. United States, 228 U. S. App. D.C. 191, 708 F. 2d
760 (1983); Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Com-
m'rs, 785 F. 2d 791 (CA9 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 482
U. S. 569 (1987); Jamison v. St. Louis, 828 F. 2d 1280 (CA8
1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 987 (1988).  As the District
Court recognized, the logical consequence of Port Author-
ity's congestion argument is that the crowded streets and
sidewalks of major cities cannot be public forums.  721 F.
Supp., at 578.  These problems have been dealt with in the
past, and in other settings, through proper time, place, and
manner restrictions; and the Port Authority does not make
any showing that similar regulations would not be effective
in its airports.  The Port Authority makes a half-hearted
argument that the special security concerns associated with
airports suggest they are not public forums; but this
position is belied by the unlimited public access the
Authority allows to its airports.  This access demonstrates
that the Port Authority does not consider the general public
to pose a serious security threat, and there is no evidence
in the record that persons engaged in expressive activities
are any different.
       The danger of allowing the government to suppress
speech is shown in the case now before us.  A grant of
plenary power allows the government to tilt the dialogue
heard by the public, to exclude many, more marginal voices.
The first challenged Port Authority regulation establishes
a flat prohibition on  [t]he sale or distribution of flyers,
brochures, pamphlets, books or any other printed or written
material, if conducted within the airport terminal,  in a
continuous or repetitive manner.   We have long recognized
that the right to distribute flyers and literature lies at the
heart of the liberties guaranteed by the Speech and Press
Clauses of the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Schneider v.
State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U. S. 105 (1943).  The Port Authority's rule, which prohibits
almost all such activity, is among the most restrictive
possible of those liberties.  The regulation is in fact so broad
and restrictive of speech, Justice O'Connor finds it void
even under the standards applicable to government regula-
tions in nonpublic forums.  Ante, at 7-8.  I have no difficul-
ty deciding the regulation cannot survive the far more strin-
gent rules applicable to regulations in public forums.  The
regulation is not drawn in narrow terms and it does not
leave open ample alternative channels for communication.
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791
(1989).  The Port Authority's concerns with the problem of
congestion can be addressed through narrow restrictions on
the time and place of expressive activity, see ante, at 8
(opinion of O'Connor, J.).  I would strike down the regula-
tion as an unconstitutional restriction of speech.
                        II
       It is my view, however, that the Port Authority's ban on
the  solicitation and receipt of funds within its airport
terminals should be upheld under the standards applicable
to speech regulations in public forums.  The regulation may
be upheld as either a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction, or as a regulation directed at the nonspeech
element of expressive conduct.  The two standards have
considerable overlap in a case like this one.
       It is well settled that  even in a public forum the govern-
ment may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place,
or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions `are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.'
Ward, supra, at 791 (quoting Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984)).  We have
held further that the government in appropriate circum-
stances may regulate conduct, even if the conduct has an
expressive component.  United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S.
367 (1968).  And in several recent cases we have recognized
that the standards for assessing time, place, and manner
restrictions are little, if any, different from the standards
applicable to regulations of conduct with an expressive
component.  Clark, supra, at 298, and n. 8; Ward, supra, at
798; Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. ---, --- (1991)
(slip op., at 5) (plurality opinion); see generally Kalven,
1965 S. Ct. Rev., at 23, 27 (arguing that all speech contains
elements of conduct which may be regulated).  The conflu-
ence of the two tests is well demonstrated by a case like
this, where the government regulation at issue can be
described with equal accuracy as a regulation of the manner
of expression, or as a regulation of conduct with an expres-
sive component.
      I am in full agreement with the statement of the Court
that solicitation is a form of protected speech.  Ante, at 4;
see also Riley v. National Federation of Blind, 487 U. S.
781, 788-789 (1988); Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 629 (1980); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, supra.  If the Port Authority's solicitation
regulation prohibited all speech which requested the
contribution of funds, I would conclude that it was a direct,
content-based restriction of speech in clear violation of the
First Amendment.  The Authority's regulation does not
prohibit all solicitation, however; it prohibits the  solicita-
tion and receipt of funds.  I do not understand this
regulation to prohibit all speech that solicits funds.  It
reaches only personal solicitations for immediate payment
of money.  Otherwise, the  receipt of funds phrase would
be written out of the provision.  The regulation does not
cover, for example, the distribution of preaddressed enve-
lopes along with a plea to contribute money to the distribu-
tor or his organization.  As I understand the restriction it
is directed only at the physical exchange of money, which is
an element of conduct interwoven with otherwise expressive
solicitation.  In other words, the regulation permits expres-
sion that solicits funds, but limits the manner of that
expression to forms other than the immediate receipt of
money.
       So viewed, I believe the Port Authority's rule survives our
test for speech restrictions in the public forum.  In-person
solicitation of funds, when combined with immediate receipt
of that money, creates a risk of fraud and duress which is
well recognized, and which is different in kind from other
forms of expression or conduct.  Travelers who are unfamil-
iar with the airport, perhaps even unfamiliar with this
country, its customs and its language, are an easy prey for
the money solicitor.  I agree in full with the Court's
discussion of these dangers in No. 91-155.  Ante, at 10-11;
ante, at 5 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).  I would add that our
precedents as well as the actions of coordinate branches of
government support this conclusion.  We have in the past
recognized that in-person solicitation has been associated
with coercive or fraudulent conduct.  Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U. S. 296, 306 (1940); Riley, supra, at 800; Heffron
v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U. S. 640, 657 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Schaumburg, supra, at 636-638.  In
addition, the federal government has adopted regulations
which acknowledge and respond to the serious problems
associated with solicitation.  The National Park Service has
enacted a flat ban on the direct solicitation of money in the
parks of the Nation's capital within its control.  36 CFR
7.96(h) (1991); see also United States v. Kokinda, 497
U. S., at 739 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).  Also,
the Federal Aviation Authority, in its administration of the
airports of Washington, D.C., even while permitting the
solicitation of funds has adopted special rules to prevent
coercive, harassing, or repetitious behavior.  14 CFR
159.94(e) - (h) (1992).  And in the commercial sphere, the
Federal Trade Commission has long held that  it constitutes
an unfair and deceptive act or practice  to make a door-to-
door sale without allowing the buyer a three-day  cooling-off
period during which time he or she may cancel the sale.
16 CFR 429.1 (1992).  All of these measures are based on
a recognition that requests for immediate payment of
money create a strong potential for fraud or undue pres-
sure, in part because of the lack of time for reflection.  As
the Court recounts, questionable practices associated with
solicitation can include the targeting of vulnerable and
easily coerced persons, misrepresentation of the solicitor's
cause, and outright theft.  Ante, at 10-11; see also Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506
F. Supp. 147, 159-163 (NDNY 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 650 F. 2d 430 (CA2 1981).
       Because the Port Authority's solicitation ban is directed
at these abusive practices and not at any particular
message, idea, or form of speech, the regulation is a
content-neutral rule serving a significant government
interest.  We have held that the content neutrality of a rule
must be assessed based on whether it is  `justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.'  Ward,
491 U. S., at 791 (quoting Clark, 468 U. S., at 293) (empha-
sis in original).  It is apparent that the justification for the
solicitation ban is unrelated to the content of speech or the
identity of the speaker.  There can also be no doubt that the
prevention of fraud and duress is a significant government
interest.  The government cannot, of course, prohibit speech
for the sole reason that it is concerned the speech may be
fraudulent.  Schaumburg, 444 U. S., at 637.  But the Port
Authority's regulation does not do this.  It recognizes that
the risk of fraud and duress is intensified by particular
conduct, the immediate exchange of money; and it address-
es only that conduct.  We have recognized that such
narrowly drawn regulations are in fact the proper means
for addressing the dangers which can be associated with
speech.  Ibid.; Riley, 487 U. S., at 799, n. 11.
       To survive scrutiny, the regulation must be drawn in
narrow terms to accomplish its end and leave open ample
alternative channels for communication.  Regarding the
former requirement, we have held that to be narrowly
tailored a regulation need not be the least restrictive or
least intrusive means of achieving an end.  The regulation
must be reasonable, and must not burden substantially
more speech than necessary.  Ward, supra, at 798-800.
Under this standard the solicitation ban survives with ease,
because it prohibits only solicitation of money for immediate
receipt.  The regulation does not burden any broader
category of speech or expressive conduct than is the source
of the evil sought to be avoided.  And in fact, the regulation
is even more narrow because it only prohibits such behavior
if conducted in a continuous or repetitive manner.  The Port
Authority has made a reasonable judgment that this type
of conduct raises the most serious concerns, and it is
entitled to deference.  My conclusion is not altered by the
fact that other means, for example the regulations adopted
by the Federal Aviation Authority to govern its airports,
may be available to address the problems associated with
solicitation, because the existence of less intrusive means is
not decisive.  Our cases do not so limit the government's
regulatory flexibility.  See Ward, supra, at 800.
       I have little difficulty in deciding that the Port Authority
has left open ample alternative channels for the communi-
cation of the message which is an aspect of solicitation.  As
already discussed, see supra, at --- the Authority's rule
does not prohibit all solicitation of funds:  It restricts only
the manner of the solicitation, or the conduct associated
with solicitation, to prohibit immediate receipt of the
solicited money.  Requests for money continue to be
permitted, and in the course of requesting money solicitors
may explain their cause, or the purposes of their organiza-
tion, without violating the regulation.  It is only if the
solicitor accepts immediate payment that a violation occurs.
Thus the solicitor can continue to disseminate his message,
for example by distributing preaddressed envelopes in
which potential contributors may mail their donations.  See
supra, at ---.
       Much of what I have said about the solicitation of funds
may seem to apply to the sale of literature, but the differ-
ences between the two activities are of sufficient signifi-
cance to require they be distinguished for constitutional
purposes.  The Port Authority's flat ban on the distribution
or sale of printed material must, in my view, fall in its
entirety.  See supra, at ---.  The application of our time,
place, and manner test to the ban on sales leads to a result
quite different from the solicitation ban.  For one, the
government interest in regulating the sales of literature is
not as powerful as in the case of solicitation.  The danger of
a fraud arising from such sales is much more limited than
from pure solicitation, because in the case of a sale the
nature of the exchange tends to be clearer to both parties.
Also, the Port Authority's sale regulation is not as narrowly
drawn as the solicitation rule, since it does not specify the
receipt of money as a critical element of a violation.  And
perhaps most important, the flat ban on sales of literature
leaves open fewer alternative channels of communication
than the Port Authority's more limited prohibition on the
solicitation and receipt of funds.  Given the practicalities
and ad hoc nature of much expressive activity in the public
forum, sales of literature must be completed in one transac-
tion to be workable.  Attempting to collect money at another
time or place is a far less plausible option in the context of
a sale than when soliciting donations, because the literature
sought to be sold will under normal circumstances be
distributed within the forum.  These distinctions have been
recognized by the National Park Service, which permits the
sale or distribution of literature, while prohibiting solicita-
tion.  Supra, at ---; 36 CFR 7.96(j)(2) (1991).  Thus the
Port Authority's regulation allows no practical means for
advocates and organizations to sell literature within the
public forums which are its airports.
       Against all of this must be balanced the great need,
recognized by our precedents, to give the sale of literature
full First Amendment protection.  We have long recognized
that to prohibit distribution of literature for the mere
reason that it is sold would leave organizations seeking to
spread their message without funds to operate.   It should
be remembered that the pamphlets of Thomas Paine were
not distributed free of charge.  Murdock, 319 U. S., at 111;
see also Schaumburg, supra, at 628-635 (discussing cases).
The effect of a rule of law distinguishing between sales and
distribution would be to close the marketplace of ideas to
less affluent organizations and speakers, leaving speech as
the preserve of those who are able to fund themselves.  One
of the primary purposes of the public forum is to provide
persons who lack access to more sophisticated media the
opportunity to speak.  A prohibition on sales forecloses that
opportunity for the very persons who need it most.  And
while the same arguments might be made regarding
solicitation of funds, the answer is that the Port Authority
has not prohibited all solicitation, but only a narrow class
of conduct associated with a particular manner of solicita-
tion.
       For these reasons I agree that the Court of Appeals
should be affirmed in full in finding the Port Authority's
ban on the distribution or sale of literature unconstitu-
tional, but upholding the prohibition on solicitation and
immediate receipt of funds.


            SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
                 Nos. 91-155 and 91-339
                        --------
          INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA
       CONSCIOUSNESS, INC., and BRIAN RUMBAUGH,
                            PETITIONERS
     91-155                     v.
                            WALTER LEE

                WALTER LEE, SUPERINTENDENT OF PORT
                         AUTHORITY POLICE
     91-339                     v.
              INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CON-
                                            SCIOUSNESS, INC., et al.
       on writs of certiorari to the united states court of
                  appeals for the second circuit
                          [June 26, 1992]

       Justice O'Connor, concurring in 91-155 and concurring
in the judgment in 91-339.
       In the decision below, the Court of Appeals upheld a
ban on solicitation of funds within the airport terminals
operated by the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, but struck down a ban on the repetitive distribution
of printed or written material within the terminals.  925
F. 2d 576 (CA2 1991).  I would affirm both parts of that
judgment.
    I concur in the Court's opinion in No. 91-155 and agree
that publicly owned airports are not public fora.  Unlike
public streets and parks, both of which our First Amend-
ment jurisprudence has identified as  traditional public
fora, airports do not count among their purposes the  free
exchange of ideas, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 800 (1985); they
have not  by long tradition or by government fiat . . . been
devoted to assembly and debate; Perry Education Assn. v.
Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983); nor
have they  time out of mind, . . . been used for purposes of
. . . communicating thoughts between citizens, and discuss-
ing public questions, Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515
(1939).  Although most airports do not ordinarily restrict
public access,  [p]ublicly owned or operated property does
not become a `public forum' simply because members of the
public are permitted to come and go at will.  United States
v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 177 (1983); see also Greer v. Spock,
424 U. S. 828, 836 (1976).   [W]hen government property is
not dedicated to open communication the government
may"without further justification"restrict use to those
who participate in the forum's official business.  Perry,
supra, at 53.  There is little doubt that airports are among
those publicly owned facilities that could be closed to all
except those who have legitimate business there.  See
Grace, supra, at 178.  Public access to airports is thus not
 inherent in the open nature of the locations, as it is for
most streets and parks, but is rather a  matter of grace by
government officials.  United States v. Kokinda, 497 U. S.
720, 743 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  I also agree with
the Court that the Port Authority has not expressly opened
its airports to the types of expression at issue here, see
ante, at 7, and therefore has not created a  limited or
 designated public forum relevant to this case.
       For these reasons, the Port Authority's restrictions on
solicitation and leafletting within the airport terminals do
not qualify for the strict scrutiny that applies to restriction
of speech in public fora.  That airports are not public fora,
however, does not mean that the government can restrict
speech in whatever way it likes.   The Government, even
when acting in its proprietary capacity, does not enjoy
absolute freedom from First Amendment constraints.
Kokinda, supra, at 725 (plurality opinion).  For example, in
Board of Airport Commrs. of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus,
Inc., 482 U. S. 569 (1987), we unanimously struck down a
regulation that prohibited  all First Amendment activities
in the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) without
even reaching the question whether airports were public
fora.  Id., at 574-575.  We found it  obvious that such a ban
cannot be justified even if LAX were a nonpublic forum
because no conceivable governmental interest would justify
such an absolute prohibition of speech.  Id., at 575.
Moreover, we have consistently stated that restrictions on
speech in nonpublic fora are valid only if they are  reason-
able and  not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's view.  Perry,
460 U. S., at 46; see also Kokinda, supra, at 731; Cornelius,
supra, at 800; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U. S.
298, 303 (1974).  The determination that airports are not
public fora thus only begins our inquiry.
        The reasonableness of the Government's restriction [on
speech in a nonpublic forum] must be assessed in light of
the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding circum-
stances.  Cornelius, supra, at 809.   `[C]onsideration of a
forum's special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality
of a regulation since the significance of the governmental
interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic
nature and function of the particular forum involved.'
Kokinda, supra, at 732, quoting Heffron v. International
Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 650-651
(1981).  In this case, the  special attributes and  surround-
ing circumstances of the airports operated by the Port
Authority are determinative.  Not only has the Port
Authority chosen not to limit access to the airports under
its control, it has created a huge complex open to travelers
and nontravelers alike.  The airports house restaurants,
cafeterias, snack bars, coffee shops, cocktail lounges, post
offices, banks, telegraph offices, clothing shops, drug stores,
food stores, nurseries, barber shops, currency exchanges, art
exhibits, commercial advertising displays, bookstores,
newsstands, dental offices and private clubs.  See 1 App.
183-185 (Newark); id., at 185-186 (JFK); id., at 190-192
(LaGuardia).  The International Arrivals Building at JFK
Airport even has two branches of Bloomingdale's.  Id., at
185-186.
       We have said that a restriction on speech in a nonpublic
forum is  reasonable when it is  consistent with the
[government's] legitimate interest in `preserv[ing] the
property . . . for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.'
Perry, supra, at 50-51, quoting United States Postal Service
v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114,
129-130 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ordinarily, this inquiry is relatively straightforward,
because we have almost always been confronted with cases
where the fora at issue were discrete, single-purpose
facilities.  See, e.g., Kokinda, supra (dedicated sidewalk
between parking lot and post office); Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788
(1985) (literature for charity drive); City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789 (1984)
(utility poles); Perry, supra (interschool mail system);
United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Assns., supra, (household mail boxes); Adderley v. Florida,
385 U. S. 39 (1966) (curtilage of jailhouse).  The Port
Authority urges that this case is no different and contends
that it, too, has dedicated its airports to a single pur-
pose"facilitating air travel"and that the speech it seeks
to prohibit is not consistent with that purpose.  But the
wide range of activities promoted by the Port Authority is
no more directly related to facilitating air travel than are
the types of activities in which ISKCON wishes to engage.
See Jews for Jesus, supra, at 576 ( The line between
airport-related speech and nonairport-related speech is, at
best, murky).  In my view, the Port Authority is operating
a shopping mall as well as an airport.  The reasonableness
inquiry, therefore, is not whether the restrictions on speech
are  consistent with . . . preserving the property for air
travel, Perry, supra, at 50-51 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted), but whether they are reasonably related
to maintaining the multipurpose environment that the Port
Authority has deliberately created.
       Applying that standard, I agree with the Court in No.
91-155 that the ban on solicitation is reasonable.  Face-to-
face solicitation is incompatible with the airport's function-
ing in a way that the other, permitted activities are not.
We have previously observed that  [s]olicitation impedes the
normal flow of traffic [because it] requires action by those
who would respond: The individual solicited must decide
whether or not to contribute (which itself might involve
reading the solicitor's literature or hearing his pitch), and
then, having decided to do so, reach for a wallet, search it
for money, write a check, or produce a credit card. . . . As
residents of metropolitan areas know from daily experience,
confrontation by a person asking for money disrupts
passage and is more intrusive and intimidating than an
encounter with a person giving out information.  Kokinda,
497 U. S., at 733-734 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted);
id., at 739 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (accepting
Postal Service's judgment that, given its past experience,
 in-person solicitation deserves different treatment from
alternative forms of solicitation and expression); Heffron,
supra, at 657 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (upholding partial restriction on solicitation at
fair grounds because of state interest  in protecting its
fairgoers from fraudulent, deceptive, and misleading
solicitation practices); id., at 665 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (upholding partial
restriction on solicitation because of the  crowd control
problems it creates).  The record in this case confirms that
the problems of congestion and fraud that we have identi-
fied with solicitation in other contexts have also proved true
in the airports' experience.  See App. 67-111 (affidavits).
Because airports users are frequently facing time con-
straints, and are traveling with luggage or children, the ban
on solicitation is a reasonable means of avoiding disruption
of an airport's operation.
       In my view, however, the regulation banning leafletting-
"or, in the Port Authority's words, the  continuous or
repetitive . . . distribution of . . . printed or written materi-
al"cannot be upheld as reasonable on this record.  I
therefore concur in the judgment in No. 91-339 striking
down that prohibition.  While the difficulties posed by
solicitation in a nonpublic forum are sufficiently obvious
that its regulation may  rin[g] of common-sense,'' Kokinda,
supra, at 734 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted), the same is not necessarily true of leafletting.  To
the contrary, we have expressly noted that leafletting does
not entail the same kinds of problems presented by face-to-
face solicitation.  Specifically,  [o]ne need not ponder the
contents of a leaflet or pamphlet in order mechanically to
take it out of someone's hand . . . . `The distribution of
literature does not require that the recipient stop in order
to receive the message the speaker wishes to convey;
instead the recipient is free to read the message at a later
time.'  Ibid. (plurality opinion), quoting Heffron, 452 U. S.,
at 665 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).  With the possible exception of avoiding litter, see
Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 162 (1939), it is difficult
to point to any problems intrinsic to the act of leafletting
that would make it naturally incompatible with a large,
multipurpose forum such as those at issue here.
       We have only once before considered restrictions on
speech in a nonpublic forum that sustained the kind of
extensive, nonforum-related activity found in the Port
Authority airports, and I believe that case is instructive.  In
Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976), the Court held that
even though certain parts of a military base were open to
the public, they still did not constitute a public forum in
light of  `the historically unquestioned power of [a] com-
manding officer summarily to exclude civilians from the
area of his command.'  Id., at 838, quoting Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 893 (1961).
The Court then proceeded to uphold a regulation banning
the distribution of literature without the prior approval of
the base commander.  In so doing, the Court  emphasized
that the regulation on leafletting did  not authorize the
Fort Dix authorities to prohibit the distribution of conven-
tional political campaign literature.  Rather, the Court
explained,  [t]he only publications that a military com-
mander may disapprove are those that he finds constitute
`a clear danger to [military] loyalty, discipline, or morale'
and that  [t]here is nothing in the Constitution that
disables a military commander from acting to avert what he
perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or
morale of troops on the base under his command.  424
U. S., at 840 (citation omitted).  In contrast, the regulation
at issue in this case effects an absolute prohibition and is
not supported by any independent justification outside of
the problems caused by the accompanying solicitation.
       Moreover, the Port Authority has not offered any justifi-
cations or record evidence to support its ban on the distri-
bution of pamphlets alone.  Its argument is focused instead
on the problems created when literature is distributed in
conjunction with a solicitation plea.  Although we do not
 requir[e] that . . . proof be present to justify the denial of
access to a nonpublic forum on grounds that the proposed
use may disrupt the property's intended function, Perry,
460 U. S., at 52, n. 12, we have required some explanation
as to why certain speech is inconsistent with the intended
use of the forum.  In Kokinda, for example, we upheld a
regulation banning solicitation on postal property in part
because the Postal Service's 30-year history of regulation of
solicitation in post offices demonstrated that permitting
solicitation interfered with its postal mission.  497 U. S., at
731-732 (plurality opinion).  Similarly, in Cornelius, we
held that it was reasonable to exclude political advocacy
groups from a fundraising campaign targeted at federal
employees in part because  the record amply support[ed] an
inference that the participation of those groups would have
jeopardized the success of the campaign.  473 U. S., at 810.
Here, the Port Authority has provided no independent
reason for prohibiting leafletting, and the record contains
no information from which we can draw an inference that
would support its ban.  Because I cannot see how peaceful
pamphleteering is incompatible with the multipurpose
environment of the Port Authority airports, I cannot accept
that a total ban on that activity is reasonable without an
explanation as to why such a restriction  preserv[es] the
property for the several uses to which it has been put.
Perry, supra, at 50-51 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
       Of course, it is still open for the Port Authority to
promulgate regulations of the time, place, and manner of
leafletting which are  content-neutral, narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and leave open
ample alternative channels of communication.  Perry,
supra, at 45; United States Postal Service, 453 U. S., at 132.
For example, during the many years that this litigation has
been in progress, the Port Authority has not banned
sankirtan completely from JFK International Airport, but
has restricted it to a relatively uncongested part of the
airport terminals, the same part that houses the airport
chapel.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 46-47.  In my view, that
regulation meets the standards we have applied to time,
place, and manner restrictions of protected expression.  See
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S.
288, 293 (1984).
       I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in
both No. 91-155 and No. 91-339.



            SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
                 Nos. 91-155 and 91-339
                        --------
          INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA
         CONSCIOUSNESS, INC., and BRIAN RUMBAUGH,
                            PETITIONERS
     91-155                     v.
                            WALTER LEE

                WALTER LEE, SUPERINTENDENT OF PORT
                         AUTHORITY POLICE
     91-339                     v.
                 INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA
                    CONSCIOUSNESS, INC., et al.
       on writs of certiorari to the united states court of
                  appeals for the second circuit
                          [June 26, 1992]

       Justice Souter, with whom Justice Blackmun and
Justice Stevens join, concurring in the judgment in No.
91-339 and dissenting in No. 91-155.
                                 I
       I join in Part I of Justice Kennedy's opinion and the
judgment of affirmance in No. 91-339.  I agree with
Justice Kennedy's view of the rule that should determine
what is a public forum and with his conclusion that the
public areas of the airports at issue here qualify as such.
The designation of a given piece of public property as a
traditional public forum must not merely state a conclusion
that the property falls within a static category including
streets, parks, sidewalks and perhaps not much more, but
must represent a conclusion that the property is no differ-
ent in principle from such examples, which we have
previously described as  archetypes of property from which
the government was and is powerless to exclude speech.
See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 480 (1988).  To treat
the class of such forums as closed by their description as
 traditional, taking that word merely as a charter for
examining the history of the particular public property
claimed as a forum, has no warrant in a Constitution whose
values are not to be left behind in the city streets that are
no longer the only focus of our community life.  If that were
the line of our direction, we might as well abandon the
public forum doctrine altogether.
       Nor is that a Scylla without Charybdis.  Public forum
analysis is stultified not only by treating its archetypes as
closed categories, but by treating its candidates so categori-
cally as to defeat their identification with the archetypes.
We need not say that all  transportation nodes or all
airports are public forums in order to find that certain
metropolitan airports are.  Thus, the enquiry may and must
relate to the particular property at issue and not necessari-
ly to the  precise classification of the property.  See ante,
at 6 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).  It is true that
property of some types will invariably be public forums.
 No particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a
specific street is necessary; all public streets are held in the
public trust and are properly considered traditional public
fora.  Frisby, supra, at 481.  But to find one example of a
certain property type (e.g., airports, post offices, etc.) that
is not a public forum is not to rule out all properties of that
sort.  Cf. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U. S. 720, 727
(1990) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.), (implicitly
rejecting the categorical approach by examining whether
 [t]he postal sidewalk at issue . . . [has] the characteristics
of public sidewalks traditionally open to expressive activ-
ity).  One can imagine a public airport of a size or design
or need for extraordinary security that would render
expressive activity incompatible with its normal use.  But
that would be no reason to conclude that one of the more
usual variety of metropolitan airports is not a public forum.
       I also agree with Justice Kennedy's statement of the
public forum principle: we should classify as a public forum
any piece of public property that is  suitable for discourse
in its physical character, where expressive activity is
 compatible with the use to which it has actually been put.
See ante, at 7, 6 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see
also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972)
( The crucial question is whether the manner of expression
is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a
particular place at a particular time); ante, at 8 (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring in No. 91-155 and concurring in judg-
ment in No. 91-339) (finding that the ban on the sale or
distribution of leaflets here must be struck down  [b]ecause
I cannot see how peaceful pamphleteering is incompatible
with the multipurpose environment of the Port Authority
airports, and concluding that regulations of leafletting may
thus only be upheld if they pass scrutiny under our test for
restrictions on time, place or manner of speech).  Applying
this test, I have no difficulty concluding that the unleased
public areas at airports like the metropolitan New York
airports at issue in this case are public forums.
                                II
       From the Court's conclusion in No. 91-155, however,
sustaining the total ban on solicitation of money for
immediate payment, I respectfully dissent.   We have held
the solicitation of money by charities to be fully protected
as the dissemination of ideas. See [Riley v. National
Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781,] 787-789
[(1988)]; Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H.
Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, 959-961 (1984); Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 628-632
(1980).  It is axiomatic that, although fraudulent misrepre-
sentation of facts can be regulated, the dissemination of
ideas cannot be regulated to prevent it from being unfair
or unreasonable.  Riley v. National Federation of Blind
of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 803 (1988) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment) (some citations
omitted).
       Even if I assume arguendo that the ban on the
petitioners' activity at issue here is both content neutral
and merely a restriction on the manner of communication,
the regulation must be struck down for its failure to satisfy
the requirements of narrow tailoring to further a significant
state interest, see, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984), and availability of
 ample alternative channels for communication.  Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976).
       As Justice Kennedy's opinion indicates, the respondent
comes closest to justifying the restriction as one furthering
the government's interest in preventing coercion and
fraud.  The claim to be preventing coercion is weak to
start with.  While a solicitor can be insistent, a pedestrian
on the street or airport concourse can simply walk away or
walk on.  In any event, we have held in a far more coercive
context than this one, that of a black boycott of white stores
in Claiborne County, Mississippi, that  Speech does not lose
its protected character . . . simply because it may embarrass
others or coerce them into action.  NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U. S.  886, 910 (1982).  See also Organi-
zation for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 419 (1971)
( The claim that . . . expressions were intended to exercise
a coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from
the reach of the First Amendment.  Petitioners plainly
intended to influence respondent's conduct by their activi-
ties; this is not fundamentally different from the function of
a newspaper).  Since there is here no evidence of any type
of coercive conduct, over and above the merely importunate
character of the open and public solicitation, that might
justify a ban, see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367
(1968); Claiborne Hardware Co., supra, at 912, the regula-
tion cannot be sustained to avoid coercion.
       As for fraud, our cases do not provide government with
plenary authority to ban solicitation just because it could be
fraudulent.   Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free
expression are suspect, NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
438 (1963), and more than a laudable intent to prevent
fraud is required to sustain the present ban.  See, e.g.,
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S.
620, 636-638 (1980) ( The Village, consistently with the
First Amendment, may not label such groups `fraudulent'
and bar them from canvassing on the streets and house to
house); Riley, supra, at 800.  The evidence of fraudulent
conduct here is virtually nonexistent.  It consists of one
affidavit describing eight complaints, none of them substan-
tiated,  involving some form of fraud, deception, or larceny
over an entire 11-year period between 1975 and 1986, dur-
ing which the regulation at issue here was, by agreement,
not enforced.  See Brief for Respondent 44; Brief for
Petitioners 46.  Petitioners claim, and respondent does not
dispute, that by the Port Authority's own calculation, there
has not been a single claim of fraud or misrepresentation
since 1981.  Ibid.  As against these facts, respondent's brief
is ominous in adding that  [t]he Port Authority is also
aware that members of [International Society for Krishna
Consciousness] have engaged in misconduct elsewhere.
Brief for Respondent 44.  This is precisely the type of vague
and unsubstantiated allegation that could never support a
restriction on speech.  Finally, the fact that other govern-
mental bodies have also enacted restrictions on solicitation
in other places, see, e.g., 36 CFR 7.96(h) (1991), is not
evidence of fraudulent conduct.
       Even assuming a governmental interest adequate to
justify some regulation, the present ban would fall when
subjected to the requirement of narrow tailoring.  See Riley,
supra, at 800; Schaumburg, supra, at 637 ( The Village may
serve its legitimate interests, but it must do so by narrowly
drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without
unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms).
 Precision of regulation must be the touchstone . . . .
Button, supra, at 438.  Thus, in Schaumburg we said:
    The Village's legitimate interest in preventing fraud
can be better served by measures less intrusive than a
direct prohibition on solicitation.  Fraudulent misrepre-
sentations can be prohibited and the penal laws used
to punish such conduct directly.  Efforts to promote
disclosure of the finances of charitable organizations
also may assist in preventing fraud by informing the
public of the ways in which their contributions will be
employed.  Such measures may help make contribution
decisions more informed, while leaving to individual
choice the decision whether to contribute . . . .  444
U. S., at 637-638 (citations and footnotes omitted).

Similarly, in Riley we required the state to cure its per-
ceived fraud problem by more narrowly tailored means than
compelling disclosure by professional fundraisers of the
amount of collected funds that were actually turned over to
charity during the previous year:
     In contrast to the prophylactic, imprecise, and
unduly burdensome rule the State has adopted to
reduce its alleged donor misperception, more benign
and narrowly tailored options are available.  For
example, as a general rule, the State may itself publish
the detailed financial disclosure forms it requires
professional fundraisers to file.  This procedure would
communicate the desired information to the public
without burdening a speaker with unwanted speech
during the course of a solicitation.  Alternatively, the
State may vigorously enforce its antifraud laws to
prohibit professional fundraisers from obtaining money
on false pretenses or by making false statements.  487
U. S., at 800.

    Finally, I do not think the Port Authority's solicitation
ban leaves open the  ample channels of communication
required of a valid content-neutral time, place and manner
restriction.  A distribution of preaddressed envelopes is
unlikely to be much of an alternative.  The practical reality
of the regulation, which this Court can never ignore, is that
it shuts off a uniquely powerful avenue of communication
for organizations like the International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, and may, in effect, completely prohibit
unpopular and poorly funded groups from receiving funds
in response to protected solicitation.  Compare Linmark
Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85, 93 (1977)
( Although in theory sellers remain free to employ a
number of different alternatives, in practice realty is not
marketed through leaflets, sound trucks, demonstrations, or
the like).
     Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals in No. 91-155, and strike down the ban on
solicitation.


