NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BARNHILL v. JOHNSON, TRUSTEE
certiorari tot he united states court of appeals for
the tenth circuit
No. 91-159.   Argued January 14, 1992-Decided March 25, 1992

The debtor's check in payment of a bona fide debt was delivered to
 petitioner Barnhill in New Mexico on November 18 and honored by
 the drawee bank on November 20, the 90th day before the debtor
 filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.  Respondent Johnson, the
 trustee of the debtor's estate, filed an adversary action against
 Barnhill, claiming that the payment was recoverable under
 11 U.S.C. 547(b) as a transfer of the debtor's property made on
 or within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing.  Johnson asserted that the
 transfer occurred on the date that the bank honored the check, but
 Barnhill claimed that it occurred on the date that he received the
 check.  The Bankruptcy Court agreed with Barnhill and denied
 recovery, and the District Court affirmed.  The Court of Appeals
 reversed, holding that a date of honor rule should govern 547(b)
 actions.
Held:For the purposes of 547(b), a transfer made by check is deemed
 to occur on the date the check is honored.  Pp.3-9.
   (a)``What constitutes a transfer and when it is complete'' is a
 matter of federal law.  McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365,
 369-370.  The Bankruptcy Code defines ``transfer'' as ``every mode,
 . . . absolute or conditional, . . . of disposing of . . . property or . . .
 an interest in property.'' 11 U.S.C. 101(54).  In the absence of any
 controlling federal law, ``property'' and ``interests in property'' are
 creatures of state law.  McKenzie, supra, at 370.  Under the Uniform
 Commercial Code, which has been adopted by New Mexico, a check
 is simply an order to the drawee bank to pay the sum stated on
 demand.  If the check is honored, the debtor's obligation is dis-
 charged, but if it is not honored, a cause of action against the debtor
 accrues to the check recipient ``upon demand following dishonor.''
 Pp.3-5.
   (b)An unconditional transfer of the debtor's interest in property
 did not occur before November 20, since receipt of the check gave
 Barnhill no right in the funds the bank held on the debtor's account.
 No transfer of any part of the debtor's claim against the bank
 occurred until the bank honored the check, at which time the bank
 had the right to ``charge'' the debtor's account and Barnhill's claim
 against the debtor ceased.  Honoring the check left the debtor in the
 position that it would have occupied had it withdrawn cash from its
 account and handed it over to Barnhill.  Thus, it was not until the
 debtor directed the bank to honor the check and the bank did so,
 that the debtor implemented a ``mode . . . of disposing . . . of property
 or . . . an interest in property'' under 101(54) and a ``transfer'' took
 place.  Pp.5-7.
   (c)Barnhill's argument that delivery of a check should be viewed
 as a ``conditional'' transfer is rejected.  Any chose in action against
 the debtor that he gained when he received the check cannot be
 fairly characterized as a conditional right to ``property or . . . an
 interest in property,'' since, until the moment of honor, the debtor
 remained in full control over the account's disposition and the
 account remained subject to a variety of actions by third parties.  In
 addition, the rule of honor is consistent with 547(e)(2)(A), which
 provides that a transfer occurs at the time it ``takes effect between
 the transferor and the transferee,'' particularly since the debtor here
 retained the ability to stop payment on the check until the very last.
 Barnhill's appeal to legislative history is also unavailing.  Pp.7-9.
931 F.2d 689, affirmed.

 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined.
Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined.
-------------------------------



Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 91-159
--------
WILLIAM BARNHILL, PETITIONER v. ELLIOT
JOHNSON, TRUSTEE
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the tenth circuit
[March 25, 1992]

  The Chief Justice  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Under the Bankruptcy Code's preference avoidance
section, 11 U. S. C. 547, the trustee is permitted to
recover, with certain exceptions, transfers of property made
by the debtor within 90 days before the date the bankruptcy
petition was filed.  We granted certiorari to decide whether,
in determining if a transfer occurred within the 90-day
preference period, a transfer made by check should be
deemed to occur on the date the check is presented to the
recipient or on the date the drawee bank honors it.  We
hold that the latter date is determinative.
  The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute.  The
debtor made payment for a bona fide debt to petitioner
Barnhill.  The check was delivered to petitioner on Novem-
ber 18.  The check was dated November 19, and the check
was honored by the drawee bank on November 20.  The
debtor later filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.  It is
agreed by the parties that the 90th day before the bank-
ruptcy filing was November 20.
  Respondent Johnson was appointed trustee for the
bankruptcy estate.  He filed an adversary proceeding
against petitioner, claiming that the check payment was
recoverable by the estate pursuant to 11 U. S. C. 547(b).
That section generally permits the trustee to recover for
benefit of the bankruptcy estate transfers of the debtor's
property made within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing.
Respondent asserted that the transfer occurred on Novem-
ber 20, the date the check was honored by the drawee bank,
and therefore was within the 90-day period.  Petitioner
defended by claiming that the transfer occurred on Novem-
ber 18, the date he received the check (the so-called ``date
of delivery'' rule), and that it therefore fell outside the 90-
day period established by 547(b)(4)(A).
The Bankruptcy Court concluded that a date of delivery
rule should govern and therefore denied the trustee
recovery.  The trustee appealed and the District Court
affirmed.  The trustee then appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed,
concluding that a date of honor rule should govern actions
under 547(b).  In re Antweil, 931 F. 2d 689 (1991).  It
distinguished a prior decision, In re White River Corp., 799
F. 2d 631 (1986), in which it held that, for purposes of
547(c), a date of delivery rule should govern when a
transfer occurs.  The Tenth Circuit concluded that 547(b)
and 547(c) have different purposes and functions, justify-
ing different rules for each.  It further concluded that a date
of honor rule was appropriate because such a rule was
consistent with provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,
was capable of easier proof, and was less subject to manipu-
lation.  We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit split.
502 U. S. ____ (1991).
In relevant part, 547(b) provides:
``(b)  Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section,
the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property -
  .      .       .      .      .
``(4) made -
  ``(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the fil-
  ing of the petition . . . .''
Title 11 U. S. C. 101(54) (1988 ed., Supp. II) defines
``transfer'' to mean
``every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional,
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting
with property or with an interest in property, including
retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure
of the debtor's equity of redemption.''
Section 547(e) provides further guidance on the meaning
and dating of a transfer.  For purposes of 547, it provides
``[(e)(1)](B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than
real property is perfected when a creditor on a simple
contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior
to the interest of the transferee.
``[(e)](2) For the purposes of this section, except as pro-
vided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, a transfer is
made-
``(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the
transferor and the transferee, if such transfer is
perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time;
``(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such
transfer is perfected after such 10 days . . . .''
Our task, then, is to determine whether, under the defini-
tion of transfer provided by 101(54), and supplemented by
547(e), the  transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid can be
said to have occurred before November 20.
``What constitutes a transfer and when it is complete'' is
a matter of federal law.  McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323
U. S. 365, 369-370 (1945).  This is unsurprising since, as
noted above, the statute itself provides a definition of
``transfer.''  But that definition in turn includes references
to parting with ``property and interests in property.''  In the
absence of any controlling federal law, ``property'' and
``interests in property'' are creatures of state law.  Id., at
370; Butner v. United States, 440 U. S. 48, 54 (1979)
(``Congress has generally left the determination of property
rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law'').
Thus it is helpful to sketch briefly the rights and duties
enjoyed under state law by each party to a check transaction.
A person with an account at a bank enjoys a claim
against the bank for funds in an amount equal to the
account balance.  Under the U. C. C., a check is simply an
order to the drawee bank to pay the sum stated, signed by
the maker and payable on demand.  U. C. C. 3-104(1),
(2)(b), 2 U. L. A. 224 (1991).  Receipt of a check does not,
however, give the recipient a right against the bank.  The
recipient may present the check but, if the drawee bank
refuses to honor it, the recipient has no recourse against
the drawee.  U. C. C. 3-409(1), 2A U. L. A. 189 (1991).
That is not to say, however, that the recipient of a check
is without any rights.  Receipt of a check for an underlying
obligation suspends the obligation ``pro tanto until the
instrument['s] . . . presentment[;] . . . discharge of the
underlying obligor on the instrument also discharges him
on the obligation.'' U. C. C. 3-802(1)(b), 2A U. L. A. 514
(1991).  But should the drawee bank refuse to honor a
check, a cause of action against the drawer of the check
accrues to the recipient of a check ``upon demand following
dishonor of the instrument.''  U. C. C. 3-122(3), 2 U. L. A.
407 (1991); see also, U. C. C. 3-413(2), 2A U. L. A. 2091).
And the recipient of a dishonored check, received in
payment on an underlying obligation, may maintain an
action on either the check or on the obligation.  U. C. C.
3-802(1)(b), 2A U. L. A. 514 (1991).
With this background we turn to the issue at hand.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in
ignoring the interest that passed from the debtor to the
petitioner when the check was delivered on a date outside
the 90-day preference period.  We disagree.  We begin by
noting that there can be no assertion that an unconditional
transfer of the debtor's interest in property had occurred
before November 20.  This is because, as just noted above,
receipt of a check gives the recipient no right in the funds
held by the bank on the drawer's account.  Myriad events
can intervene between delivery and presentment of the
check that would result in the check being dishonored.  The
drawer could choose to close the account.  A third party
could obtain a lien against the account by garnishment or
other proceedings.  The bank might mistakenly refuse to
honor the check.
The import of the preceding discussion for the instant
case is that no transfer of any part of the debtor's claim
against the bank occurred until the bank honored the check
on November 20.  The drawee bank honored the check by
paying it.  U. C. C. 1-201(21) (defining honor), 1 U. L. A.
65 (1989); U. C. C. 4-213(a), 2B U. L. A. 222 (1991).  At
that time, the bank had a right to ``charge'' the debtor's
account, U. C. C. 4-401, 2B U. L. A. 307 (1991) - i.e., the
debtor's claim against the bank was reduced by the amount
of the check - and petitioner no longer had a claim against
the debtor.  Honoring the check, in short, left the debtor in
the position that it would have occupied if it had withdrawn
cash from its account and handed it over to petitioner.  We
thus believe that when the debtor has directed the drawee
bank to honor the check and the bank has done so, the
debtor has implemented a "mode, direct or indirect . . . of
disposing of property or an interest in property."
11 U. S. C. 101(54) (emphasis added).  For the purposes of
payment by ordinary check, therefore, a "transfer" as
defined by 101(54) occurs on the date of honor, and not
before.  And since it is undisputed that honor occurred
within the 90-day preference period, the trustee presump-
tively may avoid this transfer.
In the face of this argument, petitioner retreats to the
definition of ``transfer'' contained in 101(54).  Petitioner
urges that rather than viewing the transaction as involving
two distinct actions - delivery of the check, with no
interest in property thereby being transferred, and honoring
of the check, with an interest being transferred - that we
instead should view delivery of the check as a ``conditional''
transfer.  We acknowledge that 101(54) adopts an expan-
sive definition of transfer, one that includes ``every mode
. . . absolute or conditional . . . of disposing of or parting
with property or with an interest in property.''  There is
thus some force in petitioner's claim that he did, in fact,
gain something when he received the check.  But at most,
what petitioner gained was a chose in action against the
debtor.  Such a right, however, cannot fairly be character-
ized as a conditional right to ``property or an interest in
property,'' 101(54), where the property in this case is the
account maintained with the drawee bank.  For as noted
above, until the moment of honor the debtor retains full
control over disposition of the account and the account
remains subject to a variety of actions by third parties.  To
treat petitioner's nebulous right to bring suit as a ``condi-
tional transfer'' of the property would accomplish a near-
limitless expansion of the term ``conditional.''  In the
absence of any right against the bank or the account, we
think the fairer description is that petitioner had received
no interest in debtor's property, not that his interest was
``conditional.''
Finally, we note that our conclusion that no transfer of
property occurs until the time of honor is consistent with
547(e)(2)(A).  That section provides that a transfer occurs
at the time the transfer ``takes effect between the transferor
and the transferee . . . .''  For the reasons given above, and
in particular because the debtor in this case retained the
ability to stop payment on the check until the very last, we
do not think that the transfer of funds in this case can be
said to have ``taken effect between the debtor and peti-
tioner'' until the moment of honor.
Recognizing, perhaps, the difficulties in its position,
petitioner places his heaviest reliance not on the statutory
language but on accompanying legislative history.  Specifi-
cally, he points to identical statements from Representative
Edwards and Senator DeConcini that ``payment of a debt by
means of a check is equivalent to a cash payment, unless
the check is dishonored.  Payment is considered to be made
when the check is delivered for purposes of sections
547(c)(1) and (2).''  124 Cong. Rec. 32400, (1978) and id., at
34000.  We think this appeal to legislative history unavail-
ing.
     To begin, we note that appeals to statutory history are
well-taken only to resolve ``statutory ambiguity.''  Toibb v.
Radloff, 501 U. S. ___ (1991) (slip op. at 5).  We do not
think this is such a case.  But even if it were, the state-
ments on which petitioner relies, by their own terms, apply
only to 547(c), not 547(b).  Section 547(c), in turn,
establishes various exceptions to 547(b)'s general rule
permitting recovery of preferential transfers.  Subsection
(c)(1) provides an exception for transfers that are  part of a
contemporaneous exchange of new value between a debtor
and creditor; subsection (c)(2) provides an exception for
transfers made from debtor to creditor in the ordinary
course of business.  These sections are designed to encour-
age creditors to continue to deal with troubled debtors on
normal business terms by obviating any worry that a
subsequent bankruptcy filing might require the creditor to
disgorge as a preference an earlier received payment.  But
given this specialized purpose, we see no basis for conclud-
ing that the legislative history, particularly legislative
history explicitly confined by its own terms to 547(c),
should cause us to adopt a ``date of delivery'' rule for
purposes of 547(b).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is
                               Affirmed.
 
-------------------------------

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 91-159
--------
WILLIAM BARNHILL, PETITIONER v. ELLIOT
JOHNSON, TRUSTEE
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the tenth circuit
[March 25, 1992]

  Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun joins,
dissenting.
  In my opinion, a ``transfer'' of property occurs on the date
the check is delivered to the transferee, provided that the
check is honored within 10 days.  This conclusion is
consistent with the traditional commercial practice of
treating the date of delivery as the date of payment when
a payment is made by a check that is subsequently honored
by the drawee bank.  It is also consistent with the treat-
ment of checks in tax law.  A taxpayer may deduct expenses
paid by a check delivered on or before December 31 against
that year's income even though the drawee bank does not
honor the check until the next calendar year.  Insofar as
possible, it is wise to interpret statutes regulating commer-
cial behavior consistently with established practices in the
business community.  The custom that treats the delivery
of a check as payment should not be rejected unless
Congress has unequivocally commanded a contrary result.
In the Bankruptcy Code, Congress has done no such thing.
On the contrary, the Code is entirely consistent with the
normal practice.
  The definition of the term ``transfer'' in 101(54) is
plainly broad enough to encompass the conditional transfer
of the right to funds in the debtor's bank account that
occurs when the debtor delivers a check to a creditor.
Section 101(54) defines a ``transfer'' as ``every mode, direct
or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involun-
tary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an
interest in property . . . .''  11 U. S. C. 101(54) (1988 ed.,
Supp. II).  A check is obviously a ``mode'' through which
the debtor may ``par[t] with property.''
  Of course, the fact that delivery of a check effects a
``transfer'' within the meaning of the Code does not answer
the question whether the trustee may avoid the transfer by
check in this case because 547(b) only authorizes the
trustee to avoid transfers made ``on or within 90 days before
the date of the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition.''  11
U. S. C. 547(b)(4)(A).  That raises the question:  when did
the ``transfer'' occur?  Section 547(e)(2) provides the answer.
It states that for purposes of the preference avoidance
section, 11 U. S. C. 547, a transfer is made
    ``(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the
    transferor and the transferee, if such transfer is
    perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time;
    ``(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such
    transfer is perfected after such 10 days . . . .''
    547(e)(2).
    The Court interprets this section as supporting its
conclusion that the transfer does not occur until the check
is honored by the drawee bank because, it reasons, a
transfer cannot take effect between the transferor and
transferee as long as the transferor retains the ability to
stop payment on the check.  Ante, at 8.  But that reasoning
is foreclosed by 101(54), which states that even a condi-
tional transfer is a ``transfer'' for purposes of the Code.
Because delivery of a check effects a conditional transfer
from the transferor to the transferee, the ``transfer'' is
made, for purposes of 547, on the date of delivery, provid-
ed that the transfer is ``perfected'' within 10 days as
required by 547(e)(2).
  As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recog-
nized, the use of the term ``perfected'' is ``jarring'' because
the meaning of the word ``perfected'' is not immediately
apparent in this context.  Global Distribution Network, Inc.
v. Star Expansion Co., 949 F. 2d 910, 913 (1991).  ``Debtors
transfer assets; creditors perfect security interests.''  Ibid.
The answer lies in the fact that the term ``perfected'' has a
broader meaning in 547(e) than it does in the Uniform
Commercial Code.  Section 547(e)(1)(B) states that ``a trans-
fer of . . . property other than real property is perfected
when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a
judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transfer-
ee.''  Under this definition, a transfer by check is ``perfec-
ted'' when the check is honored because after that time no
one can acquire a judicial lien superior to the interest of the
transferee.
  Thus 101(54) and 547, when read together, plainly
indicate that a ``transfer'' by check occurs on the date the
check is delivered to the transferee, provided that the
drawee bank honors the check within 10 days.  If, however,
the check is not honored within 10 days, the ``transfer''
occurs on the date of honor.
  An additional consideration reinforces this interpretation
of the statutory text.  The Courts of Appeals are unanimous
in concluding that the date of delivery of a check is control-
ling for purposes of 547(c), and the Court does not dispute
that conclusion for the purposes of its decision today.  Ante,
at 9, n. 9.  These Courts of Appeals decisions are consistent
with the legislative history, which, though admittedly not
conclusive, identifies the date of delivery of a check as the
date of transfer for purposes of 547(c).  Normally, we
assume that the same terms have the same meaning in
different sections of the same statute.  See, e.g., Sullivan v.
Stroop, 496 U. S. 478, 484 (1990).  That rule is not inexora-
ble, but nothing in the structure or purpose of 547(b) and
547(c) suggests a reason for interpreting these adjacent
subsections differently.
  I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
-------------------------------
