Slip opinion

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus
(headnote) will be released, as is being
done in connection with this case, at
the time the opinion is issued.  The
syllabus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been pre-
pared by the Reporter of Decisions for
the convenience of the reader.  See
United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200
U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

              Syllabus

   WRIGHT, WARDEN, et al. v. WEST
 certiorari to the united states court of ap-
 peals for the fourth circuit
  No. 91-542.   Argued March 24, 1992"Decided
            June 19, 1992

A few weeks after a Virginia home was burglar-
ized, over 15 of the missing items were recov-
ered from respondent West's home.  At his trial
on grand larceny charges, he admitted to a
prior felony conviction, but denied having sto-
len the items, explaining that he frequently
bought and sold merchandise at different flea
markets.  He offered no explanation for how he
had acquired any of the stolen items until
cross-examination, when he gave vague, evasive
and even contradictory answers; could not re-
member how he acquired several major items,
including a television set and a coffee table;
and failed to produce any evidence corroborat-
ing his story.  West was convicted.  The State
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and de-
nied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
both times rejecting, inter alia, West's conten-
tion that the evidence was insufficient to sup-
port a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.  On federal habeas, the District Court
also rejected that contention.  The Court of
Appeals reversed on the ground that the stan-
dard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319"t-
hat evidence is sufficient to support a convic-
tion as a matter of due process if, ``after view-
ing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt''"had not been
met.
Held:The judgment is reversed, and the case is
remanded.
931 F.2d 262, reversed and remanded.
Justice Thomas, joined by The Chief Justice
and Justice Scalia, concluded that regardless
of whether a federal habeas court should re-
view state-court applications of law to fact
deferentially or de novo, the trial record con-
tains more than enough evidence to support
West's conviction.  Jackson repeatedly empha-
sizes the deference owed the trier of fact and
the sharply limited nature of constitutional
sufficiency review.  The case against West was
strong.  The jury was entitled to disbelieve his
uncorroborated and confused testimony, dis-
count his credibility on account of his prior
felony conviction, and take his demeanor into
account.  The jury was also permitted to con-
sider what it concluded to be perjured testimo-
ny as affirmative evidence of guilt.  Pp.16-18.
Justice White concluded that there was enough
evidence to support West's conviction under the
Jackson standard.  P.1.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Blackmun
and Justice Stevens, concluded that the evi-
dence supported West's conviction and that
there was no need to decide the standard of
review issue to decide this case.  Pp.1, 9.
Justice Kennedy concluded that the evidence
was sufficient to convince a rational factfinder
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, should not be
interpreted as calling into question the settled
principle that mixed questions are subject to de
novo review on federal habeas corpus.  Pp.1-5.
Justice Souter concluded that West sought
the benefit of a ``new rule,'' and thus his claim
was barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288.  The
Court of Appeals misapplied Teague's commands,
since, while the Jackson rule was ``old'' enough
to have predated the finality of West's convic-
tion, it was not specific enough to dictate the
rule on which the conviction was held unlawful.
Although the State Supreme Court was not enti-
tled to disregard Jackson, it does not follow
from Jackson's rule that the insufficiency of
the evidence to support West's conviction was
apparent.  Virginia has long recognized a rule
that evidence of falsely explained possession
of recently stolen property is sufficient to
sustain a finding that the possessor took the
goods, and the jury's rejection of West's expla-
nation implies a finding that his explanation was
false.  Virginia's rule is reasonable and has
been accepted as good law against the backdrop
of a general state sufficiency standard no less
stringent than the Jackson rule.  Thus, it is not
possible to say that reasonable jurists could
not have considered Virginia's rule compatible
with the Jackson standard.  Pp.1-7.

Thomas, J., announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion, in which Rehnquist, C.
J., and Scalia, J., joined.  White, J., filed an opin-
ion concurring in the judgment.  O'Connor, J., filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., joined.  Kennedy, J.,
and Souter, J., filed opinions concurring in the
judgment.


Opinion
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal
revision before publication in the pre-
liminary print of the United States
Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Su-
preme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical
or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the
preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
             No. 91-542
              --------
ELLIS B. WRIGHT, Jr., WARDEN and MARY SUE TERRY,
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, PETITIONERS v.
            FRANK ROBERT WEST, Jr.
  on writ of certiorari to the united states
    court of appeals for the fourth circuit
                [June 19, 1992]

  Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the
Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief
Justice and Justice Scalia joined.
  In this case, we must determine whether the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit correctly
applied our decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U. S. 307 (1979), in concluding that the evidence
against respondent Frank West was insufficient,
as a matter of due process, to support his state-
court conviction for grand larceny.
                       I
  Between December 13 and December 26, 1978,
someone broke into the Westmoreland County,
Virginia, home of Angelo Cardova and stole items
valued at approximately $3,500.  On January 10,
1979, police conducted a lawful search of the
Gloucester County, Virginia, home of West and his
wife.  They discovered several of the items stolen
from the Cardova home, including various elec-
tronic equipment (two television sets and a record
player); articles of clothing (an imitation mink
coat with the name  Esther embroidered in it, a
silk jacket emblazoned  Korea 1970,'' and a pair of
shoes); decorations (several wood carvings and a
mounted lobster); and miscellaneous household
objects (a mirror framed with seashells, a coffee
table, a bar, a sleeping bag and some silverware).
These items were valued at approximately $800,
and the police recovered other, unspecified items
of Cardova's property with an approximate value
of $300.
  West was charged with grand larceny.  Testifying
at trial on his own behalf, he admitted to a prior
felony conviction, but denied having taken any-
thing from Cardova's house.  He explained that he
had bought and sold  a lot of . . . merchandise
from  several guys at  flea bargain places
where, according to West,  a lot of times you buy
things . . . that are stolen although  you never
know it.  App. 21.  On cross-examination, West said
that he had bought many of the stolen items from
a Ronnie Elkins, whom West claimed to have known
for years.  West testified that he purchased one
of the wood carvings, the jacket, mounted lobster,
mirror and bar from Elkins for about $500.  West
initially guessed, and then twice positively
asserted, that this sale occurred before January
1, 1979.  In addition, West claimed to have pur-
chased the coat from Elkins for $5 around January
1, 1979.  His testimony did not make clear whether
he was describing one transaction or two, whether
there were any other transactions between
himself and Elkins, where the transactions oc-
curred, and whether the transactions occurred at
flea markets.  West testified further that he
had purchased one of the television sets in an
entirely separate transaction in Goochland
County, from an individual whose name he had
forgotten.  Finally, West testified that he did not
remember how he had acquired the second televi-
sion, the coffee table, and the silverware.
  Under then-applicable Virginia law, grand larce-
ny was defined as the wrongful and nonconsensual
taking of property worth at least $100, with the
intent to deprive the owner of it permanently.
See Va. Code 18.2-95 (1975); Skeeter v. Common-
wealth, 217 Va. 722, 725, 232 S. E. 2d 756, 758
(1977).  Virginia law permits an inference that a
person who fails to explain, or falsely explains,
his exclusive possession of recently stolen
property is the thief.  See, e.g., Moehring v.
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 564, 568, 290 S. E. 2d 891,
893 (1982); Best v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 387, 389,
282 S. E. 2d 16, 17 (1981).  The trial court instruct-
ed the jurors about this permissive inference,
but warned that the inference did not compromise
their constitutional obligation to acquit unless
they found that the State had established every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
(see In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970)).
  The jury returned a guilty verdict, and West
received a 10-year prison sentence.  West peti-
tioned for an appeal, contending (among other
things) that the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.  In May 1980, the Supreme Court of Virginia
refused the petition"a disposition indicating that
the court found the petition without merit, see
Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697, 700, 204 S. E. 2d
421, 424 (1974).  Seven years later, West filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the same
court, supported by an affidavit executed by
Ronnie Elkins in April 1987.  West renewed his claim
that the original trial record contained insuffi-
cient evidence to support the conviction, and he
argued in the alternative that Elkins's affidavit,
which tended to corroborate West's trial testimo-
ny in certain respects, constituted new evidence
entitling him to a new trial.  The Supreme Court of
Virginia again denied relief.  West then filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
which rejected both claims and denied relief.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed.  931 F. 2d 262 (1991).  As the court
correctly recognized, a claim that evidence is
insufficient to support a conviction as a matter
of due process depends on  whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U. S., at 319 (emphasis in original).  Five consider-
ations led the court to conclude that this stan-
dard was not met: first, the items were recovered
no sooner than two weeks after they had been
stolen; second, only about a third of the items
stolen from Cardova (measured by value) were
recovered from West; third, the items were found
in West's house in plain view, and not hidden away
as contraband; fourth, West's explanation of his
possession was not so  inherently implausible,
even if it were disbelieved, that it could  fairly
be treated as positive evidence of guilt; and
fifth, there was no corroborating evidence (such
as fingerprints or eyewitness testimony) beyond
the fact of mere possession.  See 931 F. 2d, at
268-270.  The court viewed West's testimony as
 at most, a neutral factor, id., at 270, despite
noting his  confusion about the details of his
alleged purchases, id., at 269, and despite con-
ceding that his testimony  at first blush . . . may
itself seem incredible, id., at 270, n. 7.  In
holding that the Jackson standard was not met, the
court did not take into consideration the fact
that the Supreme Court of Virginia had twice
previously concluded otherwise.
  After the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en
banc by an equally divided court, see App. to Pet.
for Cert. 34-35, the warden and the State Attor-
ney General sought review in this Court on, among
other questions, whether the Court of Appeals had
applied Jackson correctly in this case.  We grant-
ed certiorari, 502 U. S. ___ (1991), and requested
additional briefing on the question whether a
federal habeas court should afford deference to
state-court determinations applying law to the
specific facts of a case, 502 U. S. --- (1991).  We
now reverse.
                      II
  The habeas corpus statute permits a federal
court to entertain a petition from a state pris-
oner  only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.  28 U. S. C. 2254(a).  The
court must  dispose of the matter as law and
justice require.  2243.  For much of our histo-
ry, we interpreted these bare guidelines and their
predecessors to reflect the common-law principle
that a prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus
could challenge only the jurisdiction of the court
that had rendered the judgment under which he was
in custody.  See, e.g., In re Wood, 140 U. S. 278,
285-287 (1891) (Harlan, J.); Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet.
193, 202 (1830) (Marshall, C. J.).  Gradually, we
began to expand the category of claims deemed to
be jurisdictional for habeas purposes.  See, e.g.,
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 377 (1880) (court
without jurisdiction to impose sentence under
unconstitutional statute); Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall.
163, 176 (1874) (court without jurisdiction to
impose sentence not authorized by statute).  Next,
we began to recognize federal claims by state
prisoners if no state court had provided a full
and fair opportunity to litigate those claims.
See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, 91-92
(1923); Frank v. Magnum, 237 U. S. 309, 335-336
(1915).  Before 1953, however, the inverse of this
rule also remained true: absent an alleged juris-
dictional defect,  habeas corpus would not lie for
a [state] prisoner . . . if he had been given an
adequate opportunity to obtain full and fair
consideration of his federal claim in the state
courts.  Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 459-460 (1963)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).  See generally Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 478-499
(1963).  In other words, the state-court judgment
was entitled to  absolute respect, Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 477 U. S. 436, 446 (1986) (Opinion of Powell,
J.) (emphasis added), and a federal habeas court
could not review it even for reasonableness.
    We rejected the principle of absolute deference
in our landmark decision in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S.
443 (1953).  There, we held that a state-court
judgment of conviction  is not res judicata on
federal habeas with respect to federal constitu-
tional claims, id., at 458, even if the state court
has rejected all such claims after a full and fair
hearing.  Instead, we held, a district court must
determine whether the state-court adjudication
 has resulted in a satisfactory conclusion.  Id.,
at 463.  We had no occasion to explore in detail
the question whether a  satisfactory conclusion
was one that the habeas court considered correct,
as opposed to merely reasonable, because we
concluded that the constitutional claims advanced
in Brown itself would fail even if the state courts'
rejection of them were reconsidered de novo.  See
id., at 465-476.  Nonetheless, we indicated that
the federal courts enjoy at least the discretion
to take into consideration the fact that a state
court has previously rejected the federal claims
asserted on habeas.  See id., at 465 ( As the
state and federal courts have the same responsi-
bilities to protect persons from violation of
their constitutional rights, we conclude that a
federal district court may decline, without a
rehearing of the facts, to award a writ of habeas
corpus to a state prisoner where the legality of
such detention has been determined, on the facts
presented, by the highest state court with juris-
diction).
  In an influential separate opinion endorsed by a
majority of the Court, Justice Frankfurter also
rejected the principle of absolute deference to
fairly-litigated state-court judgments.  He
emphasized that a state-court determination of
federal constitutional law is not  binding on
federal habeas, id., at 506, regardless of whether
the determination involves a pure question of law,
ibid., or a  so-called mixed questio[n] requiring
the application of law to fact, id., at 507.  None-
theless, he stated quite explicitly that a ``prior
State determination may guide [the] discretion [of
the district court] in deciding upon the appropri-
ate course to be followed in disposing of the
application.  Id., at 500.  Discussing mixed ques-
tions specifically, he noted further that  there
is no need for the federal judge, if he could, to
shut his eyes to the State consideration.  Id., at
508.
     In subsequent cases, we repeatedly reaffirmed
Brown's teaching that mixed constitutional ques-
tions are  open to review on collateral attack,
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 342 (1980), with-
out ever explicitly considering whether that
 review should be de novo or deferential.  In some
of these cases, we would have denied habeas
relief even under de novo review, see, e.g., Stric-
kland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 698 (1984) (facts
make it  clear that habeas petitioner did not
receive ineffective assistance of counsel); Neil
v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188, 201 (1972) (facts disclose
 no substantial likelihood that habeas petition-
er was subjected to unreliable pretrial lineup); in
others, we would have awarded habeas relief even
under deferential review, see, e.g., Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 405 (1977) (facts provide
 no reasonable basis for finding valid waiver of
right to counsel); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 725
(1961) (facts show  clear and convincing evidence
of biased jury); and in yet others, we remanded for
application of a proper legal rule without ad-
dressing that standard of review question, see,
e.g., Cuyler, supra, at 342, 350.  Nonetheless,
because these cases never qualified our early
citation of Brown for the proposition that a
federal habeas court must reexamine mixed consti-
tutional questions  independently, Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 318 (1963) (dictum), we have
gradually come to treat as settled the rule that
mixed constitutional questions are  subject to
plenary federal review on habeas.  Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 112 (1985).
   Jackson itself contributed to this trend.  There,
we held that a conviction violates due process if
supported only by evidence from which  no ratio-
nal trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt.  443 U. S., at 317.  We stated explicit-
ly that a state-court judgment applying the
Jackson rule in a particular case  is of course
entitled to deference on federal habeas.  Id., at
323; see also id., at 336, n. 9 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in judgment) ( State judges are more
familiar with the elements of state offenses than
are federal judges and should be better able to
evaluate sufficiency claims).  Notwithstanding
these principles, however, we then indicated that
the habeas court itself should apply the Jackson
rule, see id., at 324, rather than merely reviewing
the state courts' application of it for reason-
ableness.  Ultimately, though, we had no occasion
to resolve our conflicting statements on the
standard of review question, because we conclud-
ed that the habeas petitioner was not entitled to
relief even under our own de novo application of
Jackson.  See id., at 324-326.
  Despite our apparent adherence to a standard
of de novo habeas review with respect to mixed
constitutional questions, we have implicitly
questioned that standard, at least with respect
to pure legal questions, in our recent retroac-
tivity precedents.  In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S.
302, 313-314 (1989), a majority of this Court
endorsed the retroactivity analysis advanced by
Justice O'Connor for a plurality in Teague v. Lane,
489 U. S. 288 (1989).  Under Teague, a habeas
petitioner generally cannot benefit from a new
rule of criminal procedure announced after his
conviction has become final on direct appeal.  See
id., at 305-310 (Opinion of O'Connor, J.).  Teague
defined a  new rule as one that was  not dictated
by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final.  Id., at 301 (emphasis in
original).  In Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 415
(1990), we explained that the definition includes
all rules  susceptible to debate among reasonable
minds.  Thus, if a state court has reasonably
rejected the legal claim asserted by a habeas
petitioner under existing law, then the claim
seeks the benefit of a  new rule under Butler,
and is therefore not cognizable on habeas under
Teague.  In other words, a federal habeas court
 must defer to the state court's decision reject-
ing the claim unless that decision is patently
unreasonable.  Butler, supra, at 422 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
    Teague was premised on the view that retroac-
tivity questions in habeas corpus proceedings
must take account of the nature and function of
the writ, which we described as  `a collateral
remedy . . . not designed as a substitute for
direct review.'  489 U. S., at 306 (Opinion of
O'Connor, J.) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401
U. S. 667, 682-683 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in
judgments in part and dissenting in part)) (empha-
sis in Mackey).  Justice Stevens reasoned similar-
ly in Jackson, where he stressed that habeas
corpus  is not intended as a substitute for
appeal, nor as a device for reviewing the merits
of guilt determinations at criminal trials, but
only  to guard against extreme malfunctions in
the state criminal justice systems.  443 U. S., at
332, n. 5 (opinion concurring in judgment); see also
Greer v. Miller, 483 U. S. 756, 768-769 (1987) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in judgment).  Indeed, the
notion that different standards should apply on
direct and collateral review runs throughout our
recent habeas jurisprudence.  We have said, for
example, that new rules always have retroactive
application to criminal cases pending on direct
review, see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314,
320-328 (1987), but that they generally do not
have retroactive application to criminal cases
pending on habeas, see Teague, supra, at 305-310
(Opinion of O'Connor, J.).  We have held that the
Constitution guarantees the right to counsel on
a first direct appeal, see, e.g., Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U. S. 353, 355-358 (1963), but that it
guarantees no right to counsel on habeas, see,
e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 555
(1987).  On direct review, we have announced and
enforced the rule that state courts must exclude
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.  See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643,
654-660 (1961).  We have also held, however, that
claims under Mapp are not cognizable on habeas as
long as the state courts have provided a full and
fair opportunity to litigate them at trial or on
direct review.  See Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465,
489-496 (1976).
  These differences simply reflect the fact that
habeas review  entails significant costs.  Engle
v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126 (1982).  Among other
things,  `[i]t disturbs the State's significant
interest in repose for concluded litigation,
denies society the right to punish some admitted
offenders, and intrudes on state sovereignty to
a degree matched by few exercises of federal
judicial authority.'  Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U. S.
195, 210 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
Harris v. Reed, 489 U. S. 255, 282 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting)).  In various contexts, we have
emphasized that these costs, as well as the
countervailing benefits, must be taken into
consideration in defining the scope of the writ.
See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. ---, ---
(1991) (slip op., at 19-26) (procedural default); Mc-
Cleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. ---, --- (1991) (slip op.,
at 24-28) (abuse of the writ); Teague, supra, at
308-310 (Opinion of O'Connor, J.) (retroactivity);
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, supra, at 444-455 (Opinion of
Powell, J.) (successive petitions); Stone v. Powell,
supra, at 491-492, n. 31 (cognizability of particu-
lar claims).
  In light of these principles, petitioners ask
that we reconsider our statement in Miller v.
Fenton that mixed constitutional questions are
 subject to plenary federal review on habeas,
474 U. S., at 112.  By its terms, Teague itself is not
directly controlling, because West sought federal
habeas relief under Jackson, which was decided a
year before his conviction became final on direct
review.  Nonetheless, petitioners contend, the
logic of Teague makes our statement in Miller
untenable.  Petitioners argue that if deferential
review for reasonableness strikes an appropriate
balance with respect to purely legal claims, then
it must strike an appropriate balance with re-
spect to mixed questions as well.  Moreover, they
note that under the habeas statute itself, a
state-court determination of a purely factual
question must be  presumed correct, and can be
overcome only by  convincing evidence, unless
one of eight statutorily enumerated exceptions is
present.  28 U. S. C. 2254(d).  It makes no sense,
petitioners assert, for a habeas court generally
to review factual determinations and legal deter-
minations deferentially, but to review applica-
tions of law to fact de novo.  Finally, petitioners
find the prospect of deferential review for mixed
questions at least implicit in our recent state-
ment that Teague concerns are fully implicated  by
the application of an old rule in a manner that was
not dictated by precedent.  Stringer v. Black, 503
U. S. ---, --- (1992) (emphasis added) (slip op., at 4).
For these reasons, petitioners invite us to
reaffirm that a habeas judge need not"and indeed
may not"``shut his eyes entirely to state-court
applications of law to fact.  Brown v. Allen, 344
U. S., at 508 (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.).  West
develops two principal counterarguments: first,
that Congress implicitly codified a de novo stan-
dard with respect to mixed constitutional ques-
tions when it amended the habeas statute in 1966;
and second, that de novo federal review is neces-
sary to vindicate federal constitutional rights.
    We need not decide such far-reaching issues in
this case.  As in both Brown and Jackson, the claim
advanced by the habeas petitioner must fail even
assuming that the state court's rejection of it
should be reconsidered de novo.  Whatever the
appropriate standard of review, we conclude that
there was more than enough evidence to support
West's conviction.
  The case against West was strong.  Two to four
weeks after the Cardova home had been burglar-
ized, over 15 of the items stolen were recovered
from West's home.  On direct examination at trial,
West said nothing more than that he frequently
bought and sold items at different flea markets.
He failed to offer specific information about how
he had come to acquire any of the stolen items,
and he did not even mention Ronnie Elkins by name.
When pressed on cross-examination about the
details of his purchases, West contradicted
himself repeatedly about where he supposedly had
bought the stolen goods, and he gave vague,
seemingly evasive answers to various other
questions.  See n. 1, supra.  He said further that
he could not remember how he had acquired such
major household items as a television set and a
coffee table, and he failed to offer any explana-
tion whatsoever about how he had acquired Car-
dova's record player, among other things.  More-
over, he testified that he had acquired Cardova's
second television set from a seller other than
Elkins (who remained unidentified) in an entirely
unrelated (but roughly contemporaneous) transac-
tion.  Finally, he failed to produce any other
supporting evidence, such as testimony from
Elkins, whom he claimed to have known for years
and done business with on a regular basis.
  As the trier of fact, the jury was entitled to
disbelieve West's uncorroborated and confused
testimony.  In evaluating that testimony, more-
over, the jury was entitled to discount West's
credibility on account of his prior felony convic-
tion, see Va. Code 19.2-269 (1990); Sadoski v.
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1069, 254 S. E. 2d 100 (1979),
and to take into account West's demeanor when
testifying, which neither the Court of Appeals nor
we may review.  And if the jury did disbelieve
West, it was further entitled to consider whatev-
er it concluded to be perjured testimony as
affirmative evidence of guilt.  See, e.g., Wilson v.
United States, 162 U. S. 613, 620-621 (1896); United
States v. Zafiro, 945 F. 2d 881, 888 (CA7 1991)
(Posner, J.), cert. granted on other grounds, 503
U. S. --- (1992); Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F. 2d 265,
269 (CA2 1952) (L. Hand, J.).
  In Jackson, we emphasized repeatedly the defer-
ence owed to the trier of fact and, correspond-
ingly, the sharply limited nature of constitutional
sufficiency review.  We said that  all of the
evidence is to be considered in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, 443 U. S., at 319
(emphasis in original); that the prosecution need
not affirmatively  rule out every hypothesis
except that of guilt, id., at 326; and that a
reviewing court  faced with a record of historical
facts that supports conflicting inferences must
presume"even if it does not affirmatively appear
in the record"that the trier of fact resolved any
such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and
must defer to that resolution, ibid.  Under these
standards, we think it clear that the trial record
contained sufficient evidence to support West's
conviction.
  Having granted relief on West's Jackson claim,
the Court of Appeals declined to address West's
additional claim that he was entitled to a new
trial, as a matter of due process, on the basis of
newly-discovered evidence.  See 931 F. 2d, at 271,
n. 9.  As that claim is not properly before us, we
decline to address it here.  The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

It is so ordered.

 Concur 1

      SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
             No. 91-542
              --------
ELLIS B. WRIGHT, Jr., WARDEN and MARY SUE TERRY,
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, PETITIONERS v.
            FRANK ROBERT WEST, Jr.
  on writ of certiorari to the united states
    court of appeals for the fourth circuit
                [June 19, 1992]

        Justice White, concurring in the judgment.
  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), required
the federal courts to deny the requested writ of
habeas corpus if, under the Jackson standard,
there was sufficient evidence to support West's
conviction, which, as the Court amply demon-
strates, see ante, at 16-18, there certainly was.

Concur 2
      SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
             No. 91-542
              --------
ELLIS B. WRIGHT, Jr., WARDEN and MARY SUE TERRY,
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, PETITIONERS v.
            FRANK ROBERT WEST, Jr.
  on writ of certiorari to the united states
    court of appeals for the fourth circuit
                [June 19, 1992]

  Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Blackmun
and Justice Stevens join, concurring in the
judgment.
  I agree that the evidence sufficiently support-
ed respondent's conviction.  I write separately
only to express disagreement with certain state-
ments in Justice Thomas' extended discussion,
ante, at 6-16, of this Court's habeas corpus
jurisprudence.
  First, Justice Thomas errs in describing the
pre-1953 law of habeas corpus.  Ante, at 6-7.
While it is true that a state prisoner could not
obtain the writ if he had been provided a full and
fair hearing in the state courts, this rule gov-
erned the merits of a claim under the Due Process
Clause.  It was not a threshold bar to the consid-
eration of other federal claims, because, with
rare exceptions, there were no other federal
claims available at the time.  During the period
Justice Thomas discusses, the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights were not yet understood to apply in
state criminal prosecutions.  The only protectio-
ns the Constitution afforded to state prisoners
were those for which the text of the Constitution
explicitly limited the authority of the States,
most notably the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.  And in the area of criminal
procedure, the Due Process Clause was under-
stood to guarantee no more than a full and fair
hearing in the state courts.  See, e.g., Ponzi v.
Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254, 260 (1922) ( One accused
of crime has a right to a full and fair trial ac-
cording to the law of the government whose sover-
eignty he is alleged to have offended, but he has
no more than that).
  Thus, when the Court stated that a state pris-
oner who had been afforded a full and fair hearing
could not obtain a writ of habeas corpus, the
Court was propounding a rule of constitutional
law, not a threshold requirement of habeas cor-
pus.  This is evident from the fact that the Court
did not just apply this rule on habeas, but also in
cases on direct review.  See, e.g., Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 107-108 (1934) ( the
presence of a defendant is a condition of due
process to the extent that a fair and just hearing
would be thwarted by his absence, and to that
extent only); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78,
110-111 (1908) ( Due process requires that the
court which assumes to determine the rights of
parties shall have jurisdiction, and that there
shall be notice and opportunity for hearing given
the parties.  Subject to these two fundamental
conditions, . . . this court has up to this time
sustained all state laws, statutory or judicially
declared, regulating procedure, evidence and
methods of trial, and held them to be consistent
with due process of law) (citations omitted).  As
long as a state criminal prosecution was fairly
conducted by a court of competent jurisdiction
according to state law, no constitutional ques-
tion was presented, whether on direct or habeas
review.  Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692, 698 (1891);
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 175 (1899).
  The cases cited by Justice Thomas"Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923), and Frank v. Mangum,
237 U. S. 309 (1915)"demonstrate that the absence
of a full and fair hearing in the state courts was
itself the relevant violation of the Constitution;
it was not a prerequisite to a federal court's
consideration of some other federal claim.  Both
cases held that a trial dominated by an angry mob
was inconsistent with due process.  In both, the
Court recognized that the State could neverthe-
less afford due process if the state appellate
courts provided a fair opportunity to correct the
error.  The state courts had provided such an
opportunity in Frank; in Moore, they had not.  In
neither case is the  full and fair hearing rule
cited as a deferential standard of review applica-
ble to habeas cases; the rule instead defines the
constitutional claim itself, which was reviewed de
novo.  See Moore, supra, at 91-92.
  Second, Justice Thomas quotes Justice Powell's
opinion in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436 (1986),
out of context.  Ante, at 7.  Justice Powell said
only that the judgment of a committing court of
competent jurisdiction was accorded  absolute
respect on habeas in the 19th century, when the
habeas inquiry was limited to the jurisdiction of
the court.  Kuhlmann, supra, at 446 (opinion of
Powell, J.).  Justice Powell was not expressing the
erroneous view which Justice Thomas today
ascribes to him, that state court judgments were
entitled to complete deference before 1953.
  Third, Justice Thomas errs in implying that
Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953), was the first
case in which the Court held that the doctrine of
res judicata is not strictly followed on federal
habeas.  Ante, at 8.  In fact, the Court explicitly
reached this holding for the first time in Salinger
v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224, 230 (1924).  Even Salinger
did not break new ground:  The Salinger Court
observed that such had been the rule at common
law, and that the Court had implicitly followed it
in Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365, 378 (1902),
and Ex parte Spencer, 228 U. S. 652, 658 (1913).
Salinger, supra, at 230.  The Court reached the
same conclusion in at least two other cases
between Salinger and Brown.  See Waley v. Johnston,
316 U. S. 101, 105 (1942); Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S.
200, 214 (1950).  Darr and Spencer, like this case,
involved the initial federal habeas filings of
state prisoners.
  Fourth, Justice Thomas understates the cer-
tainty with which Brown v. Allen rejected a defer-
ential standard of review of issues of law.  Ante,
at 8-10.  The passages in which the Brown Court
stated that a district court should determine
whether the state adjudication had resulted in a
 satisfactory conclusion, and that the federal
courts had discretion to give some weight to
state court determinations, ante, at 8, were
passages in which the Court was discussing how
federal courts should resolve questions of fact,
not issues of law.  This becomes apparent from a
reading of the relevant section of Brown, 344
U. S., at 460-465, a section entitled  Right to a
Plenary Hearing.  When the Court then turned to
the primary legal question presented"whether the
Fourteenth Amendment permitted the restriction
of jury service to taxpayers"the Court answered
that question in the affirmative without any hint
of deference to the state courts.  Id., at 467-47-
4.  The proper standard of review of issues of law
was also discussed in Justice Frankfurter's
opinion, which a majority of the Court endorsed.
After recognizing that state court factfinding
need not always be repeated in federal court,
Justice Frankfurter turned to the quite different
question of determining the law.  He wrote:   Where
the ascertainment of the historical facts does
not dispose of the claim but calls for interpreta-
tion of the legal significance of such facts, the
District Judge must exercise his own judgment on
this blend of facts and their legal values.  Thus,
so-called mixed questions or the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found
leave the duty of adjudication with the federal
judge.  Id., at 507 (emphasis added; citation
omitted).  Justice Frankfurter concluded:  The
State court cannot have the last say when it,
though on fair consideration and what procedural-
ly may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived
a federal constitutional right.  Id., at 508.
  Fifth, Justice Thomas incorrectly states that
we have never considered the standard of review
to apply to mixed questions of law and fact raised
on federal habeas.  Ante, at 10.  On the contrary,
we did so in the very cases cited by Justice
Thomas.  In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), we
stated quite clearly that  `mixed questions or the
application of constitutional principles to the
facts as found leave the duty of adjudication with
the federal judge.'  It was, therefore, the duty of
the Court of Appeals to independently evaluate
[the issue of jury prejudice].  Id., at 723 (quot-
ing Brown v. Allen, supra, at 507 (opinion of Frank-
furter, J.).  We then proceeded to employ precisely
the same legal analysis as in cases on direct
appeal.  366 U. S., at 723-728.
  In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 318 (1963), we
again said that  [a]lthough the district judge may,
where the state court has reliably found the
relevant facts, defer to the state court's find-
ings of fact, he may not defer to its findings of
law.  It is the district judge's duty to apply the
applicable federal law to the state court fact
findings independently.
  In Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188 (1972), we ad-
dressed de novo the question whether the state
court pretrial identification procedures were
unconstititutionally suggestive by using the same
standard used in cases on direct appeal: ```a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.'''
Id., at 198 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390
U. S. 377, 384 (1968)).
  In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977), we
reviewed de novo a state court's finding that a
defendant had waived his right to counsel.  We held
that  the question of waiver was not a question
of historical fact, but one which, in the words of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, requires `application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found . . . .'
Id., at 403 (quoting Brown v. Allen, supra, at 507
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.)).  We then employed the
same legal analysis used on direct review.  430
U. S., at 404.
  In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980), we
explicitly considered the question whether the
Court of Appeals had exceeded the proper scope of
review of the state court's decision.  Id., at 341.
We concluded that because the issue presented
was not one of historical fact entitled to a
presumption of correctness under 28 U. S. C.
2254(d), the Court of Appeals was correct in
reconsidering the state court's  application of
legal principles to the historical facts of this
case.  Id., at 342.  Although we held that the
Court of Appeals had erred in stating the proper
legal principle, we remanded to have it consider
the case under the same legal principles as in
cases on direct review.  Id., at 345-350.
  In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984),
we held that  [t]he principles governing ineffec-
tiveness claims should apply in federal collateral
proceedings as they do on direct appeal or in
motions for a new trial. . . . [N]o special standards
ought to apply to ineffectiveness claims made in
habeas proceedings.  Id., at 697-698.  We distin-
guished state court determinations of mixed
questions of fact and law, to which federal courts
should not defer, from state court findings of
historical fact, to which federal courts should defer.
Id., at 698.
  Finally, in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 112
(1985), we recognized that  an unbroken line of
cases, coming to this Court both on direct appeal
and on review of applications to lower federal
courts for a writ of habeas corpus, forecloses
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the `volunt-
ariness' of a confession merits something less
than independent federal consideration.
  To this list of cases cited by Justice Thomas,
one could add the following, all of which applied a
standard of de novo review.  Leyra v. Denno, 347
U. S. 556, 558-561 (1954); United States ex rel.
Jennings v. Ragen, 358 U. S. 276, 277 (1959); Rogers
v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534, 546 (1961); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 339-345 (1963); Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 384-386 (1966); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 349-363 (1966); McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 766-774 (1970); Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 522-536 (1972); Lego v. Twomey,
404 U. S. 477, 482-490 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U. S. 471, 480-490 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U. S. 778, 781-791 (1973); Schneckloth v. Bustam-
onte, 412 U. S. 218, 222-249 (1973); Manson v. Brath-
waite, 432 U. S. 98, 109-117 (1977); Watkins v. Sowde-
rs, 449 U. S. 341, 345-349 (1981); Jones v. Barnes,
463 U. S. 745, 750-754 (1983); Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U. S. 420, 435-442 (1984); Moran v. Burbine, 475
U. S. 412, 420-434 (1986); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477
U. S. 365, 383-387 (1986); Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U. S. 356, 360-365 (1988); Duckworth v. Eagan,
492 U. S. 195, 201-205 (1989); Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U. S. ___ (1991) (slip op., at 5-6).  There have
been many others.
  Sixth, Justice Thomas misdescribes Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979).  Ante, at 11-12.  In
Jackson, the respondents proposed a deferential
standard of review, very much like the one Jus-
tice Thomas discusses today, that they thought
appropriate for addressing constitutional claims
of insufficient evidence.  443 U. S., at 323.  We
expressly rejected this proposal.  Ibid.  Instead,
we adhered to the general rule of de novo review
of constitutional claims on habeas.  Id., at 324.
  Seventh, Justice Thomas mischaracterizes
Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), and Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989), as  question[ing]
th[e] standard [of de novo review] with respect to
pure legal questions.  Ante, at 12.  Teague did not
establish a  deferential standard of review of
state court determinations of federal law.  It did
not establish a standard of review at all.  In-
stead, Teague simply requires that a state con-
viction on federal habeas be judged according to
the law in existence when the conviction became
final.  Penry, supra, at 314; Teague, supra, at 301.
In Teague, we refused to give state prisoners the
retroactive benefit of new rules of law, but we did
not create any deferential standard of review
with regard to old rules.
  To determine what counts as a new rule, Teague
requires courts to ask whether the rule a habeas
petitioner seeks can be meaningfully distin-
guished from that established by binding prece-
dent at the time his state court conviction
became final.  Cf. Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S.
667, 695 (1963) (inquiry is  to determine whether
a particular decision has really announced a `new'
rule at all or whether it has simply applied a well-
established constitutional principle to govern a
case which is closely analogous to those which have
been previously considered in the prior case law)
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and
dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks
omitted, emphasis added).  Even though we have
characterized the new rule inquiry as whether
 reasonable jurists could disagree as to wheth-
er a result is dictated by precedent, see Sawyer
v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 234 (1990), the standard for
determining when a case establishes a new rule is
 objective, and the mere existence of conflicting
authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new.
Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op.,
at 14).  If a proffered factual distinction between
the case under consideration and pre-existing
precedent does not change the force with which
the precedent's underlying principle applies, the
distinction is not meaningful, and any deviation
from precedent is not reasonable.
  So, while Justice Thomas says that we  defer
to state courts' determinations of federal law,
the statement is misleading.  Although in practice,
it may seem only  a matter of phrasing whether
one calls the Teague inquiry a standard of review
or not,  phrasing mirrors thought, [and] it is
important that the phrasing not obscure the true
issue before a federal court.  Brown v. Allen, 344
U. S., at 501 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).  As Jus-
tice Kennedy convincingly demonstrates, the duty
of the federal court in evaluating whether a rule
is  new is not the same as deference; federal
courts must make an independent evaluation of the
precedent existing at the time the state convic-
tion became final in order to determine whether
the case under consideration is meaningfully
distinguishable.  Teague does not direct federal
courts to spend less time or effort scrutinizing
the existing federal law, on the ground that they
can assume the state courts interpreted it
properly.
  Eighth, though Justice Thomas suggests other-
wise, ante, at 14, de novo review is not incompati-
ble with the maxim that federal courts should
 give great weight to the considered conclusions
of a coequal state judiciary, Miller v. Fenton,
supra, at 112, just as they do to persuasive, well-
reasoned authority from district or circuit
courts in other jurisdictions.  A state court
opinion concerning the legal implications of
precisely the same set of facts is the closest one
can get to a  case on point, and is especially
valuable for that reason.  But this does not mean
that we have held in the past that federal courts
must presume the correctness of a state court's
legal conclusions on habeas, or that a state
court's incorrect legal determination has ever
been allowed to stand because it was reasonable.
We have always held that federal courts, even on
habeas, have an independent obligation to say
what the law is.
  Finally, in his one-sentence summary of respon-
dent's arguments, ante, at 16, Justice Thomas
fails to mention that Congress has considered
habeas corpus legislation during 27 of the past
37 years, and on 13 occasions has considered
adopting a deferential standard of review along
the lines suggested by Justice Thomas.  Congress
has rejected each proposal.  In light of the case
law and Congress' position, a move away from de
novo review of mixed questions of law and fact
would be a substantial change in our construction
of the authority conferred by the habeas corpus
statute.  As Justice Thomas acknowledges, to
change the standard of review would indeed be
 far-reaching, ante, at 16, and we need not decide
whether to do so in order to resolve this case.



Concur 3
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
             No. 91-542
              --------
ELLIS B. WRIGHT, Jr., WARDEN and MARY SUE TERRY,
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, PETITIONERS v.
            FRANK ROBERT WEST, Jr.
  on writ of certiorari to the united states
    court of appeals for the fourth circuit
                [June 19, 1992]

  Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment.
  While I could not disagree with the majority that
sufficient evidence supported West's conviction,
ante, at 12-14, I do not think the Court should
reach that issue.  We have often said that when
the principles first developed in Teague v. Lane,
489 U. S. 288 (1989), pose a threshold question on
federal habeas review, it is only after an answer
favorable to the prisoner that a court should
address the merits.  See, e.g., Collins v. Youngblo-
od, 497 U. S. 37, 40-41 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U. S. 302, 313, 329 (1989); Teague, supra, at 300
(plurality).  This habeas case begins with a Teague
question, and its answer does not favor West.  I
would go no further.
                        I
  Under cases in the line of Teague v. Lane, supra,
with two narrow exceptions not here relevant,
federal courts conducting collateral review may
not announce or apply a  new rule for a state
prisoner's benefit, Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S.
407, 412 (1990); Teague, supra, at 310 (plurality), a
new rule being one that was  not `dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final,' Sawyer v. Smith, 497
U. S. 227, 234 (1990) (quoting Teague, supra, at 301
(plurality)) (emphasis in original).  Put differently,
the new-rule enquiry asks  whether a state court
considering [the prisoner's] claim at the time his
conviction became final would have felt compelled
by existing precedent to conclude that the rule
[the prisoner] seeks was required by the Consti-
tution.  Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 488 (1990).
Or, put differently yet again, if  reasonable
jurists [might have] disagree[d] about the steps
the law would take next, its later development will
not be grounds for relief.  Sawyer v. Smith, supra,
at 234; see also Butler, supra, at 415 ( suscepti-
ble to debate among reasonable minds).
  The Teague line of cases reflects recognition of
important  interests of comity and finality.
Teague, supra, at 308 (plurality).  One purpose of
federal collateral review of judgments rendered
by state courts in criminal cases is to create an
incentive for state courts to `````conduct their
proceedings in a manner consistent with estab-
lished constitutional standards,''''' Butler, supra,
at 413 (quoting Teague, supra, at 306 (plurality)),
and  [t]he `new rule' principle recognizes that
purpose by  validat[ing] reasonable, good-faith
interpretations of existing precedents made by
state courts even though they are shown to be
contrary to later decisions.  Butler, supra, at
414 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897,
918-919 (1984)).
  The crux of the analysis when Teague is invoked,
then, is identification of the rule on which the
claim for habeas relief depends.  To survive
Teague, it must be  old enough to have predated
the finality of the prisoner's conviction, and
specific enough to dictate the rule on which the
conviction may be held to be unlawful.  A rule old
enough for Teague may of course be too general,
and while identifying the required age of the rule
of relief is a simple matter of comparing dates,
passing on its requisite specificity calls for
analytical care.
  The proper response to a prisoner's invocation
of a rule at too high a level of generality is well
illustrated by our cases.  In Butler, supra, for
example, the prisoner relied on the rule of Arizona
v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675 (1988), which we an-
nounced after Butler's conviction had become
final.  We held in Roberson that the Fifth Amend-
ment forbids police interrogation about a crime
after the suspect requests counsel, even if his
request occurs in the course of investigating a
different, unrelated crime.  Id., at 682.  Butler
argued that he could invoke Roberson's rule
because it was  merely an application of Edwards
[v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981)],'' in which we held
that, if a person is in custody on suspicion of a
crime, the police must stop questioning him about
that crime once he invokes his right to counsel,
id., at 484-485, ``to a slightly different set of
facts.  494 U. S., at 414.  We rejected this argu-
ment, saying that it  would not have been an
illogical or even a grudging application of Edwards
to decide that it did not extend to the facts of
Roberson.  Id., at 415.
     Likewise, in Sawyer, supra, the petitioner sought
the benefit of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S.
320 (1985), which had been announced after Sawye-
r's conviction was final.  We held in Caldwell that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits resting  a death
sentence on a determination made by a sentencer
who has been led to believe that the responsibili-
ty for determining the appropriateness of the
defendant's death rests elsewhere.  Id., at
328-329.  Sawyer argued that he was entitled to
the benefit of Caldwell's rule as having been
 dictated by the principle of reliability in capital
sentencing, Sawyer, 497 U. S., at 236, which, he
said, had been established by cases announced
before his conviction became final, Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982), and Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U. S. 586 (1978), among them.  We rejected the
argument, saying that
``the [Teague] test would be meaningless if
applied at this level of generality.  Cf. Ander-
son v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 639 (1987) (`[I]f
the test of ``clearly established law'' were to
be applied at this level of generality, . . .
[p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule
of qualified immunity that our cases plainly
establish into a rule of virtually unqualified
liability simply by alleging violation of ex-
tremely abstract rights').''  497 U. S., at 236
(internal-quotation brackets in original).
Although the principle that Sawyer invoked cer-
tainly  lent general support to the conclusion
reached in Caldwell, id., at 236, we said that ```it
does not follow that [Eddings and Lockett] compel
the rule that [petitioner] seeks,''' ibid. (second
set of brackets in original) (quoting Saffle, supra,
at 491).
  In sum, our cases have recognized that  [t]he
interests in finality, predictability, and comity
underlying our new rule jurisprudence may be
undermined to an equal degree by the invocation
of a rule that was not dictated by precedent as by
the application of an old rule in a manner that was
not dictated by precedent.  Stringer v. Black, 503
U. S. ____, ____ (1992) (slip op., at 4).  This does
not mean, of course, that a habeas petitioner
must be able to point to an old case decided on
facts identical to the facts of his own.  But it
does mean that, in light of authority extant when
his conviction became final, its unlawfulness must
be apparent.  Cf. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S.
635, 640 (1987).
                      II
  In this case, the Court of Appeals overruled the
Commonwealth's Teague objection by saying that
West merely claimed that the evidence had been
insufficient to support his conviction, so that
the result he sought was dictated by Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), a case announced
before petitioner's conviction became final for
Teague purposes in 1980.  931 F. 2d 262, 265-267
(CA4 1991).  Having thus surmounted Teague's time
hurdle, the court went on to say that  the evi-
dence here consisted entirely . . . of the . . . facts
. . . that about one-third in value of goods stolen
between December 13 and December 26, 1978, were
found on January 10, 1979, in the exclusive pos-
session of . . . West, coupled with [West's] own
testimony explaining his possession as having
come about by purchases in the interval.  Id., at
268.  Applied in this context, the court held, the
unadorned Jackson norm translated into the more
specific rule announced in Cosby v. Jones, 682 F.
2d 1373 (CA11 1982), which held that the evidence of
unexplained or unconvincingly explained posses-
sion of recently stolen goods was not, without
more, sufficient to prove theft, but must be
weighed more exactly after asking five questions:
(1) Was  the possession . . . recent, relative to the
crime?  (2) Was a large majority of the stolen
items found in the defendant's possession?  (3) Did
the defendant attempt to conceal the stolen
items?  (4) Was the defendant's explanation,  even
if discredited by the jury, . . . `so implausible or
demonstrably false as to give rise to positive
evidence in favor of the government'? and (5) Was
there corroborating evidence supporting the
conviction?  931 F. 2d, at 268 (quoting Cosby,
supra, at 1383, n. 19).
  Applying Cosby to the facts of this case, the
Court of Appeals found that all five factors were
either neutral or advantageous to West:  (1) Two
to four weeks elapsed between theft and the
possession described in testimony, a time
period consistent with West's explanation that he
had bought the goods in the interval; (2) measured
by value, a mere third of Cardova's belongings
surfaced in West's possession; (3) the stolen
items were found in plain view in West's home; (4)
while  there was no third person testimony cor-
roborating [West's] explanation and on cross-
examination West exhibited confusion about the
exact circumstances of some of the purchases[,]
. . . he maintained his general explanation that he
had purchased all the items at flea markets, and
there was nothing inherently implausible about
this explanation . . . ; and, finally, (5) there was
no evidence corroborating theft by West.  931
F.2d, at 269-270.  The Court of Appeals concluded
that  the evidence here, assessed in its entirety
and in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion, was not sufficient to persuade any rational
trier of fact of [West's] guilt . . . .  Id., at 270.
  It is clear that the Court of Appeals misapplied
the commands of Teague by defining the rule from
which West sought to benefit at an unduly elevat-
ed level of generality.  There can of course be no
doubt that, in reviewing West's conviction, the
Supreme Court of Virginia was not entitled to
disregard Jackson, which antedated the finality of
West's conviction.  But from Jackson's rule, that
sufficiency depends on whether a rational trier,
viewing the evidence most favorably to the prose-
cution, could find all elements beyond a reason-
able doubt, it does not follow that the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence to support West's convic-
tion was apparent.  Virginia courts have long
recognized a rule that evidence of unexplained or
falsely explained possession of recently stolen
goods is sufficient to sustain a finding that the
possessor took the goods.  See, e.g., Montgomery v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 188, 190, 269 S. E. 2d 352, 353
(1980); Henderson v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 811,
812-813, 213 S. E. 2d 782, 783-784 (1975); Bazemore
v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 351, 352, 170 S. E. 2d 774,
776 (1969); Bright v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 248,
251, 356 S. E. 2d 443, 444 (1987).  In this case, we
are concerned only with the Virginia rule's second
prong.  West took the stand and gave an explana-
tion that the jury rejected, thereby implying a
finding that the explanation was false.  Thus,
the portion of the state rule under attack here is
that falsely explained recent possession suffices
to identify the possessor as the thief.  The rule
has the virtue of much common sense.  It is utter-
ly reasonable to conclude that a possessor of
recently stolen goods who lies about where he got
them is the thief who took them, and it should come
as no surprise that the rule had been accepted as
good law against the backdrop of a general state
sufficiency standard no less stringent than that
of Jackson.  See, e.g., Bishop v. Commonwealth, 227
Va. 164, 169, 313 S. E. 2d 390, 393 (1984); Inge v.
Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S. E. 2d 563,
568 (1976).  It is simply insupportable, then, to
say that reasonable jurists could not have
considered this rule compatible with the Jackson
standard.  There can be no doubt, therefore, that
in the federal courts West sought the benefit of
a  new rule, and that his claim was barred by
Teague.
  On this ground, I respectfully concur in the
judgment of the Court.



Concur 4
      SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
             No. 91-542
              --------
ELLIS B. WRIGHT, Jr., WARDEN and MARY SUE TERRY,
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, PETITIONERS v.
            FRANK ROBERT WEST, Jr.
  on writ of certiorari to the united states
    court of appeals for the fourth circuit
                [June 19, 1992]

     Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment.
  I do not enter the debate about the reasons
that took us to the point where mixed constitu-
tional questions are subject to de novo review in
federal habeas corpus proceedings.  Whatever the
answer to that difficult historical inquiry, all
agree that, at least prior to the Court's adoption
of the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane,
489 U. S. 288 (1989), see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S.
302, 313-314 (1989), the matter was settled.  It
seems that the real issue dividing my colleagues
is whether the retroactivity analysis of Teague
casts doubt upon the rule of Miller v. Fenton, 474
U. S. 104, 112 (1985).  Even petitioner the State of
Virginia and the United States as amicus curiae,
both seeking a deferential standard with respect
to mixed questions, recognize that this is how the
standard of review question arises.  See Brief for
Petitioners 11 ( The notion that a state prisoner
has a right to de novo federal collateral review of
his constitutional claims . . . surely has not
survived this Court's decisions in Teague and its
progeny); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
12 ( Prior to the rule established by Teague [and
later cases applying Teague], this Court often
treated mixed questions of law and fact as sub-
ject to independent review in federal habeas
corpus).
  If vindication of the principles underlying
Teague did require that state court rulings on
mixed questions must be given deference in a
federal habeas proceeding, then indeed it might be
said that the Teague line of cases is on a colli-
sion course with the Miller v. Fenton line.  And in
the proper case we would have to select one at
the expense of the other.  But in my view neither
the purpose for which Teague was adopted nor the
necessary means for implementing its holding
creates any real conflict with the requirement of
de novo review of mixed questions.
    In my view, it would be a misreading of Teague to
interpret it as resting on the necessity to defer
to state court determinations.  Teague did not
establish a deferential standard of review of
state court decisions of federal law.  It estab-
lished instead a principle of retroactivity.  See
Teague v. Lane, supra, at 310 ( we now adopt Jus-
tice Harlan's view of retroactivity for cases on
collateral review).  To be sure, the fact that our
standard for distinguishing old rules from new
ones turns on the reasonableness of a state
court's interpretation of then existing prece-
dents suggests that federal courts do in one
sense defer to state court determinations.  But
we should not lose sight of the purpose of the
reasonableness inquiry where a Teague issue is
raised: the purpose is to determine whether
application of a new rule would upset a conviction
that was obtained in accordance with the consti-
tutional interpretations existing at the time of
the prisoner's conviction.
  As we explained earlier this Term:
      When a petitioner seeks federal habeas
relief based upon a principle announced after
a final judgment, Teague and our subsequent
decisions interpreting it require a federal
court to answer an initial question, and in
some cases a second.  First, it must be deter-
mined whether the decision relied upon an-
nounced a new rule.  If the answer is yes and
neither exception applies, the decision is not
available to the petitioner.  If, however, the
decision did not announce a new rule, it is
necessary to inquire whether granting the
relief sought would create a new rule because
the prior decision is applied in a novel set-
ting, thereby extending the precedent.  The
interests in finality, predictability, and
comity underlying our new rule jurisprudence
may be undermined to an equal degree by the
invocation of a rule that was not dictated by
precedent as by the application of an old rule
in a manner that was not dictated by prece-
dent.  Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S. --- (1992)
(slip op., at 4) (citation omitted).

The comity interest is not, however, in saying
that since the question is close the state court
decision ought to be deemed correct because we
are in no better position to judge.  That would be
the real thrust of a principle based on deference.
We see that principle at work in the statutory
requirement that, except in limited circumstances,
the federal habeas court must presume the cor-
rectness of state court factual findings.  See 28
U. S. C. 2254(d).  See also Rushen v. Spain, 464
U. S. 114, 120 (1983) (per curiam) (noting that  the
state courts were in a far better position than
the federal courts to answer a factual question).
Deference of this kind may be termed a comity
interest, but it is not the comity interest that
underlies Teague.  The comity interest served by
Teague is in not subjecting the States to a regime
in which finality is undermined by our changing a
rule once thought correct but now understood to
be deficient on its own terms.  It is in recognition
of this principle that we ask whether the decision
in question was dictated by precedent.  See, e.g.,
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 488 (1990).
  Teague does bear on applications of law to fact
which result in the announcement of a new rule.
Whether the prisoner seeks the application of an
old rule in a novel setting, see Stringer, supra, at
--- (slip op., at 4), depends in large part on the
nature of the rule.  If the rule in question is one
which of necessity requires a case-by-case
examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate
a number of specific applications without saying
that those applications themselves create a new
rule.  The rule of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307
(1979), is an example.  By its very terms it pro-
vides a general standard which calls for some
examination of the facts.  The standard is whether
any rational trier of fact could have found guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt after a review of all
the evidence, so of course there will be varia-
tions from case to case.  Where the beginning
point is a rule of this general application, a rule
designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a
myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infre-
quent case that yields a result so novel that it
forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent.
  Although as a general matter  new rules will not
be applied or announced in habeas proceedings,
Penry, 492 U. S., at 313, there is no requirement
that we engage in the threshold Teague inquiry in
a case in which it is clear that the prisoner would
not be entitled to the relief he seeks even if his
case were pending on direct review.  See Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37 (1990).  Therefore, it is
not necessary to the resolution of this case to
consider the oddity that reversing respondent's
conviction because of the quite fact-specific
determination that there was insufficient evi-
dence would have the arguable effect of under-
cutting the well-established general principle in
Virginia and elsewhere that the trier of fact may
infer theft from unexplained or falsely denied
possession of recently stolen goods.  Whether a
holding that there was insufficient evidence would
constitute one of those unusual cases in which an
application of Jackson would create a new rule
need not be addressed.
  On these premises, the existence of Teague
provides added justification for retaining de novo
review, not a reason to abandon it.  Teague gives
substantial assurance that habeas proceedings
will not use a new rule to upset a state convic-
tion that conformed to rules then existing.  With
this safeguard in place, recognizing the impor-
tance of finality, de novo review can be exercised
within its proper sphere.
  For the foregoing reasons, I would not interpret
Teague as calling into question the settled prin-
ciple that mixed questions are subject to plenary
review on federal habeas corpus.  And, for the
reasons I have mentioned, I do not think it neces-
sary to consider whether the respondent brings
one of those unusual Jackson claims which is
Teague-barred.
  I agree that the evidence in this case was
sufficient to convince a rational factfinder of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and I concur in
the judgment of the Court.
